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Abstract 
Peacekeeping organizations have recently begun to critically evaluate their operations 
concerning the effects their activities have on the local community in post-conflict 
environments. There is now an increased recognition that local-level, or day-to-day, activities 
play a much more significant role in post-conflict stabilization than once attributed and that 
they affect policy goals more directly than previously thought. Yet, a systematic study of the 
effects of military bases in post-conflict environments is absent. 
 
This research begins to fill this gap concerning military bases established in post-conflict 
environments. It uses process tracing through within case study comparison and livelihoods-
focused political economy analysis of the Republic of Kosovo to address several questions: what 
are the impacts of the base construction activities; what are the effects of the day-to-day 
sustainment activities, and what are the effects of the continued presence of the base on 
relations between military and local elites. Noting the economic gains of shadow economies by 
war-time elites often translates into political power in a post-war environment, elites’ relations 
with the military base may assure their dominance through control of access to high-paying 
base employment and profitable business relationships. Thus, the everyday practices of 
establishing and maintaining military bases in post-conflict environments, which directly affect 
the political, social and economic components of the local political economy, may permanently 
affect stability and development.  
 
Field research of these questions finds substantial variance between bases, which have roots in 
the procedures of the lead contributing nation. Overall, political effects are limited, while social 
and economic effects are mixed. Given the size, characteristics and enduring presence of 
military bases in peace operations, it is therefore necessary to look beyond size of the base, and 
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interrogate more closely the specific practices, rules and regulations that they follow to identify 
their effects on the local political economy and implications for sustainable peacebuilding. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction to the Thesis  
1.0   Introduction  
Particularly since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, a period where competing Super 
powers had both suppressed and encouraged localized grievances, there has been a substantial 
increase in intra-state conflicts and a corresponding increase in peace operations to address 
them. Peace operations, a suite of activities to dispel violence and create the conditions for 
lasting peace (United Nations, 2017), have historically been deployed to monitor and patrol 
ceasefires, and create spaces for lasting diplomatic or political solutions to conflict. More 
recently, however, peace operations have been deployed to protect civilian populations from 
protracted armed violence, and to actively build peace and shape post-conflict settlements. In 
these contemporary cases, tens of thousands of peacekeepers and humanitarian actors may 
arrive to establish their offices and begin working in a conflict, or newly post-conflict 
environment.  
Peacekeeping and humanitarian organizations have recently begun to critically evaluate their 
operations and the effects they have on the local community. There is now an increased 
recognition that their day-to-day activities play a much more significant role in post-conflict 
stabilization than once attributed, and that they affect peace operation goals more directly. Yet, 
a comparable study of the effects of military bases in this environment is absent. As the 
frequency of environments where military forces and humanitarian actors share space 
increases, persistent failure to understand the influence of the everyday activities of military 
bases on the local political economy invites less-than-optimum outcomes. This research begins 
to fill the gap in knowledge concerning military bases established in a post-conflict 
environment, and contributes to international relations theory by identifying the political, social 
and economic influences of the military base on the local political economy and their wider 
implications for peacebuilding.  
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1.1 Background of the Problem  
Military bases have been a feature of the human landscape for millennia. Once simple walls for 
protection from predators, fortifications became indicators of wealth, social hierarchy and 
identity (Bradley, 2001; Fletcher, 1996). Settlements that bordered such fortifications often 
politically and economically benefited from their proximity, even as they ‘paid’ for their physical 
security through financial and military obligations (Bar-Yosef, 2001; Hammond & Barton, 1972). 
Yet, fortifications were also symbols of offense, and for some, defeat and humiliation. Military 
bases, as they are now known, ultimately possess significant coercive power over their 
communities. Hence, for those with whom the base aligns, there is the appearance of its tacit 
support. Particularly in a post-conflict environment, this appearance of support may 
inadvertently entrench actors with destabilizing agendas, reinforce pre-conflict activities, foster 
resentment and contribute to the return to violence.  
 
Peace operations are fundamentally based on the concepts of the liberal peace and the 
normative ideals of democracy, particularly a common trust in resolving differences without 
violence; respect for political transparency and collective recognition of the benefits of 
economic interdependence (Doyle, 2004; Mitchell, 2009). These, according to Owen, tend to 
result in a positive, “self-fulfilling prophecy of peace” (Owen, 1994:92). Democratization, 
therefore, is typically integrated into post-conflict reconstruction programs (Chandler, 2013; 
Paris, 2004), despite its’ often destabilizing effects upon implementation (Doyle & Sambanis, 
2006; Fortna, 2008; Sen, 1999), and its tendency to produce political, social and economic 
losers that did not exist before (Duffield, 2011; Grzymala‐Busse & Jones Luong, 2008; Höglund, 
2008). Particularly in ‘humanitarian interventions,’ the intervenors generally overturn existing 
governments and marginalize the values, norms and customs of that state (Chandler, 2004; 
Kartas, 2007). Moreover, the new ‘winners’ may act to exploit and consolidate power, leading 
to renewed conflict (Braumoeller, 1997; Darby & MacGinty, 2008). It is in this early 
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environment that military forces will establish their bases, too new to grasp the ways their 
activities and early relations may contribute to the longer term political and economic dynamics 
and relationships.  
While military forces possess significant coercive authority, they are also highly constrained by 
negotiated Rules of Engagement (ROE) and national caveats including an admonition to remain 
politically neutral (Guéhenno, 2008: Münch, 2013). Hence, military forces deployed in peace 
operations tend to become risk averse and avoid unnecessary interaction with the community 
(Duffield, 2011). They concentrate their efforts instead to maintain a sterile military-security 
‘safe and secure environment’ (Blair & Fitz-Gerald, 2009; Mockaitis, 2004; Woodward, 2002) 
but in so doing, limit opportunities to leverage their presence for positive influence in the 
community.  
 
With the increasing number of intra-state conflicts, there has been a determined effort to 
identify their causes and drivers. Conflicts, especially in weak states, can be a rational economic 
activity (Addison & Murshed, 2002; Berdal & Malone, 2000; Cramer, 2006; Justino, 2008; Keen, 
1998), which ultimately establishes a war-based economy where a few powerful actors may 
profit from the influx of humanitarian and reconstruction aid (Ballentine, 2005; Cater, 2002; 
Doyle, 2006; Münch, 2013). This economy produces powerful actors, often warlords and local 
elites, who are able to translate economic gain into political power and take advantage of the 
absence of a capable government (Grzymala‐Busse & Jones Luong, 2008; Torjesen, 2013; 
Narten, 2009; Zaum & Cheng, 2008). It is these actors, or those who are affiliated with them, 
that the military forces are most likely to first encounter in the establishment of their bases. As 
a result, these relationships are likely to shape the wider political economy as they are 
legitimized and their practices become permanent, thereby undermining military effectiveness 
and peace operations. 
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Academics and international organizations have begun to critically study the effects 
peacekeepers have on the local population in a post conflict environment (Autesserre, 2014; 
Carnahan, 2004; Colletta, et. al., 2008; Duffield, 2011; Paffenholz, 2015; Sciarra; 2008). Chief 
among the findings are food, housing and fuel shortages and the emergence of a balloon 
economy, which places costs for basic goods well above the means of the local population 
(Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Durch, 2004); and, the introduction of human trafficking 
and prostitution (Enloe, 2000; Stern, 2015). These findings have led to calls for stronger Codes 
of Conduct, greater accountability and a closer examination of the organizational political, 
social and economic activities influencing the community.  
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem and Significance of the Study 
A comparable examination of the practices of military bases, however, is nearly absent 
(Anderson, et. al., 2014; Marley, 2016). Instead, attention tends to focus on the effects of base 
closings (Cowan, 2012; Dardia, et al., 1996; Lynch, 1970; Sharp, 1990); in military involvement in 
humanitarian aid, particularly its unintended co-option (LeRiche, 2004, Münch, 2012; Rana, 
2008) and gender-based exploitation and violence (Enloe, 2000; Colas & Peyroux, 2016; Haynes, 
2010; Higate & Henry, 2004; Martin, 2005). While important for both stability and human 
rights, their emphasis overlooks the effects of the more ubiquitous daily practices of base 
employment and local purchasing on the community, which appear to have a more significant 
role in post-conflict stabilization than once understood (Collinson, 2003; Dobbins, 2013; Hudson 
& Leftwich; 2014; Vervoer & Junes, 2012). This research concerning the effects of military bases 
on the political economy of their communities begins to fill this gap in knowledge; it contributes 
to post conflict literature, International Relations theory, and provides additional insight to 
policy makers, military organizations and practitioners in the field. 
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1.3 Research Question and Design 
This research asks, “How do the everyday practices of military bases established in post-conflict 
environments affect the local political economy and what are the implications for 
peacebuilding.”  
 To do this, the research is structured around three principal concepts: first, the base as a 
primary employer and consumer of goods and services; second, the base as a catalyst for 
secondary economic benefits and effects, and third, the base as political agent in the local 
community, where community leaders and elites may leverage their relationship (Cheng, 2013) 
with the military to further local political and economic agendas contrary to peace operations. 
  
The research design is a within case study comparison, and primarily uses a Political Economy 
Analysis (PEA) livelihoods approach, specifically because this PEA approach is oriented “to the 
meso and local level … grounded in the people’s own perspectives, and how the totality of the 
economic, political, social and cultural factors affects people’s lives” (Collinson, 2003:4). This 
approach is also widely used by governmental and non-governmental organizations to 
understand the acquisition and distribution of power and identify the interrelationship between 
war-time coping and subsequent shadow economies. Case studies likewise facilitate 
understanding of the interrelationship of environmental and social systems, and thus highlight 
causal relationships and how they transform over time. This approach to PEA, coupled with case 
studies’ ‘thick description’ (Yin, 2015) will best illustrate the ways military bases may influence 
interests, incentives and constraints at the local level which have consequent effect on 
peacebuilding programs and initiatives.  
 
The Republic of Kosovo was selected as the case study because it offers three useful 
characteristics: it contains a substantial military presence that has been active in the community 
for over ten years; it has operated under a long trusteeship, which tends to limit actors at both 
24 
 
the local and federal level, and Kosovo continues to receive a high level of technical and 
economic assistance from the international community, which operates independently of the 
military but shares the same geographical area. These provide controls and limit the effects of 
exogenous factors while examining the three Kosovo municipalities selected for comparison. 
This period also allows sufficient passage of time to examine the political, social and economic 
changes occurring since the arrival of military forces, and to observe its evolving political 
economy.  
 
1.4 Summary and Thesis Structure  
By their nature, military forces always represent ‘a side taken,’ and therefore bring a political-
power component to their relationship with the local community. Their alliance with 
opportunists and malign actors therefore, may unintentionally reinforce pre-conflict 
inequalities and foster the advancement of their ability to control present and future economic 
and social resources, (Doyle, 2006; Grzymala‐Busse & Jones Luong, 2008; Sowell, 1981; Zaum & 
Knaus, 2013), and directly contribute to renewed conflict. Therefore, this research concerning 
the effects of the everyday practices of military bases established in a post-conflict environment 
on the local political economy begins to fill this wide gap in knowledge. It contributes to post 
conflict literature, and International Relations theory and provides additional insight to 
peacebuilding policy makers, humanitarian and military organizations, and practitioners in the 
field. 
This thesis is comprised of 11 chapters, structured into three foundational themes: Historical 
context; military bases in post-conflict peace operations, and case studies. Chapters 1 and 2 
introduce the thesis and the gap in the literature; Chapter 3 presents the research hypotheses 
and an innovative framework which examines key post-conflict political, social and economic 
factors pertinent to base communities to evaluate the intervening forces’ influence on the 
25 
 
community. Subsequent chapters provide historical context, research findings and analysis, and 
the thesis conclusion.  The individual chapters are described below: 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis, including its aims, the significance of the study and the 
contribution to the fields of post-conflict studies and International Relations theory. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature relating to the central concepts, perceptions and 
outcomes of contemporary peace operations. It closely examines the political economy of 
conflict environments, and the peacekeeper activities to establish bases that have had harmful 
unintended outcomes in post-conflict environments, including the purchase of local goods and 
services, local employment on the base, and community relations. It also explores recent 
peacekeeper’s lessons-learned and practices to mitigate these unintended outcomes. The 
chapter examines preconceptions of military bases held by many humanitarian organizations 
and the divergent perspectives held by military organizations. This chapter also surveys the 
primary characteristics of present-day military bases and assessments of Kosovo’s post-conflict 
human and physical environment, noting a near absence of post conflict academic literature 
focused upon the meso- and micro levels. It concludes with observations concerning this gap in 
literature regarding the effects of the day-to-day practices of military bases on the local 
community and on wider peace operations literature.  
 
Chapter 3 describes the methods and strategy used for this research, primarily a within-case 
study, that takes a livelihoods approach to political economy analysis. The thesis further 
employs three hypotheses based upon an innovative framework, assessing the hypothesis 
according to the key political, social and economic post-conflict factors in order to identify and 
gauge the influences of the military base. In addition, the chapter addresses the limitations to 
the cases’ generalizability conceding Kosovo is a single NATO intervention in a unique post-
conflict environment. It concludes with a discussion of research ethics, and this researcher’s 
unique positionality. 
 
Chapter 4 provides background of the political and economic history of the former Republic  
of Yugoslavia and its province of Kosovo. It demonstrates both the systemic discrimination of 
Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo, and the extreme development gap of the Province compared to 
other parts of Yugoslavia; and how the declining economic fortunes of the Yugoslav republics in 
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the 1980s and early 1990s exacerbated ethnic and nationalistic tendencies, leading to the 
breakup of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo War. 
 
Chapter 5 contains an assessment of Kosovo’s growing informal economy, its support for 
Kosovo      
 Albanians, and for the Kosovo parallel government prior to the Kosovo War in 1999. It also 
describes both typical and contentious military base practices and operations in the post-
conflict environment. 
 
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 are individual case studies: The Municipality of Ferizaj (Chapter 6) and 
Prizren (Chapter 7), both of which contain a military base, and the Municipality of Gjakova 
(Chapter 8) which does not contain a base. 
 
Chapter 9 presents an analysis of the hypothesized and resultant political, social and economic 
effects of military bases revealed in the individual community case studies, finding the 
hypothesized effects on the community by the bases to be much less significant than 
anticipated, particularly the limited relations between the military base and community elites. 
The analysis demonstrates the necessity for a closer inspection of the activities and range of 
possible unintended political influences of the military Liaison Monitoring Teams, and a robust 
need to determine whether the community-based Teams act as proxies for military leaders.  
 
Chapter 10 provides a focused examination of the military Liaison Monitoring Teams. Unique to 
Kosovo, these small teams of unarmed military personnel act as the ‘eyes and ears’ for the 
military commander and directly extend the reach of the military base. Unthreatening and 
community oriented, LMTS have become trusted bridges between the military base, the local 
government and community at large, but may also interfere with the communities’ 
development and ownership of culturally-based conflict resolving solutions when they endure 
indefinitely. 
 
Chapter 11 provides the thesis conclusion, the contribution to the literature, and 
recommendations for additional research. The thesis finds the three hypotheses representing 
the political, social and economic influence of the military bases are not well supported; rather, 
the military bases have a very limited effect on their community.  
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In addition to these conclusions, the significant contribution of this thesis is an innovative 
framework that provides a means to examine the effects of the bases that are established by 
intervening forces in a post-conflict environment through the assessment of political, social and 
economic influences, and comparison with key post conflict livelihood factors.  
 
Lastly, this research provides a foundation for three areas of further study: investigation of the 
culture of humanitarian and military organizations while on mission; the ‘gender effects’ on 
both the individual and community as a result of women who had been employed on base, and 
an assessment of the political and social influences of unarmed teams, such as the Liaison 
Monitoring Teams and UN Observer teams operating in other post-conflict mission 
environments.   
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review  
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the literature surrounding the central concepts, perceptions and 
outcomes relevant to the establishment of military bases in the contemporary post-conflict 
environment. It is divided into five main themes that create a framework with which to view the 
basis of peace operations. They are examined and discussed individually to promote a deeper 
understanding of their effects: 1) concepts of liberal peace and intervention; 2) military forces 
in peace operations; 3) political economy of conflict; 4) peacekeepers’ impact on the local 
political economy and lessons learned, and 5) an overview of military bases and their 
communities.  
 
A consideration of the theoretical ideals of liberal peace are presented first, providing 
background for the emergence of the ‘responsibility to intervene’ and how the military forces 
and their base interacts with concurrent humanitarian space. It then considers literature 
concerning drivers of conflict and the post-conflict political economy, noting the lessons learned 
by many international organizations, particularly relating to long-term effects on the local 
community. The establishment of military bases is then introduced, including studies of base 
closures, its adjacent community and the Republic of Kosovo, which expand understanding of 
the relationships between military bases and their communities.  
The grey literature concerning the impact of international organizations and military 
peacekeepers on the community is largely published from 1995 forward, mirroring the sharp 
rise in peacekeeping operations in response to the internal conflicts that followed the end of 
the Cold War, providing additional insight concerning the day to day practices of military bases, 
and provide a basis from which to examine the political, social and economic consequences of 
the military bases established in a post-conflict environment.  
29 
 
2.1 The Liberal Peace and Intervention 
 
The philosophical foundation of peace operations rests heavily on the ideals of a perpetual 
peace. In its most rudimentary definition, it states that if all nations were constitutional 
republics – leaders of republics are directly accountable to their constituents - there would be 
no wars except for self-defense, as there would be no aggressors (Orend, 2004:175). A more 
modern derivative of liberal peace asserts sovereign democratic states are less likely to enter 
into armed conflict with each other due to shared social and ideological values (Finnemore, 
2003; Newbrander, 2012:0; Verellen, 2012). Such states hold a common trust in non-violent 
means of resolving conflict; free and fair elections; a respect for political transparency and the 
collective recognition of the benefits of economic interdependence (Doyle, 2004; Mitchell, 
2009). These together “prod normative ideals” and tend to result in a positive, generally self-
fulfilling prophecy of peace (Owen, 1994:92). Hence, the foundations of liberal democracy are 
often actively promoted in post-conflict reconstruction programs (Chandler, 2013; Paris, 
2004:5). Democracy is widely endorsed as the best form of governance to protect citizens’ 
rights; facilitate prosperity and ensure regional stability, (Bank, 1997; Doyle, 1986; Ghani & 
Lockhart, 2008; Hoffman, 2009; Jentleson, 2007; Kartas, 2007; Paris, 2004). Yet while there 
exists a general consensus for the basic ideals of liberal peace, assumptions concerning the 
“universal rightness” of direct or liberal democracy to establish it (Sen, 1999:3), especially post-
conflict, is divided, and its overemphasis has negative implications for sustainable peace 
building. Fortna (2008) similarly questions early emphasis on democratization, noting fostering 
democracy tends to drains resources from the primary and more urgent human-goals of 
maintaining peace and stability (Fortna, 2008:40). 
Layne (1994), contends that while democracy’s tenets are generally positive, the process of 
democratization is highly problematic, first because it is inherently destabilizing (Layne, 1994; 
also Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Paris, 2004), as it tends to disregard the presence of states’ 
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existing socio-economic inequalities (Jahn, 2012). Second, it requires overwhelming political, 
social and economic changes to make both this form of governance and the open markets work 
(Barbara, 2008; Barnett, 2009; Cheng, 2013; Collinson, 2010; Fetherston, 2000; Chandler, 2010; 
Finkel, et al., 2006; Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; Kartas, 2007; Sabaratnam, 2013; Woodward, 2002). 
Moreover, the excessive focus on open markets also tends to underestimate the concurrent 
need for social and economic “safety nets” (Rowland, 2002) during the transition process, 
especially in formerly centrally governed states, including the Balkans (Grzymala‐Busse & Jones 
Luong, 2008).  
The critical peacebuilding literature likewise reminds that the democratization process tends to 
produce political, social and economic losers where they had not existed before (Duffield, 2011; 
Höglund, 2008; Grzymala‐Busse & Jones Luong, 2008; Jahn, 2012; Paris, 2011; Pugh, 2005; 
Richmond, 2010; Stewart, 2008), adding substanitally to opportuities for renewed conflict. 
Moreover, democratization tends to favor pro-Western political and economic systems 
(Paffenholz, 2015: 861; Peou, 2014:380), or more simply, democratization is self-serving 
(Chandler, 2004:2). Particularly in the Soviet successor states, Braumoeller (1997) asserts that 
democratization has often led to “liberal nationalism” (Braumoeller, 1997:377), which often 
concentrates political power into a few people groups, or “nations”, within that state, and 
subsequently  predisposes them toward the use of force (ibid) to consolidate power. Snyder 
(2000) similarly states the very tenets of liberal democracy, such as elections and freedom of 
speech and press, ‘may be hijacked by nationalists for illiberal ends,’ especially by elites that are 
threatened by democratization (Snyder, 2000), revealing a profound connection between 
nacent democratization and nationalism (ibid). These critics strongly suggest, therefore, that 
the tenets of democratization and subsequent liberal peace which generally foster positive 
opportunities for mutual political and economic benefit between mature republics, can be 
easily undermined or exploited by too rapid efforts to establish a modern liberal democracy in 
societies affected by conflict. In a post-conflict environment therefore, military forces, which 
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are most often representatives of mature Western and liberal democratic governments, often 
fail to recognize the ways that their activities may contribute to this transition instability. 
Moreover, by their presence, can add their coercive weight to the pressures for the local 
community to conform to the political agendas of these international actors.  
2.2 Military Forces in Peace Operations 
The peace operations in Kosovo was fundamentally based on UN Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Article 28, stating:  
“Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”  
The right to intervene subsequently emerged from this Article to address those situations where 
the State itself endangers or fails to protect its people, such as the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 
and ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica in 1995. It gave motion to the idea that there is a moral 
requirement for the international community to intervene when human rights are violated by 
their own state, and that that right to intervene transcends sovereign boundaries (Evans & 
Sahnoun, 2001; Johnson, 2008; Kaldor, 2005; Verellen, 2012; Weiss, 2007).  
Yet, such interventions, regardless of its normative underlying reason, are ultimately 
contradictory and  hostile acts (Paris & Sisk, 2009:305). Chandler, (2004) and Kartas (2007), 
both find intervention largely overturns existing governments and makes the societal customs, 
values and norms of the country intervened upon irrelevant. Further criticism of intervention 
ranges from interveners being “uninformed of local culture, values and power relationships” 
(Begby & Burgess, 2009:92; Evans & Sahnoun, 2001); being naïve, (Jones, et al., 2011; Paris, 
2010); overusing top-down and ‘one-size-fits-all templates (Hoffman, 2009); and stifling local 
capacity to resolve conflict, (Campbell, et al., 2011; Peou, 2014).  
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2.2.1 Questioning the Military’s Role     
Military forces in this environment are often unwelcome by civilian organizations, and 
opponents of the use of military forces in humanitarian intervention are especially harsh. Chief 
among their contention is military intervention ‘blurs impartiality and the roles of military, 
political and humanitarian actors’ (Collinson, 2010; De Torrenté, 2006; Ferreiro, 2012; Jackson 
& Haysom, 2013), leaving humanitarians organizations more vulnerable (ibid.) Moreover, 
military participation in these interventions to ‘save’ failed states paves the way to 
securitization, especially as humanitarian assistance is used to achieve economic, political, 
security or other non-humanitarian interests, rather than to meet human need (Blair & Fitz-
Gerald, 2009; Collinson, 2010; MacGinty, 2012; Mockaitis, 2004:29; Paris, 2010; Paris & Sisk, 
2009; Pugh, 2005). This perception is exacerbated by claims by some, predominantly United 
States’ military leaders, that the activities of civilian international and non-governmental 
organizations can serve as ‘force multipliers’ for combat operations (De Torrenté, 2006).  
 
Hence, a significant portion of literature written by peacebuilding research organizations and 
‘think tanks’ is clearly suspicious of the military’s role in peace operations. Yet, these 
organizations also tend to hold several preconceptions of military forces. The first, while the 
military may be a ‘necessary evil’ in certain cases, its’ personnel are unschooled in ‘real’ 
humanitarian work, and therefore can often cause more harm than good (Anderson, 2000; 
Fishstein & Wilder, 2012; Jackson & Haysom, 2013; LeRiche, 2004).  
 
The second preconception is that intervening military forces are homogeneous and malign; the 
harm they precipitate varies only by the size of the forces on the ground (Jackson & Haysom, 
2013). Third is a preconception that military forces operate all but autonomously, and their 
activities are virtually unaccountable to authority (Fishstein & Wilder, 2012). The fourth 
preconception is the short-term perspective, and risk averse, hierarchal operating style of the 
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military is fundamentally incompatible with the intangible, unpredictable and long-term work of 
peacebuilding (Mockaitis, 2004; Duffield, 2011). Thus, military bases and their personnel 
become unwelcome amateurs which only interfere and complicate an already difficult and fluid 
environment for civilian-led peace operations.  
2.2.2 Civilian Peace Operations in Military Battle Space 
 
Federal governments, their research agencies and the military organizations themselves hold a 
far more positive perspective of their activities. Particularly since 2000, as predominantly 
Western governments, NATO members and partners recognized an overlap of social well-being 
with international stability and security, there have been wide changes in defense and civil-
military strategies and doctrine (Army, 2013; AUSA & CSIS, 2002; CCOE, 2013; Cole, et al., 2009; 
Ikenberry, 2000; Mc Ivor, 2005). This has caused many of the national development 
organizations, such as the Organization for European Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and development agencies in individual countries1 to promote inter/national stability and 
security through humanitarian-like post-conflict reconstruction at the tactical level in support of 
military operations.  
Thus, acknowledging the blurred lines between between humanitarian and military actors, 
Dobbins, (2007) and Hamre & Sullivan, (2002) and tension created by military forces and 
humanitarian organizations sharing the same physical space, they remind the military often 
possesses equipment and resources that are useful to humanitarian organizations (Dobbins, et 
al., 2007; Hamre & Sullivan, 2002; Mockaitis, 2004; also Etchemendy, 2010). Likewise, as 
hostilites often continue after official cessation of combat operations, Weiss (2007) reminds 
that humanitarians directly benefit from the security provided by military forces for their own 
activities (Weiss, 2007:70). Covey, et. al. (2005) too maintains, that substantial threat to 
humanitarian organizations remains if violent competition for power has not yet ended (Covey, 
                                                             
1 Such as AusAID, DfID, GIZ, USAID. This is a very small sample, many other government-led aid organizations 
exist.  
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et al., 2005:7), while Marley (2016) notes ‘… military forces competent to fight the Taliban, 
Yugoslav Army or Somali warlords may have something useful to offer …’ the international 
community as well (Marley, 2016:50). 
 
Nevertheless, while military forces in peace operations possess significant coercive authority, 
they also highly constrained by their national Rules of Engagement2, especially restriction of 
direct involvement in criminal and civil policing matters. Military forces are typically mandated 
to remain neutral and apolitical in civilian affairs, (Guéhenno, 2008; Münch, 2013), a particularly 
challenging task when the military forces may have been specifically deployed to protect one 
group from another. Here, Duffield is especially critical, stating the result is military forces will 
avoid unnecessary civilian interaction, becoming increasingly risk-averse and security stability-
oriented (Duffield, 2011). Non-involvement may also inadvertently imply consent and suggests 
that by strictly limiting their efforts to maintaining their military-focused, stable “safe and 
secure” environment, (Blair & Fitz-Gerald, 2009; Mockaitis, 2004; Woodward, 2002), the 
military forces are likely to continue to miss opportunities to have any meaningful positive 
influence on their local community.   
These views, therefore, invoke several important questions, key among them, is this negative 
perspective warranted; in what ways, and to what degree? Specifically, are the communities 
surrounding military bases indeed made worse; to they become less secure, less socially and 
politically open, or less prosperous than those communities that do not? These questions 
therefore, return to this research concerning the effects the everyday practices of the military 
may have on the local community and their implications for peacebuilding.  
 
 
                                                             
2 Rules of Engagement include how and when it is permissible to intervene to protect military forces; civilians and 
property, including the use of force, especially deadly force.  
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2.3 Political Economy of Conflict 
2.3.1 Drivers of Conflict  
There is a rich body of literature concerning the political economy of conflict. Especially since 
the mid-1990s, there has been a concerted study of the drivers and sustainers of conflict, and 
recognition of the emergence of distinct war formed economies. While conflicts have 
historically been conceived as politically or ‘grievance’ based (Sandole, 2010), this knowledge 
was increasingly challenged in 2000, particularly concerning civil wars in “weak states” (Berdal 
& Malone, 2000:2). These studies of exacerbating behaviors, environmental conditions and 
costs of war gave rise to a ‘greed vs. grievance’ construct, admonishing the earlier focus on 
grievance-based conflict, which tended to overlook conflicts’ economic motivation and benefits 
(ibid). Hence, rather than ‘ancient hatreds’ (Kaplan, 1993) and ‘mindless violence’ (Keen, 
2002:23), conflicts have purpose and are often the outcome of rational cost-benefit analyses to 
engage in conflict (Addison & Murshed, 2002; Ballentine, 2003; Ballentine & Nitzsche, 2005; 
Berdal & Keen, 1997; Cramer, 2002; Cramer 2006). Once established there are significant 
economic disincentives for peace, particularly where poverty and income inequality are high 
and better opportunites are low (Justino, 2008). Hence, Keen (1998) articulates conflict and 
wars offer “seven economic categories: pillage; extorting protection money; 
controlling/monopolizing trade; exploiting labor; gaining access to land, water and mineral 
resources; stealing aid supplies; and advantages for the military” (Keen, 1998:1), reaffirming 
that “there is more to civil wars than winning” (Keen, 1998:1; Berdal & Malone, 2000:2). As a 
result, the economic aspects of conflict can undermine the best of peace building efforts (Keen, 
2002:9).  
 
At the same time, econometrics quantified common conditions of civil conflicts in an attempt to 
predict the probability of conflict occurring between existing, competing groups. Economists 
Collier & Hoeffler (2000) proposed that conflicts occur within a feedback loop of grievances, 
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which not only spark the conflict, but also tend to create economic means to profit by 
sustaining the conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000:27). Doyle & Sambanis, (2006) offered a similar 
quantitative approach by considering the ways conflicts’ end  was achieved, specificaly whether 
the peace was realized through negotiated settlement or by military intervention. (Doyle & 
Sambanis, 2006:72; Fortna, 2008). However, Cramer (2002) takes a dim view of research that 
reduces complicated individual and group behavior to proxies and ‘maximalizing monolithic 
agents’ (Cramer, 2002; also 2006), which fails to either define how the conditions facilitate 
conflict, or adequately describe the diverse contributing factors that sustain conflict (ibid). 
 
2.3.2 Conflict Economies  
These explanatory models suggest the political economy of conflict is an outcome as well as a 
description. Robert Keohane aptly states “Economics and politics profoundly affect one another 
through the relationship between interdependence and power” (Keohane, 2008) as does Lake 
(2009), pointing to the economic effects of political hierarchies at the local level (Lake, 2009). 
Thus, in the post conflict environment, the absence of legitimate or capable government 
institutions can “cause the formation of local informal governance and shadow economic 
systems from the local community, often illicit, to survive” (Rubin, 2000:1793) and form new 
power structures. Moreover, the extreme post-conflict shifts in financial, legal, social 
opportunity and transaction costs allowed some local entrepreneurs to accumulate wealth and 
prestige that would have been unlikely otherwise (ibid). Particularly when economic sanctions 
prevent trade and degrade industry, and conflict damaged infrastructure and farmland prevent 
their use, shadow economies emerge to meet basic food, medicine and fuel needs, a structure 
that is often strengthened by humanitarian aid sent to offset sanctions’ effects on the civilian 
population (Berdal & Malone, 2000). This economic and social environment then, may lead to a 
war-based economy, where a few may benefit from the continued influx of humanitarian and 
reconstruction aid, leading some to become increasingly predatory against the civilian 
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population (Ballentine, 2005; Berdal & Malone, 2000; Cater, 2002; Cramer, 2006; Cramer, 2009; 
Doyle, 2006; Keen, 1998; Münch, 2013; Pugh, 2004; Reno, 2000; Studdard, 2005:6; Weinstein, 
2005; Woodward, 2002) as civilians caught in the unstable environment become a means to 
create wealth.  
 
The complexity is compounded when former war leaders, local elites and opportunists take 
advantage of the absence of a capable government (Zaum & Cheng, 2008; Cox, 2001; Earle, 
1997; Filipov, 2006; Grzymala‐Busse & Jones Luong, 2008; Lake, 2009; Newman & Schabel, 
2002; Reno, 2000; Studdard, 2005; Torjesen, 2013) are able to leverage their self-declared 
positions to ‘represent’ their communities (Zaum & Cheng, 2008; Korf, 2003) with the newly 
arrived local military organizations. In this way shadow economies are strengthened and their 
leader legitimized, often leading to their permanenance.  
Particularly concerning military forces at the local level, the first relationships with community 
leaders are most likely opportunistic, as Cheng (2012) and Filipov (2006) specifically note the 
early unintentional support of predatory actors may occur for three reasons: imperfect 
knowledge of informal power brokers held by the intervening organization; the social and 
economically disruptive process of political liberalization and privatization (Filipov, 2006); and 
credible threats by leaders or elites to the interveners to return to violence (Cheng, 2013; 
Münch, 2013). As the relationships that develop between elites and military leaders are never 
neutral, especially at the local level (Winslow, 2007), the relationships and economic 
opportunity provided by the outsiders - including military forces - may reinforce pre-conflict 
inequalities and inadvertently foster the advancement of individuals or groups’ ability to control 
present and future economic and social resources (Doyle, 2006; Filipov, 2006; Grzymala‐Busse 
& Jones Luong, 2008; Sowell, 1981), therefore undermining military effectiveness by 
delegitimizing peace operations for a substantial part of population. 
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The literature demonstrates that the arrival of military forces can have immediate and 
significantly negative outcomes on the local political economy. First, while military forces may 
be a relief for some by their interruption of the predatory environment (Cheng, 2013), those 
same forces may inadvertently “legitimize” the power and influence of these self-appointed 
actors by working with them (LeRiche, 2004; Münch, 2013; Weinstein, 2005). Secondly, the 
arrival of military forces may also further destabilize the community, as elites, war leaders, non-
governmental and other actors may be compelled to ‘compete’ with the military for population 
influence concerning security and the use or control of aid and scarce resources (Lake, 
2009:268). Therefore, the peacekeeping presence may negatively affect the community before 
it is able to produce positive outcomes or set the conditions for sustainable peacebuilding.  
 
2.4:  Peacekeepers’ Impact on the Local Political Economy 
 
Peacekeeping organizations have only recently begun to critically study the effects they have on 
their local communities in a post-conflict environment, (AUSA & CSIS, 2002; Autesserre, 2014; 
Brahimi, 2000; Campbell, et al., 2011; Caplan, 2005; Carnahan, et al., 2005; Colletta, et al., 2008; 
Duffield, 2011; Edelstein, 2009; Ferreiro, 2012; Finkel, et al., 2006; Frost, 2003; Hegre, et al., 
2010; Heldt, 2004; Jackson & Haysom, 2013; Jeong, 2005 Jones, et al., 2011; LeRiche, 2004; 
Leonhardt, 2001; MacDonald, 2005; Natsios, 2009; Paffenholz, 2015; Roehner, 2012; Sciarra, 
2008; Suhrke, et al., 2000; Toft, 2010; Tierney, 2010; USAID, 2009). These studies reveal four 
overlapping factors: first, organizational goals tend to be top-driven and are far more ambitious 
than their resources allow; second, there is insufficient advance knowledge of the complex 
political and social relations and conditions in the field prior to arrival, therefore, thirdly, trade-
offs necessary to meet urgent political, financial or security needs are often at the expense of 
long-term improvements and program effectiveness and efficiency. Fourth, the peacekeepers 
and peace builders themselves too often create new problems in this environment and worsen 
those already existing. Crime, human trafficking and prostitution in particular, are too-
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frequently stated outcomes of the arrival of international organizations (Enloe, 2000; Godec, 
2010; Ingimundarson, 2003; Martin, 2005; Mendelson, 2005; Stern, 2015).  
 
2.4.1 Civilian Peacekeeping Organizations in the Post Conflict Environment  
 
The United Nations (UN) operations in 2000, and the ensuing UN Paper, Report of the Panel on 
United Nations Peace Operations, (“Brahimi Report,”) was especially critical of its own 
performance, promulgating 20 recommendations to improve future UN peacekeeping 
operations (Brahimi, 2000). This paper was followed in 2004 and in 2009 with a further 
appraisal of UN base start-up procedures, and effects of operations on the surrounding 
community in which they operate (Durch, 2004, Durch, 2009; Edelstein, 2009). These have 
promulgated stronger organizational rules of conduct, better analysis of assumptions, planning 
and information sharing; and a closer examination of the political, social and economic factors 
influencing behavior and conflict at the local level.  
 
2.4.2 Military Forces in Post Conflict Environment  
 
Comparable examinations of the effects of military forces establishing a military base in the 
post-conflict environment are rather thin (Anderson, et.al., 2014;  Marley, 2016). The small 
number of scholarly studies concerning the effects of military bases on the community tend to 
be concentrated on the consequences of base closures (Cowan, 2012), most often the 
economic consequences of closing bases; bases established in the 1940s for the Second World 
War (Lynch, 1970) or those established in the 1950-1960s for the US-Soviet Union Cold War, 
both ‘overseas’ and ‘at home’ (Dardia, et.al.,1996; Sharp, 1990; also, Reischauser, 1992; Spiegel, 
2011).  
 
 The absence of scholarly literature concerning the effects of military bases is not insignificant. 
The arrival and establishment of bases for intervening international organizations and military 
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peacekeeping forces – whose numbers range from a few hundred to several thousand – can 
affect their communities in four principal ways. First, all of these require the use of office space 
or other facilities to operate, likely competing for space also needed by local residents, 
businesses and civil society organizations (Carnahan, 2006:6). Second, these personnel will 
require housing, meals and personal incidentals (ibid), some or all of which may be need to 
purchase these locally, possibly consuming scarce resorces. Thirdly, these organizations bring in, 
and have access to, a vast amount of individual wealth and organizational resources 
(Autesserre, 2014), especially employment that alters the available skilled labor force for local 
reconstruction (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007). Fourth, legitimacy of the intervention in the 
eyes of the population is influenced both by how the intervention was brought about and how 
long it takes for life to return to a relatively safe and economic normal (AUSA & CSIS, 2002; 
Bhatia, 2005:208; Chandler, 2013:23). These groups and their activities place tremendous strain 
on the local physical, social and political infrastructure (Autesserre, 2014). While any of these 
single intrusive factors in a benign environment might be challenging to work through, in 
combination and in a post-conflict environment the opportunity for breakdown are immense.  
Thus, this absence of study concerning the effects of military bases and their forces in the local 
community in post-conflict environments prevents accurate knowledge for the military forces 
as well. In this case military forces may ‘misread’ and thus respond inappropriately to benign 
events, or conversely, underestimate deteriorating situations (Simons, 2011:4), leading to 
renewed conflict.  
 
2.5 Peace Operations’ Lessons Learned and Observed   
The principal concern found in the literature is the development of a “balloon economy,” a 
situation whereby the arrival of an influx of money into a community creates a disproportionate 
focus on servicing the wealthy international organizations, and at the expense of the local 
residents in two primary ways (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007:277; Aolain, et al., 2011; 
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Woodward, 2002). These effects are comprehensive and ubiquitous, including, the inflationary 
effects upon food, housing/ offices and supplies due to demands made by a large number of 
internationals with money; the consequences of hiring of local staff and demands on local 
infrastructure (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Carnahan, et. al., 2006; Durch, 2004; 
Gauster, 2006; Hegre, et al., 2010). Moreover, directly related effects are changes in acceptable 
social behavior and mores (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007, Gauster & Maruszczak, 
2006:277), and gender-based criminal activity specifically resulting from interaction with peace 
operations’ forces.  
2.5.1   Inflated Prices 
 
Academic and organizational literature often point to “the rise in prices for food that can place 
even the basic foods out of range and inaccessible for local residents” (Narten, 2009), while 
housing costs increase dramatically, and community members are displaced from their homes 
in order to capitalize on wealthy outsiders (Anderson, 2000). Businesses also emerge to suit 
outsiders’ tastes and interests, and as Woodward notes, this rise occurs “even if there are an 
insufficient number of internationals to sustain (new) business” (Woodward, 2002:10).  
However, the same body of literature also widely disagrees to the extent and scale of this 
balloon economy. The UN’s organizational ‘best practices’ recommend field workers use the 
organizational commissaries, and similar UN resources that are brought in specifically to 
prevent overwhelming the local economy during this especially weak period (Carnahan, et. al., 
2006; Durch, 2004). Carnahan (2006) also states price spikes are usually temporary; prices fall 
again once the demands of the initial surge of international staff are met. The increased prices 
also tend to be contained within the urban areas where international staff are located (Gauster 
& Maruszczak, 2006:55), or are offered specifically to the international staff (International Crisis 
Group, 2001). Moreover, Carnahan (2006) and Woodward (2002) both state that published 
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datasets showing the rise in food prices also tend to include the prices of expensive imported 
‘foreign foods’ which are preferred by the international community.  
2.5.2 Purchasing and Contracting 
General information concerning military contracting may be found in an array of widely 
available military publications. In the simplest terms, military forces may purchase and 
transport its material, supplies and services from ‘home’ themselves; purchase directly from the 
local community; or, purchase through large contractors, who then hire local firms as 
subcontractors -  the latter being a frequently promoted best-practice (Carnahan, 2006; Durch, 
2004; Gauster, 2006). MacDonald notes however, that returning expatriates with outside 
financial connections and newly developed culture and language skills that are more compatible 
with the military forces, may be continually found to be the ‘best qualified’ subcontractors, and 
therefore marginalize the small local contractors, (Bhatia, 2005; MacDonald, 2005); reinforce 
patronage networks (Dobbins, 2013; Woodward, 2002); or, increase opportunities for 
corruption (Leonhardt, 2001:28; OECD, 2007). Consequently, even when contractors are hired 
from the surrounding area, additional consideration is necessary to determine the extent which 
the local community participates and benefits economically. Indeed, the arrival of military 
forces may lead to unrealistic expectations of economic opportunity for the community, and 
when those expectations are not met, lead to resentment or return to violence (MacDonald, 
2005). 
2.5.3   Housing and Office Building Scarcity 
In addition to competing with local residents for usable structures to rebuild their livelihoods, 
peace operations organizations are often granted use of buildings and land by national-level 
political leaders, sometimes at no cost to the organization in exchange for their assistance, 
(Sharp, 1990; Williams, 2005), especially under conditions set by a negotiated peace agreement. 
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However, Carnahan states community members often move in with family members explicitly 
to take advantage of the opportunity to rent their property to international staff at inflated 
prices (Carnahan 2006). Likewise, legitimate owners as well as opportunists will offer use of 
their buildings and land in exchange for income or other personal benefit through various 
patronage networks (Torjesen, 2013), even as discerning legal ownership for payment is 
attempted at a time when cadastral records are often conflicting, lost or destroyed (Demarest, 
2007; Riedlmayer, 2007; Sewell, 2011).  
Yet Gauster & Maruszczak (2006) assert the arrival of international organizations can provide 
significant community-wide economic opportunity. In particular, new construction and 
refurbishment to bring hotel and residential property to the standards of the international staff 
typically hire local contractors and craftsmen, creating jobs and restoring livelihoods at a critical 
time (Carnahan, et. al., 2006:55). This initial economic benefit to the community remains when 
the international staffs continue to purchase food and other items for their daily needs; the 
benefit is further extended if the posting allows family members. In addition, the high number 
of restaurant meals consumed, and the natural proclivity for international staff to travel and 
buy local items for gifts and as souvenirs may lead to new industry such as tourism (Carnahan, 
et al., 2005), although such new industry may also cause disruptions to local labor markets 
(Bhatia, 2005; Dobbins, 2013), and the long term and unintended effects on this potential 
wealth are not yet well explored (Enloe, 2000; Weldon, et al., 2012; Woodward, 2002).  
Nevertheless, while some of these initial conditions may be unknowable, the local community’s 
ongoing inability to obtain suitable property and restore livelihoods, and the international 
organization’s continued reliance on preferential treatment, or ill-gained benefits is likely to 
degrade the intervening organization’s credibility and reputation of impartiality (Shaw & Kemp, 
2012).  
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2.5.4   Bases’ Effects on Local Infrastructure  
The importance of civil infrastructure, especially roads networks used for military supply, 
patrolling, and civilian livelihoods is well studied (Transportation Research Board, 2013; also, 
Anderson, 2000:27; Army, 2000;  Kaiser, 1995), and the physical and social effects of heavy 
equipment and military vehicles on civil roadways is a long-practiced planning factor in military 
operations (Army, 1958; Transportation Research Board, 2013). Similarly, road and bridge 
repairs and upgrades - whether due to deferred maintenance or battle damage - are frequently 
made by military forces to ensure not only their continued freedom of movement for military 
operations, but also to maintain local commerce and promote community good will (Anderson, 
2000: 27; AUSA & CSIS, 2002; Blair & Fitz-Gerald, 2009; Collinson, 2010).  
2.5.5   Hiring Local Staff 
According to much academic and the organizational best practices literature, the employment 
of local staff by international and humanitarian organizations gives legitimacy and promotes 
acceptance of the operation (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Call & Cousens, 2007:18; 
Carnahan, et al., 2005; Narten, 2009). Moreover, locally hired staffs typically have the best 
knowledge of the area and its customs and are generally more cost effective than international 
workers (Gauster, 2006; Sciarra, 2008). Natsios affirms these salaries “directly inject much 
needed cash into the economy” as these workers often support extended families while the 
local economy is particularly weak and before substantial development initiatives begin 
(Natsios, 2009; Sciarra, 2008). Finally, it is utimately the local staff that will ‘own’ and sustain 
peacebuilding activities (Narten, 2009).  
Yet this literature also points to the unsustainably high wages usually paid by international 
organizations. While the rationale for high salaries is to recruit the best and most skilled 
(Gauster & Maruszczak, 2006), the discrepancy between salaries offered by the international 
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organizations and local government is most problematic when senior officials, civil servants and 
high-skill professionals that work in their communities earn much less than unskilled labor 
employed by an international organization, and with far less responsibility (Ammitzbøell & Dons 
Tychen, 2007; Gauster & Maruszczak, 2006; International Crisis Group, 2001; Sciarra, 2008). At 
the same time, employment outside their professions tends to erode those skills. Moreover, 
younger employees who tend to have the best English and technical skills are likely to use their 
work with international organizations as ‘stepping stones’ to find better employment 
elsewhere, collectively creating a ‘brain drain’ when their skills are needed most by their 
community (AUSA & CSIS, 2002). Gauster (2006) and Sciarra (2008) likewise argue the high 
wages and improved working conditions may become the new minimum “benchmarks” that 
cause pressure on the local community to continue both high salaries and well-resourced 
working conditions after the international organizations are gone (Gauster, 2006; Sciarra, 2008).  
Finally, where employment relies on word-of-mouth recommendations, self-appointed 
gatekeepers may arise, entrenching conflict power structures (Narten, 2009). Particularly where 
ethnicity or national identities were dominant features in the preceding conflict, this can easily 
appear as continued institutional discrimination (Sowell, 1981), thereby encouraging 
antagonism between international peacekeepers and the local population (Ammitzbøell & Dons 
Tychen, 2007; Higate & Henry, 2004).  
2.5.6   Changes in Social Roles and Mores  
Employment with international organizations can also have unexpected effects on social roles, 
particularly opportunities for women that would not have been possible otherwise, especially in 
traditional societies (Aolain, et al., 2011; Curtis, 2007). The “gender effect” of social roles is 
even more pronounced when the post-conflict primary family wage earner is female and holds 
a position of responsibility with an international organization, but is expected to assume her 
traditional position as a woman - wife or a child - at home (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007). 
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Feminist literature more often points to the “unequal power structure between international 
staff and local women, which tends to place local women in insecure positions which reinforce 
(negative) gender roles, or foster exploitation, including trafficking and prostitution” (Aolain, et 
al., 2011; Eifler & Siefert, 2009; Enloe, 2000; Higate & Henry, 2004). However, the typical 
relations described between local women and men working for international organizations are 
reliably one-sided: local women are victims, while local men are absent, indifferent to women’s 
insecurity or are similarly predatory. Yet this overarching perspective does both women and 
men a disservice, especially as it overlooks the social and cultural dynamics of gender relations 
and inequalities in place before the conflict (Agustin, 2007; Cahn, 2007).  
2.5.7   Peacekeeper Prostitution 
Human trafficking and prostitution by peacekeepers are among the most contentious 
unintended outcomes in the post-conflict environment. The arrival and spread of organized 
criminal activities in the sex and drug trades have consistently been directly traced to the arrival 
of peacekeepers (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Aolain, et al., 2011; Autesserre, 2014; 
Baker, 2010; Carnahan, et al., 2005; Enloe, 2000; Higate & Henry, 2004; Martin, 2005; 
Mendelson, 2005). This phenomenon appears to have two components: first, the early creation 
of brothels by opportunists and organized crime to ‘service’ the international community is 
cheap, easy and profitable (Carnahan, et. al., 2006:21). Second, this illicit ‘business’ provides 
cash and cover for its far more profitable component: trade in drugs and arms (Haynes, 
2004:226). According to Haynes (2004), it is the tendencies of international organizations and 
peacekeeping forces to neither follow their own codes of conduct, nor hold offenders 
accountable, which allows these illicit and damaging activities to continue and thrive, and 
directly undermines the security they have specifically been sent to provide (Carnahan, et al., 
2005; Haynes, 2004; Higate & Henry, 2004). Moreover, such activities tend to become 
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permanent and erode stability and security not just locally, but into adjacent countries as well 
(Colas & Peyroux, 2016:28). 
2.6   Overview of Military Bases and their Communities 
 
While the body of literature concerning the effects of international organization’s bases is 
limited but nonetheless present, scholarly literature pertaining to the political and economic 
effects of the military bases on their surrounding communities is nearly absent. Instead, 
materials reviewed in this theme are predominantly grey literature, including military manuals, 
journal articles, websites and web logs (blogs). The internet sites were scanned, but not 
reviewed in detail for inclusion in this literature review unless their resources and materials 
were cross-referenced by academic sources or snowballing. 
Within the materials reviewed, the term ‘military base,’ ‘base,’ ‘facility,’ ‘garrison’ and 
‘installation’ were used interchangeably; each may refer to a temporary to long-term secured 
facility of any size for the primary function of housing, supplying, maintaining and otherwise 
supporting military and civilian support personnel engaged in conducting military operations 
(Defense, 2014). These operations include, but are not limited to, patrols on foot or by vehicle, 
skill building activities (such as weapons marksmanship, radio procedures, first aid) and training 
exercises (Army, 2017). Notably, bases established and situated in post-conflict and 
peacebuilding environments throughout this literature review are unaccompanied postings; 
military personnel are not joined by their family members, and thus family members will have 
no impact on the local economy.  
 A determined search of publicly available military sources pertaining to base openings also 
produced limited results, finding instead a dominance of material relating to base closures. A 
small number of commercial publications concerning new bases referred to the physical 
structure, such as its easy set up for use in post-conflict base camps, or exceeding minimum 
government criteria, (Anderson, et al., 2014). Defense-contractor promotional materials were 
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briefly reviewed for their applicability, however, these generally consisted of descriptions of the 
multiple uses or suitable environments for the rapid construction of their equipment for short-
term operations and emergencies, usually in conjunction with military support to civil 
authorities and disaster management; in combination with base defense and security best 
practices; for logistics and transportation requirements or improved base management and 
procedures.  
Pointedly, none of these commercial publications addressed purchasing, staff hiring, land and 
building acquisition, or any other areas of the procurement process that are applicable to the 
day to day operations of the base once it is physically established. Due to the absence of 
academic literature to draw upon, international organization literature serves as the primary 
resource, as it is expected there will be sufficient similarities concerning the establishment of 
international organization bases and military bases, to provide a point of departure for more 
specific research.  
2.7   Base Closure Literature 
Base closings and subsequent civilian worker redundancy dominates the official military, 
popular and grey literature concerning military bases, particularly the economic effects of 
military base closures on the surrounding community as a result of reduced defense spending 
(Cowan, 2012; Dardia, et al., 1996; Lynch, 1970; Sharp, 1990). Material concerning the selection 
and process of bases closures is often highly contested from the local to the national level. A 
large volume of the available literature was politically charged and antagonistic, mostly biased 
in favor of retaining the base, and anecdotal in nature, and thus unusable. Nevertheless, a small 
sample of official base closure literature was located and reviewed to gain an insight concerning 
how some military base communities were able to successfully transition both politically and 
economically to an all-civilian economy, and whether comparisons could be inferred towards 
base establishment and operation.  
49 
 
Two primary publications concerning base closures were selected for close examination, one 
each concerning domestic and overseas US bases, which appeared to be comprehensive and 
robust enough to be generalized for this review, and thus serve as a meta-view of the closure 
process. These were selected first because the sponsoring organizations are credible and fully 
independent of the base closure process, and second, these were among the most often cited 
in later similar, but less comprehensive studies. Notably these studies specifically occurred as 
the result of stable peace-time conditions, under a “peace dividend,” and both include the 
impact of military dependent’s spending and employment in the community, thus its direct 
applicability is limited. Nevertheless, there are several important insights that can be distilled 
from these publications.  
Lynch (1970) provides the first, a seminal study prepared for the US Department of Defense 
(DOD) to evaluate the impact of closing or significantly reducing some 950 domestic US military 
bases and defense support facilities between 1963 and 1969. Although the reductions were 
recommended and conducted in the midst of the Viet Nam War, these bases had already been 
determined to be excess following the end of Korean War in 1953; their closure was considered 
as part of that earlier ‘peace dividend’. The study found three interrelated factors to be 
necessary for a communities’ successful transition to a civilian economy: the initiative of the 
community to develop additional means of income sources; its proximity to a larger urban 
center and, the proportion of local hires as compared to the overall population (Lynch, 1970).  
Two significant observations were found in Lynch’s forward, “While this problem (base closure) 
seems to be a large one, it would appear to be intrinsically manageable but for two 
considerations: the first is a political-protective attitude (of members of the US Congress) in 
response to the closings, and (the second is) the characteristic of no economic contingency plan 
for other work to be done in the event of base closure” (Lynch, 1970). These statements make 
clear that the entrenchment of political interest and protection of bases goes well beyond the 
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immediate locale even in the most benign of environments, and military bases can form a type 
of dependency: once established the military base becomes a significant part of the economic 
fabric of the community, and ‘always be there.’ 
 The second publication, an exploratory study prepared by the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, (SIPRI), proposed several hypothetical scenarios of US military withdrawals 
from Europe, and studied the economic benefits and costs to the European NATO states due to 
the resulting military base closures. This study found two major factors for a smooth and 
successful transition to a civilian economy: first, the more skilled or technical a military facility 
was the better (Sharp, 1990). This implies the better educated and skilled civilian technical 
workforce is more easily able to find alternate work, thus easing transition to an all civilian 
community.  
The second factor, similar to that noted by Lynch, is once military bases are established they 
begin to redefine the communities’ identity. In this sense, political and economic choices made 
by the community appear to both integrate and depend upon the continued presence of ‘their’ 
military base in local decision-making processes, often significantly (Sharp, 1990). As inferred in 
Lynch’s domestic base closing literature, the civilian workforce and community political leaders 
develop relationships with the military base, which strongly suggests not simply economic 
dependency, but also a center of local political and economic power where alliances, especially 
the change resisting alliances, are likely to occur (ibid). The volume of anecdotal literature and 
‘save our base’ materials strongly reinforces this conclusion.  
2.7.1 Civilian - Military relationships   
The base-closing literature strongly suggests the quality of the civilian-military relationships, 
and ability for the community to see new opportunity is a key indicator of a successful 
transition to a non-military community (Cowan, 2012; Lynch, 1970; Sharp, 1990). However, the 
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literature concerning the post-conflict environment itself is far less positive. As Cheng described 
earlier, “the absence of the rule of law and a credible, capable government, criminalized war 
and conflict economies are quick to emerge to exploit the power vacuum, and in the absence of 
capable institutions, these conflict economies are likely to continue when conflict ends, 
becoming entrenched and permanent” (Cheng, 2013; Berdal, 2009; Pugh, 2004). Bardhan also 
states, “initial adopters, to suit their interests, may lock in the whole system ... denying a 
footing to later, more appropriate, institutions” (Bardhan, 2005), and therefore  cause 
“seemingly innocent agreements and concessions with far reaching implications” (Barnett & 
Zurcher, 2009).  
A uniquely complicating factor is the “impartial self-image and risk avoiding temperament” of 
military organizations, which are “by nature stability and security oriented” (Call & Cousens, 
2007:12; Duffield, 2011). Moreover, the military “has a tendency to divorce contemporary 
events and ‘peacebuilding’ challenges from their specific historical and cultural contexts ...” 
(Berdal, 2009). Similarly, there is a “...Western blind spot, the tendency to underestimate the 
effects of a protracted foreign presence, however well intentioned, are likely to have in 
stimulating nationalist sentiments, encouraging various forms of local resistance and, more 
generally, in shaping the complex psychological environment post-conflict societies” (Berdal, 
2009; Gauster, 2006). At the same time, intervening military forces are always the physical 
representation of a political “side taken” (OECD, 2007; Weinstein, 2005), hardly an impartial, 
apolitical position. Therefore, an early alliance with the military may give unintentional 
credibility and authority to opportunists (Cater, 2002) as well as reinforce an already sharp 
sense of wrong and injustice, making subsequent stabilizing measures and peacebuilding 
initiatives much more difficult (Barnett, 2009; Cheng, 2013; Fishstein & Wilder, 2012; Rubin, 
2000).  
Finally, an unspoken, but inescapable element within much of the literature concerning post-
conflict political economy, is the need to acknowledge and resolve the lingering distrust and 
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hostility between the warring parties, such as the Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs in this 
case study. The success of NATO peacekeeping forces, Kosovo Forces (KFOR), to maintain a safe 
and secure environment is as much dependent upon a sense of psychological security as 
physical security (Lederach, 1997; Risner, 2013:61) and a related need to confront and move 
beyond the “lingering war-time narratives of betrayal, victimization and entitlement” in order 
to facilitate enduring economic measures (Mertus, 1999). Thus, the lack of widespread and 
sustainable economic improvement since the end of the Kosovo war in 1999 is also a barometer 
of the unresolved fear and uncertainties that contribute to political instability (Sklias & 
Roukanas, 2007). 
2.8    Gaps in the Literature 
  
The substantial body of literature concerning peace operations tends to focus on the macro and 
strategic levels, including questioning their undeclared intentions and legality. However, 
particularly since the end of the Cold War, a recurring response to contemporary conflicts has 
been intervention by international organizations and the deployment of military peacekeeping 
forces into a sovereign state or territory to end the violence there, and to prevent its spread to 
its neighbors. Despite the surface parallels with international organizations that may be 
inferred, military forces and their bases present in the post-conflict environment are also 
sources of coercive power, which opportunists and local elites may attempt to coopt for their 
own benefit. Current literature is particularly thin concerning the local-level practices between 
military bases and their communities, including those which may unintentionally create or 
entrench inequities and inequalities which may not only impede or prevent sustainable 
peacebuilding, but also lead to renewed violence. This research contributes to closing this 
significant gap in knowledge of military base activities at the micro and meso levels.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology  
3.0 Introduction  
This chapter provides an overview of the methods and strategy used for this research posed 
with this question: “How do the everyday practices of military bases established in post-conflict 
environments affect the local political economy and what are the implications for 
peacebuilding?” This chapter is comprised of two sections, pre- and post-fieldwork. Section One 
contains a synopsis of the literature review and purpose of the research; a discussion of the 
methods and processes to be used and, a general description of the anticipated data. An 
examination of researcher positionality completes this section. Section Two includes the 
challenges that were encountered in field work, a sample of field data, and an assessment of 
the divergence of field data from literature. This chapter concludes with a recap of significant 
findings and hypothesis refinement.  
 
3.1 Literature Review 
The effects of peacekeeping organizations on the local community within a post-conflict 
environment have been critically studied by academics, policy makers, and by the peacekeeping 
organizations themselves, for more than a decade (Arnall, et al., 2013; AUSA & CSIS, 2002; 
Baker, A., 2004; Baker, C., 2010; Boyce, 2002; Brahimi, 2000; Caplan, 2005; Carnahan, et al., 
2005;  Colletta, et al., 2008; Duffield, 2011; Edelstein, 2009; Enloe, 2000; Ferreiro, 2012; Finkel, 
et al., 2006; Fishstein & Wilder, 2012; Frost, 2003; Hegre, et al., 2010; Heldt, 2004; Jackson & 
Haysom, 2013; Jeong, 2005 Jones, et al., 2011; LeRiche, 2004; Learned, n.d.;  Leonhardt, 2001; 
MacDonald, 2005; Natsios, 2009; Roberts, 1985; Roehner, 2012; Sciarra, 2008; Tierney, 2010; 
USAID, 2009; Zaum & Knaus, 2013). Yet a comparable examination of the effects of establishing 
a military base in the same environment is nearly absent in academic literature. The base-
related studies that do exist are generally undertaken through the concerned government’s 
direction, or by an interested organization. These studies are more typically focused upon the 
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local impact of the economic losses resulting from the closure of domestic military bases, or 
upon the trade-off of anticipated cost-savings in comparison to decreased national security 
(Cowan, 2012; Lynch, 1970; Reischauser, 1992; Sharp, 1990). The use of contractors for logistic 
services to military bases has been studied more recently, especially for US bases in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. However, their emphasis is upon corporate accountability, and risk of increased 
political and military dependency on civilians to provide sustainment services (Krahmann, 2005; 
Singer, 2003) rather than their collective effect on the community. Finally, the small number of 
relevant studies in International Relations concerning military bases tend to focus on legal 
justification, strategy reforms, macro-level economic decisions, and broad policy effects on 
national and international security (Crocker, et al., 2005:363; Roberts, 2006) rather than their 
individual and collective effects on the ground.  
 
A growing body of literature in International Development and International Relations suggests 
that micro-level, or day to day activities play a much more significant role in post conflict 
stabilization than once attributed, and that they affect policy goals more directly (Collinson, 
2003; Dobbins, 2013; Hudson & Leftwich, 2014; Verkoren & Junne, 2012). Moreover, as the 
frequency of environments containing a combination of military forces and non-military 
humanitarian actors continues to rise, persistent failure to understand the role of every day 
relations and activities invites wasted resources and less-than-optimum outcomes. This 
research begins to fill this gap in literature concerning military bases that are established after 
conflict and their influences at the local, or community, level. 
 
Unlike international humanitarian actors, military forces and the relationships that develop 
between the local community and military forces cannot be neutral; military forces always 
represent a State or other international body which has a political objective for its intervention. 
Therefore, with regard to the military, “the relationships and economic opportunity provided by 
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the outsiders may concurrently reinforce pre-conflict inequalities and inadvertently foster the 
evolution of an individual or groups’ ability to control present and future economic and social 
resources, while withholding the same opportunity for others they wish not to include” 
(Grzymala‐Busse & Jones Luong, 2008; also, Sowell, 1981). Particularly with regard to 
humanitarian aid and profits from natural resource extraction, elites and strongmen can use 
violence to exclude access by others and reinforce their control (Münch, 2013:2; von Billerbeck, 
2012). The complexity of this situation is compounded in the absence of a legitimate and 
capable government to prevent malign actors from leveraging their positions and promoting 
their particular interests in the post-conflict and peacebuilding environment (Cheng & Zaum, 
2008; Cox, 2001; Earle, 1997; Grzymala‐Busse & Jones Luong, 2008; Korf, 2003; Newman & 
Schabel, 2002; Studdard, 2005; Torjesen, 2013; Verkoren & Junne, 2012). Hence, the arrival of a 
military force can quickly and unknowingly generate at least three negative outcomes.    
 
o First, while the arrival of military forces may be a relief for many by interrupting the 
dangerous or predatory environment, military forces’ presence may also represent, or be 
perceived to “side” with the government that had directly contributed to the conflict. 
o Secondly, the military forces may inadvertently reinforce and “legitimize” the power and 
influence of malign self-appointed actors by working with them, and  
o Thirdly, the arrival of military forces may destabilize the fragile stasis when confronting war 
leaders and similar actors, as the military competes with them for influence over the 
population3   
 
                                                             
3 Elite competition with the military tends to emerge concerning security; law enforcement, counter organized crime 
and antiterrorism.  
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This research therefore, begins to fill the gap in literature concerning these outcomes by 
examination of the comparatively minor scale day-to-day relationships and activities of 
establishing and maintaining a military base and its subsequent political economy.  
 
 
3.2 Research methodology and rationale 
This research takes a mixed method approach, primarily using political economy analysis (PEA) 
and within case study comparison. Both the case study method and PEA are frequently used by 
international organizations to explore the effect of their own peacekeeping forces on the local 
community, and evaluate the effectiveness of programs and development aid (Carnahan, 2006; 
Cowan, 2012; del Castillo, 2008; DfID, 2009; Durch, 2004). Case studies are particularly suitable 
for this reseach because they facilitate understanding of the interelationship of enviromnental 
and social systems, allowing the researcher to ‘unpack’ meaning, as well as examine causal 
relationships and describe ranges of applicability for those causal mechanisms in context (Ng & 
Hase, 2008; Piekkari & Welch, 2011), and within social processes from empirical data when little 
suitable literature and knowledge exists (Yin, 2012 ). Likewise PEA is specifically useful to 
understand the relationships between key stakeholders, both individuals and groups concerning 
the distribution and acquisition of power, or the “rules of the game”  (Hudson & Leftwich, 
2014:9). 
 
According to Yin (2003) and Campbell (2010), the case study method offers a depth of study 
within a bounded system over time, providing a “thick description” of phenomena in context 
(Campbell, 2010:174), and is well suited for a single or small number of examples (small – n) to 
be studied in their environment, within a complex context, and where the observer has little or 
no control of the environment (Yin, 2003; Yin, 2012; Buttolph-Johnson, 2005). Within case 
comparison further allows the comparison of phenomenon within the case, increasing its 
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explanatory capabilities through examination of similarities, differences and patterns across 
(sub)cases (Campbell, 2010:174) as exogeneous factors are more closely controlled.  
 
This research begins with a preliminary hypothesis informed by desk work and uses a 
standardized procedure to gather data described later in this section; uses multiple sources and 
documents, and it examines communities with and without military bases in geographically 
disparate locations. These facilitate cross referencing and improves the validity of the gathered 
information (Bell, 1993). Interviews and observation techniques borrowed from ethnography 
provide historical and cultural context, however, the ethnographic method itself is not a 
significant contributor to analysis. A list of interview subjects is provided as Annex 1. 
 
Political Economy Analysis is a process which can be used to assemble a portrait of actors and 
forces in the post-conflict environment. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) provides a broad definition of 
political economy analysis as it is to be used in this research:  
Political economy analysis is concerned with the interaction of political and economic 
processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups 
and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships 
over time. 4 
 
This research takes a ‘Livelihoods Approach’ to political economy analysis, as this approach is 
oriented “to the meso-and local level … it is grounded in the people’s own perspectives, and 
how the totality of economic, political, social and cultural factors affects people’s lives” 
(Collinson, 2003:4). The Livelihoods Approach also better explains post conflict economies, 
                                                             
4 Political Economy Analysis expands upon earlier Drivers of Change studies that were developed to challenge 
assumptions and provide better understanding of the local centripetal and centrifugal forces in context and therefore 
better able to address underlying concerns and facilitate more appropriate development solutions. In this research, 
PEA assists study of these forces specifically between the bases and local community. 
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particularly interrealtion of coping and shadow or parallel economies. Political Economy 
Analysis therefore provides an additional tool to examine in what ways the presence of a 
military base affects the local community. Coupled with the ‘thick description’ of the case study 
including interviews with locally hired staff, local businesses and community leaders; and, 
governmental and non-governmental organization studies, the political economy analysis of the 
post conflict environment can illustrate the ways military bases influence interests, incentives 
and constraints at the local level and provide insights toward enduring and sustainable 
peacebuilding. Hence, the political, social and economic factors of the three communities of 
interest, Ferizaj, Prizren and Gjakova, are examined to ascertain whether, and in what ways, the 
military base influences its’ surrounding community. This research therefore, helps to fill a wide 
gap in knowledge, and contributes to post-conflict studies and International Relations theory.   
 
3.3 Case Study Selection 
  
The Republic of Kosovo5 (Kosovo) is one of the newest states globally. As of the 2011 census, 
Kosovo’s population was approximately 1.8 million, with an overall ethnic Albanian majority of 
just over 92% (ASK, 2012).6  Ethnic Serbs accounted for 5.3%, and all other minorities combined 
are estimated at 2.7% (Brunborg, 2002)7. According to the World Bank, Kosovo’s population 
grew at a rate of 0.86% in 2012 (Bank, 2012), and thus these proportions are likely to be nearly 
identical at the end of the research period in 2016.  
  
Prior to its unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008, Kosovo was the 
southernmost province of Serbia, and historically among the poorest regions in the Balkans. 
Particularly during the Cold War period, the predominantly ethnic Albanian province of Kosovo 
                                                             
5 The Republic of Kosovo has not been fully recognized by all of 193 UN members, including Serbia, from which it 
declared independence in 2008. As of late 2015, 108 of 193 countries have formally recognized Kosovo’s 
independence.  
6 The 2011 Census was boycotted by Serbs in northern Kosovo, especially in vicinity of Mitrovica, and in southern 
Kosovo by Serbs and Roma, resulting in a population of 1.5 and 1.1% respectively, therefore, previous data are used.  
7 Bromberg’s 2002 population figures of 5.3% Kosovo Serb and 2.7% for all others identifying neither Albanian or 
Serb are used in place of the official 2011 percentages  
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experienced varying levels of economic investment; cultural and linguistic autonomy and local 
control. However, continued lack of adequate investment and regional political malfeasance, 
coupled with the persistent and increasing discrimination of ethnic Albanians, led to 
widespread demonstrations and eventually demands for independence. The “Dayton Accords”8 
failure to include Kosovo’s status in its final agreement in 1995 incited guerilla style harassment 
of Kosovo’s Serb minority by the covert Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), to which the central, 
predominantly Serb government responded with overwhelming force, including ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ tactics. As conflict escalated into open war and Kosovo Albanian and Serb refugees 
threatened regional stability, the international community, particularly NATO military forces, 
intervened.  
The war in Kosovo ended in June 1999 with the adoption of UN Resolution 1244 which 
established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and 
authorized the posting of approximately 50,000 multi-national military forces, the Kosovo 
Forces, known as KFOR, for oversight and security. Although UNMIK officially terminated its 
oversight mission in 2012, UN advisors, EULEX9 and KFOR remain. The number of military 
personnel posted in Kosovo have been reduced from the initial deployment of 50,000 to less 
than 20,000, however continued strained relations between the governments of Kosovo and 
Serbia still fuel antagonistic acts by factions of former belligerents. These prolong a fear of 
renewed conflict by NATO and military leaders, thereby extending the presence of the multi-
national military forces in Kosovo (Cook, 2008) 
3.3.1 Kosovo as Case Study  
Kosovo was selected as a case study because it offers three significant characteristics:  first, a 
substantial and active presence of multi-national military forces operating in a peacekeeping 
                                                             
8 The Dayton Agreement or Dayton Accords is a colloquialism for the General Framework Agreement for Peace 
(GFAP) meeting held at Wright-Paterson Airforce Base near Dayton, Ohio, United States to end hostilities between 
Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
9 European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo: a civilian task force to support law enforcement, prosecutors and 
the judiciary to facilitate use of international legal standards.  
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environment that has continuously interacted with its community. Second, a long political 
trusteeship, which tends to limit the agency of actors at both the federal and the local 
community level, and therefore community leaders may establish relationships with the 
military base to serve as a ‘political voice.’ Third, Kosovo has received a high level of technical 
and economic investment by the international community10 in parallel with military operations 
within the same compact area for over a decade, thus comparison of the effects of the practices 
of military bases on communities may be more efficiently and effectively studied.  
 
The period of study of these bases in Kosovo is approximately twelve years; beginning in 1999 
upon the implementation of UN Resolution 1244, which ended open conflict in Kosovo, to mid-
2012 when the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) officially terminated its supervision. 
This period also provides a sufficient passage of time to examine the social, political and 
economic changes occurring since the arrival of the international community and military forces 
in Kosovo, and to observe its evolving political economy. 
3.3.2 Kosovo’s Permissive Environment  
 
In addition to Kosovo’s structural usefulness as a case study to examine the effects of the day-
to-day practices of military bases established in a post conflict environment, Kosovo’s post 
conflict environment is also militarily suitable. Research where military peacekeeping forces are 
deployed is inherently risky. However, the Republic of Kosovo provides a uniquely safe, or 
permissive11 environment; there have been few extended outbreaks of violence since the riots 
in 2004, and KFOR actively maintains a force of nearly 20,000 soldiers for a population of 
approximately 2 million people to maintain a “safe and secure environment”. Thus, this is 
research design was able to be conducted in a relatively straightforward manner, and required 
                                                             
10 Rossi states Kosovo is relatively stable in appearance, but remains in a ‘frozen conflict’ concerning relations 
between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, stultifying political, social and economic progress (Rossi, 2013)  
11 A combat environment where one does not need to have a high degree of fear for personal or unit safety. 
According to the United States Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0) a permissive environment is one “in which the host 
country military and law enforcement agencies have control, as well as the intent and capability to assist operations 
that a unit intends to conduct”.  
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no extraordinary concerns for the physical security of participants or in the ability to travel 
freely, in contrast with locations where overt hostility and violence have not yet ceased.  
3.3.3 Community Selection 
KFOR bases are located in Kosovo’s larger cities. This research is formed by a comparison of 
three cities, or communities, in their same-named municipalities: Ferizaj and Prizren, each of 
which has a Kosovo Forces (KFOR) military base that was established in 1999; and Gjakova, 
which shares several physical characteristics of both Ferizaj and Prizren but does not have a 
military base. Camp Monteith, a US military base in the municipality of Gjilan12 is included in 
this research as it was operated concurrently by the US military for five years, and a large 
number of workers were transferred to Camp Bondsteel when Camp Monteith closed in 2005. 
The bases in Ferizaj, (Camp Bondsteel), and Prizren, (Camp Prizren), have continued their 
operations without interruption since 1999. The cities of Ferizaj and Prizren were chosen 
because they are both majority Kosovo Albanian cities, and the US and Germany deployed 
similar sized military forces13 to these bases. The largest city and capital of the Republic of 
Kosovo, Pristina, with an official population of 199,868 (OSCE, 2013) was specifically not 
included in the research. The reasons for its non-selection are twofold: first, Pristina includes 
the NATO Headquarters for Kosovo as well as a number of small single NATO-member military 
contingents. Second, Pristina also contains a substantial international non-military presence, 
including embassies and international and non-governmental organizations’ headquarters, 
most of which are physically concentrated in the same small part of the city. Thus, discerning 
the particular effects of the military presence from the international civilian presence becomes 
problematic and Pristina was eliminated for study.  
 
                                                             
12 The Municipality of Gjilan is adjacent to the Municipality of Ferizaj; the bases were approximately 15 miles apart, 
sharing administration. 
13 The Italian military force in Peja is one of the smallest, 2,300 personnel, and is less than half of the US forces in 
Ferizaj (7,000) or German forces in Prizren (8,500). The French military deployed 7,000 personnel to Mitrovica, which 
has a substantial proportion of Kosovo Serb.  
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3.4 Terminology and Definitions  
The research question contains four foundational concepts requiring definition: post-conflict, 
peacebuilding, political economy and, power. For the purpose of this research, Post-conflict is 
defined as the period following major armed conflict where open conflict and hostilities may 
have ended, but there is not yet real peace (Brahimi, 2007), a time period that may last several 
years.  
The second, Peacebuilding is defined as specific initiatives and activities that are designed to 
prevent the eruption or return of armed conflict (AUSA & CSIS, 2002; Brahimi, 2007; Call & 
Cousens, 2007; Schirch, 2004; United Nations, 2017). These programs and activities include 
advocacy, economic investment and development; education, good governance and policy 
making training, and development of civil society organizations.  
The third concept, Political Economy, is defined here as the outcome “of the social relations, 
particularly the power relations that mutually constitute the production, distribution and 
consumption of resources ...” (Mosco, 2009:2). The post-conflict literature broadly states 
political economy evolves and emerges as a result of the balance of responses between the 
populace and the local elite, within local context and history (Call & Cousens, 2007; Collinson, 
2003; Dobbins, 2013; Doyle, 2006; Pugh, 2005), and continues to evolve, change and reproduce 
(Cheng, 2013; Coyne, 2008; Mosco, 2009; Wendt, 1992).  
The final concept is Power, and is similarly socially constructed (Barnett & Duvall, 2005: 
Biersteker & Weber, 1996; Wendt, 1999). It is composed of an interaction of relationships, 
meanings, ideas, culture and context (Wendt, 1999). Power is often held as the capacity to have 
‘compellance over’ or ‘compellance to,’ especially in relation to the control of resources and 
other “strategic interests” through overt or covert use of violence (Bilgin & Berivan, 2008; 
Mattern, 2008; Nye, 2006; Waltz, 1979). However, power is equally relevant in describing the 
hierarchy within social, ethnic and kin ties through the control of social relations and acceptable 
behavior, or control of information, opportunity and choices (Bardhan, 2005; Barnett & Duval, 
63 
 
2005; Earle, 1997; Lukes, 2005; Richmond, 2011). Bueno de Mesquita states “an orientation of 
power on State relations, is only a backdrop to consider power relations at the community 
level” (Bueno de Mesquita, 2008). Therefore, the arrival of military forces, and whose initial 
relationships with the local community are most likely formed by chance, may have a significant 
impact on both community stability and peacebuilding operations.  
 
3.5 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
 
The field research is based on the central research question:  
 “How do the everyday practices of military bases established in post-conflict environments 
affect the post-war political economy and what are the implications for peacebuilding?”  
 
The research examines three principal areas relating to the establishment of a military base and 
forms three hypotheses. The first concerns the economic impact of the initial construction and 
establishment of the military base on the local community. The emphasis is on the military base 
as an employer and direct consumer of goods and services.  
Hypothesis 1 
o There is an initial surge in demand for labor, building material and construction 
services for base construction, where the military base becomes a ‘positive shock’ of 
employment and business opportunities at the local level (McClure, 2000; Williams, 
2005).  
 
However, literature strongly suggests returning expatriates and foreign-owned businesses arrive 
to take advantage of the economic opportunities (Bhatia, 2005; LeRiche, 2004; Richmond, 2010; 
Studdard, 2005; Woodward, 2002), crowding out local residents and businesses, thus benefits 
of the early ‘positive shock’ to the local community may be denied, or limited.  
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Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported by examples derived from archival material and interviews, 
including: the presence/absence of initial rapid and wide scale employment of unskilled and 
semi-skilled laborers from the local area; substantial hiring of local construction companies; 
large and ongoing purchase of building materials (quarried gravel, concrete mix, lumber) and 
equipment from local businesses; and the opening of small retail or restaurants in response to 
the increase in persons with disposable income. Archival and primary data will show a rise in 
local entrepreneurs, while anecdotes are likely to be the main source to support the influx of 
extra-community individuals and businesses that are often stated to arrive specifically to take 
part in economic opportunities created by the military base construction (Carnahan, 2006; 
Durch, 2004; Sciarra, 2008).   
 
Hypothesis 2 
The focus is the military base as a catalyst for secondary economic activities and effects. The 
outcomes of these circumstances are expected to be mixed and vary in relation to preexisting 
conditions and social and cultural norms; illicit business practices are projected to be largely 
negative and outside of the primary economy. 
o Hypothesis 2 states, the income generated by employment at the military base will 
have a temporary inflationary effect on the local economy, and the income 
generated by employment at the military base will create substantial new revenue 
generating opportunities.  
 
Hypothesis 2 examines fundamental economic effects noted in the international and non-
governmental organization literature, including the indirect economic and social effects of 
hiring local personnel (Higate & Henry, 2004; Sciarra, 2008), and the emergence of a “balloon 
economy,” whereby prices for daily commodities such as food, lodging and fuel will rise to take 
advantage of the higher incomes of international actors and their local employees, placing 
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these commodities beyond the reach of many in the local community (Carnahan, 2006; Durch, 
2004; Paris & Sisk, 2009; Woodward, 2002). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 will examine primary and 
secondary data for examples of inflationary effects, such as increases in the cost of food, fuel 
and rent in those communities with a high proportion of employees at the military base. 
However, the high incomes paid by international organizations may also catalyze sustainable 
revenue generating business enterprises that continue to benefit the base communities.  
 
A separate, and concurrent issue concerns the economic effects of military use and/or damage 
to key infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, on civilian agriculture and commerce. The 
effects are expected to be neutral to positive overall due to the probable low level of commerce 
and agriculture in the early post-conflict environment, accompanied by the military proclivity of 
improving the local transportation infrastructure it relies upon for its own freedom of 
movement (Army, 2000). A high incidence of anecdotes and complaints noted during interviews 
or found in archival data with corresponding low evidence of remedy or repair will support the 
supposition that continued use and unrepaired damage of transportation routes will limit and 
impede restoration of civilian commerce and agriculture. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
The quality of relationships between the military base and local leaders will affect the 
comparable relationships between local leaders and the community at large (Lynch, 1970; 
Sharp: 1990). The emphasis is the military base as a political agent. Where elite control is 
destructive and high, the effects on the community will be stifled and constrained, thus the 
overall outcome of these relationships on the community would be expected to be neutral to 
negative (Münch, 2013).  
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o Hypothesis 3 submits local elites will seek opportunities to further consolidate and 
strengthen their interests by increasing their relationships and proximity to the 
military base; the military therefore becomes a personal source for elites’ economic 
opportunities 
 
The post conflict literature states that as the absence of legitimate governance and lack of 
economic progress continues, war leaders and local elites will increase negative pressure on 
their communities through informal relationships, especially with important familial, ethnic and 
other sub-groups, to remain loyal to them, even as these leaders will often exploit those same 
relations for social and/or financial support (Arnall, et al., 2013; Cheng, 2013; Coyne, 2008; 
Münch, 2013; Sorensen, 1991; Torjesen, 2013; Verkoren & Junne, 2012; Vlahos, 2005). Hence, 
local elites will leverage real or ostensible relationships with the military base to cement their 
positions as leaders and power brokers in their community, thereby entrenching themselves as 
leaders, a condition similar to the consequences of warlord-controlled aid distribution in 
Somalia and Afghanistan (Bhatia, 2005; LeBillion, 2008; Münch, 2013).  
This post-conflict elite capture contrasts with urban planning and base closing literature which 
find the close economic and political relationships between the military and local elites, and 
between the military and the community tend to diffuse away from the military over time; 
more simply, the initial close relationships do not endure. In this non-post conflict alternate, 
direct economic effects decrease and become less centered on the military base, while non-
military related economic effects increase (Lynch, 1970; Sharp, 1990). Therefore, a convergence 
of similar responses obtained from interviews, observations, and documents across the areas of 
interest pointing to particular individuals or exclusive groups is necessary to support the third 
hypothesis. Their absence or disagreement with material gained through desk and field 
research will demonstrate some other factor, whether in addition to, or instead of those 
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expected, is highly significant and will require additional inquiry, a valid result of both case 
studies14 and political economy analysis.  
 
This third hypothesis is especially contextual and relies directly on understanding the political 
and social relationship between the community elites and the community at large to ascertain 
pre-war norms of leadership and cooperation (Call & Cousens, 2007; Coyne, 2008), in order to 
identify changes that may have resulted from the establishment and practices of the bases. 
Therefore, it is also necessary to determine whether the relationships between war elites, 
community leaders and the community are indeed as negative and predatory as anticipated 
from literature, from the communities’ point of view (Filipov, 2006). Evidence of these 
relationships will include instances of exclusive business and contractor lists15, where tenders 
should have been broadly distributed but were not; pervasive examples of quid pro quo 
between community leaders and select businesses; and, formation of in-groups and out-groups, 
as a result. Corroborating details of these business opportunities gained from interviews in the 
field will reinforce the third hypotheses, even as that same data is acknowledged to likely be 
colored by the passage of time. Similarly, interviews and anecdotes will indicate whether local 
elites had resisted change or stifled community growth where they do not benefit, a finding 
that is constant within both post-conflict and base closing literature (Lynch, 1970; Münch, 2013; 
Robinson & Green, 1989).  
 
3.6 Research Sample  
The purpose of the research is to fill the gap in knowledge concerning outcomes of everyday 
activities and relationships between a military base established after conflict and its local 
community to understand its political economy and longer-term consequences for 
                                                             
14 Yin notes case studies “… may infer new propositions, hypothesis, addition of new variables, or synthesis of new 
theories.”   
15 Discovery of such flagrant lists will be unlikely. Instead, interviews with businesses would illustrate whether there 
is a predominance of contracts that favor a very small number of vendors, leading to further inquiry.  
68 
 
peacebuilding. Interviews were conducted in the cities of Ferizaj and Gjilan near Camp 
Bondsteel first due to the greater volume of material and literature available on these 
communities16 from which to locate interviewees, followed by the city of Prizren and Camp 
Prizren. A wide range of sub-groups were sampled; military leaders, community leaders/elites 
and community members to reach a minimum of 25 interviews per location, for a minimum 
total number of 50. The sample also included community members that presently work or have 
worked on the military bases, including retail contractors17, as well as vendors and businesses 
that currently or had supplied goods and services to the military base; and local businesses that 
have or have had military patrons. The sample of community leaders and elites are those that 
likely to have, or have had, a relationship with the military base18. These include formal, 
appointed or elected officials; informal unelected leaders and opinion shapers who control or 
influence community resources and beliefs, and those that hold special knowledge (Arnall, et 
al., 2013; Rubin & Rubin, 2005). This group also includes large business owners as well as 
‘elected leaders’ of opposition or shadow governments, but excludes organized crime which 
may have influence, but is not generally community based. The community at large includes all 
other residents, comprised of the permanent and semi-permanent population of the persons, 
businesses and organizations geographically collocated to the military base.  
 
The initial selection of persons to interview is by their relevant position or function, through 
review of grey (organizational) literature, including the US Army National Guard and NATO 
Kosovo Forces website, and former personal professional contacts. “Snowballing” was used as 
necessary to increase both the quantity and the quality of interviews. The interviews were 
                                                             
16 Predominantly US and NATO developed or focused materials, including books, journal articles and the 
organization’s website.  
17 Particularly for Camp Bondsteel, base retail shops are typically run by local businesses as contractors to the US 
contractor B&R, and are not employees.  
18 Ongoing will be defined as meeting twice-monthly or more often for a substantive portion of the military 
leadership’s posting, e.g., four months out of six months posting; for nine months out of a twelve-month posting.  
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semi-structured, opening with similar basic questions followed by situationally appropriate 
questions19 in a conversational manner and in an informal office or restaurant setting.  
3.6.1 Data Quality 
Due to the limited research concerning the establishment of military bases established after 
conflict, no comparable data is available. Therefore, the interview questions are based on the 
effects and influences of international organizations have had in the local community, such as 
the 2006 United Nations study “Economic Impact of Peacekeeping” (Carnahan, 2006). The 12-
year lapse between the initial establishment of the KFOR camps in 1999 and the interviews 
increases the likelihood that memories of many events will have faded, were forgotten, or that 
events would be remembered either more positively or negatively than had actually occurred. 
This possibility is mitigated by advance deskwork to become familiar with the local community 
and, by asking the same basic open-ended questions, framing the questions with similar events 
when appropriate. As example, “A bakery owner I met recently told me his bakery was visited 
by KFOR personnel to buy bread for their cafeteria. How did you come to provide ‘X 
product/service’ for the Camp?”  It is anticipated that responses to interview questions will be 
quite similar; unusual responses will stimulate further discussion and examination. Outlier 
responses will be examined on a by case basis for additional study or consideration for removal 
from the data set.  
 
3.6.2 Researcher Positionality 
This research is particularly unique as it is developed as a participant observer; the researcher is 
closely affiliated with a part of the group under study, yet is still an outsider. Corbin, Dwyer & 
Buckle (2009) quote Adler and Adler, who identify three “membership roles” of qualitative 
researchers engaged in [such] observational methods: (a) peripheral member researchers, who 
                                                             
19 All interviewees are asked the same broad questions; military personnel, local base employees, business owners, 
community leaders, etc. have additional questions relative to their position or function.  
70 
 
do not participate in the core activities of group members; (b) active member researchers, who 
become involved with the central activities of the group without fully committing themselves to 
the members’ values and goals; and (c) complete member researchers, who are already 
members of the group or who become fully affiliated during the course of the research“. This 
researcher falls in the third category. Although currently observing and conducting interviews 
as an outsider, this researcher had deployed to Kosovo as a member of KFOR as a civil military 
operations officer for over a year with US Army National Guard from 2008 to 2009 at one of the 
military bases under study, Camp Bondsteel, and is currently a member of the US Army 
Reserve. This military perspective and insider knowledge is rare in academic International 
Relations research: the review of grey and academic literature by non-military researchers often 
concentrates on macro and federal-level policies and plans. Moreover, these researchers tend 
to either over-generalize positive outcomes, or single-mindedly focus on the negative, excluding 
the wider context of civil and military operations.  
 It is anticipated as a member of the military, and former KFOR soldier will be viewed as more 
trustworthy by members of the military or military contractors in the interviews, and therefore 
likely to elicit more comprehensive responses than would a comparable non-military 
researcher. Undoubtedly, the potential for both positional blindness and bias, the inability to 
see how certain military processes or activities are experienced in terms of social and economic 
power by others, due to a long membership in the armed forces, are particularly high. Yet this 
same membership can also provide unique perspective and insight not otherwise possible.  
Nevertheless, positive conversations are not guaranteed. Membership in the military may solicit 
negative or limited responses in some civilian interviewees that hold oppositional stances to 
military intervention, including Kosovo Serbs and field workers for international and non-
governmental organizations. This circumstance may evoke less cooperation and comprehensive 
responses than would otherwise be given. Acknowledging these tendencies, in interviews and 
analysis, will require diligent testing and a continual challenge of assumptions and 
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generalizations formed by the empirical data. Thus, the foremost principle is caution; to be 
continually aware of unintentional personal bias, particularly concerning how military 
membership may be perceived by the interviewees, and to address them as they occur.  
3.6.3 Research Ethics and Confidentially 
As Yin notes, particularly for qualitative research, it is incumbent upon the researcher to 
conduct their research with a high regard for accuracy and data integrity (Yin, 2015). There are 
three primary concerns for researcher ethics in field research: precautions to ensure research 
participant’s privacy and confidentiality; to protect research participants from harm; and, to 
assure participation and response are completely voluntary.  
Prior to interviewing, participants receive a research acknowledgement form in the participant’s 
preferred language (Albanian, English, Serbian) describing the research, and emphasizing 
participation is voluntary and may be stopped at any time for any reason. To protect privacy 
and confidentiality, individual names acquired during the interviews are coded by initials and 
the date of interview, and listed in numerical order. Individuals are strictly referred to by their 
interview number in text. The original materials are disposed per university procedures.  
While this research has been prepared in careful accordance with the University of Reading’s 
research guidelines, as a participant-observer researcher, it is also necessary to be especially 
cognizant of continued membership in the US military which may infer some ability to assist 
with community issues. As a result, all interview introductions include the disclosure that this 
research is conducted solely as a scholarly endeavor, and is not related to present membership 
in the US military, nor an outcome of a previous deployment to Kosovo.  
 
3.7 Overview and Challenges  
The Kosovo field research was conducted between May and August 2014, with a follow up 
research visit to the Municipality of Gjakova in October 2016. The initial interview time frame 
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was approximately 50 days before the European vacation period20, and the out-rotation of the 
Brigade Combat team from Camp Bondsteel, allowing good access to local officials, businesses 
and military personnel. Interviews were concentrated in the majority ethnically Albanian cities 
of Ferizaj, Gjilan, and Prizren; a total of 84 semi-structured interviews and an additional 10 
informal conversations were held, the majority of which were with local business owners and 
community leaders. The second two-week research period in October 2016 was conducted to 
focus on business growth and local investment.  
3.7.1 Loss of Access to Military Bases  
With little prior notice all access, including accompanied access, to both Camp Bondsteel and 
Camp Prizren was denied. This prevented any review of on-site historical records and 
documents relating to the establishment or maintenance of the military bases, posing a 
significant barrier to examine or discuss hiring and purchasing procedures21. In addition, Camp 
Bondsteel is operated by US government civilians and contractors; all but one individual 
declined requests to be interviewed. Moreover, the US military unit is a tenant of the base with 
little influence on base operations or hiring and purchasing decisions. As a result, there was an 
immediate turn to remote civilian acquaintances from the 2008-2009 KFOR deployment; an 
outreach to former military co-workers and contacts for additional referrals, and to military, 
professional and organizational journals and websites to locate suitable interviewees. Cold-
calling or visiting without an appointment was also used, especially in Prizren, due both to the 
absence of contacts, and the limited published and internet material concerning early Camp 
Prizren operations.  
 
 
                                                             
20 Continental Europeans often take their annual vacations during the months of July and August. Kosovars living 
abroad return to visit family during much of this period, making local residents less available for interview.  
21 The US Federal Acquisition Regulations and policies used at Camp Bondsteel is available at 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/far.html; corresponding regulation was not located for Camp Prizren.  
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3.7.2 Interviewee Fears  
Lack of base access was amplified by the refusal of the overwhelming majority of both former 
and currently employed local residents to be interviewed for fear of losing their jobs22 or 
potential future opportunities. Business owners and vendors were likewise reluctant to meet 
for fear of losing their business relationship with their base. Especially in the cities of Ferizaj and 
Gjilan, and on the US base Camp Bondsteel, this anxiety is likely to have had root in the highly 
publicized National Security Agency (NSA) intelligence leaks by a former Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) employee some six months earlier.23  Casual conversations taking place between 
former acquaintances, or during occasional shopping and daily restaurant visits are not included 
in the total number of interviews, but their comments are occasionally included in background, 
and referenced accordingly.  A breakdown of the interviewees is found in Table 3.1 and Table 
3.2 below.  
 
              Field Interviews: May-August 2014 
Interviewee 
type 
Base 
Employee 
Business 
Owner 
Local 
elite/ 
leader 
Community 
member 
Military/Mil 
Contractor 
IO/NGO 
member 
Current  3 19 20 5 6 (Local)     7 
Former 8    2 (Ex-Pat)   4 
             Table 3.1                                                                                                                      
                                                   
Additional fieldwork was conducted in October 2016 to gain additional data concerning the 
locally perceived and actual economic benefit and likelihood of investment due to proximity to 
a military base. Local banks required permission through the Central Bank of Kosovo prior to 
interview, which was only granted at the end of the research visit, limiting the number of these 
                                                             
22 Local civilians working on the US base were polygraphed regularly. Although they were not prevented from being 
interviewed, most did not want to risk having participated in an interview.  
23 WikiLeaks and similar incidents often initiate increased security and threat awareness measures in government 
and military organizations, including safety briefings, minimizing unofficial visits and not speaking with personnel 
outside one’s organization.  
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interviews. Government officials and academics were generally accommodating, providing a 
second meeting when necessary. Table 3.2 provides a breakdown of interviews in October 
2016.  
 
                                                            Field Interviews24: October 2016 
Interviewee 
type 
Business 
Investor  
Academic: 
Economics 
Bank/Finance 
Institution 
Community 
member 
Military/Mil 
Contractor 
Gov’t 
Official 
Current  2 2 1 1  6 
Former     1  
             Table 3.2                                                                                                                      
                                                   
3.8 Summary  
Interviews were coded and/or transcribed at the end of each day and consolidated at the end 
of the week. As the interview questions were based on the initial hypothesis statements, the 
responses were roughly ‘pre-binned’ into categories. However, the interview responses 
contained more overlap between categories than anticipated. More importantly, the responses 
received during the interviews radically differed from the anticipated answers based on the 
literature review, especially concerning the absence of a balloon economy; the cool, formal 
relations between the military base and political elites/leaders, and an overall little indication of 
illicit activities, particularly prostitution. The literature-incongruent responses remained 
consistent throughout the interviews, and between the initial three cities25, evoking further 
examination of the literature and initial hypotheses. Thus, this thesis broadened its inquiry to 
include a closer examination of the bases’ effect upon each communities’ unique political, social 
and economic characteristics.  
                                                             
24 Additional interviews were scheduled but not completed due to interviewee no-shows, interviewee illness and 
interpreter scheduling conflicts.  
25 Similar responses were received in the October 2016 visit.  
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Chapter 4: Political and Economic History of Kosovo 
4.0 Introduction 
To understand the political-economic aspects of establishing military bases in a post-conflict 
environment, it is important to put the military base into the wider historical context of 
Yugoslavia’s history and political economy. To that end this chapter provides an overview of the 
former Yugoslavia, including its early relationship with Soviet Russia. 
The 1945 Yugoslavia was a federation that was formed by combining existing Balkan nations26 
and former kingdoms under Marshal Josip Broz Tito after the Second World War. In 1946, 
Yugoslavia became a communist state whose system was based upon the Soviet Union’s 
political-economic plan; it was under Tito that Yugoslavia established wide ranging political, 
social and economic reforms to close the development gap between the six constituent 
republics, not only to increase the wealth of Yugoslavia, but also to solidify his central control 
and suppress nationalism. The redistribution required to improve conditions in less developed 
republics ultimately resulted in wide-ranging resentment in the wealthier republics. The 
circumstantial and systemic discrimination of ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province of 
Kosovo led, first, to their apartheid conditions, and then to their state authorized oppression. 
The collapse of communism, the war in adjacent Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the failure of 
international community to address the grievances of Kosovars about their conditions through 
the Dayton Accords enabled the formation of the guerilla-style Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). 
The KLA, using hit-and-run tactics, successfully leveraged media attention of Serb “ethnic 
cleansing” to gain global interest in Kosovo. The resulting peace operations by the United 
Nations and NATO in 1999 established an international trusteeship and military presence that 
continues to the present day.  
                                                             
26 Defined as people groups possessing a common heritage, language and cultural identity (Global Policy Forum, 
2017) 
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This chapter is comprised of three sections. The first is a timeline of key political events in the 
establishment of Yugoslavia. The second introduces military bases in Kosovo; the third describes 
the military intervention in Kosovo by NATO in 1999 and establishment of KFOR. It argues that 
the influence of military bases must be viewed in relation to Yugoslavia’s overall political and 
economic environment to be understood, rather than as either a political or economic 
phenomenon alone.  
4.1 Section Introduction   
This section first examines leading characteristics of Kosovo’s history, politics and economy in 
the latter half of the 20th century. It opens with a brief study of the regional history and 
introduces the initial political setting, including the establishment of post-1945 Yugoslavia 
under Marshall Josip Broz Tito, and the break in relations between Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia 
in 1949. It then examines four major political periods in Yugoslavia where crises brought about 
sweeping change from the Federal to the local levels, noting their effects on Kosovo in 
particular: the promulgation of the 1953 Yugoslav Constitution; the outcomes of the revised 
Yugoslav Constitution in 1974; the Kosovo State of Emergency until 1988, and the loss of 
autonomy in 1989. An examination of these events in view of Kosovo’s specific political and 
economic conditions illuminates how these events have shaped contemporary relationships 
between the local community and Kosovo government. This section concludes with 
considerations of contemporary military base effects on the local overall political economy.  
4.2 Establishing Yugoslavia 
The nations, people groups and states located between the eastern-most edge of continental 
Europe, and western-most edge of Russia and Asia form the area informally known as the 
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Balkans27. For centuries, this region has been geographically important as a bridge between East 
and West for trade. It was ruled by various empires for some 11 centuries, the most recent 
being the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the latter lasting nearly 500 years until the 
early 20th century. At its peak, the Ottomans extended from their origins in Turkey to as far 
north as the outskirts of Vienna, Austria. Their influence on customs, language, government and 
religion remain throughout the Balkans, most especially in the southernmost regions, including 
Kosovo28.  
The political origin of the contemporary Balkans stems from treaties enacted at the Berlin 
Congress in 1878 and the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire after the First World War, 
which led to the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Bideleux & Jeffries, 
2007; Hashi, 1992). This new kingdom was governed by Serb King Petar Karadjordjevic who 
established an aggressive pro-Serb dictatorship and relocation program. This forced out the 
mostly ethnic Albanians in the south from their homes and farms, replacing them with ethnic 
Serbs and Montenegrins. His successor, son Alexandar Karadjordjevic, renamed the kingdom 
‘Yugoslavia’ in 1929, and he continued a similarly autocratic rule until 1945 when he was 
strongly encouraged to by Allied leaders to abdicate his throne in favor of the anti-Axis Marshall 
Tito.   
During the Second World War Marshall Broz Tito had been the leader of an anti-Nazi resistance 
group, the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia, colloquially 
known as the Partisans, which liberated Belgrade from the German Army in 1944 (Benson, 
2001; Lampe, 2000), and contributed to the withdrawal of German forces from Serbia. Tito was 
a committed communist but downplayed his participation and leadership in the Communist 
                                                             
27 The Balkans are generally comprised of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Romania, Serbia and Slovenia. Greece and Turkey are also, but less commonly, considered part of the Balkans. The 
word ‘Balkan’ is Turkish for mountain/ous, descriptive of the regional geography.  
28 The Ottomans introduced Islam to the Balkan region; much of Albania, Kosovo, parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
enclaves in Macedonia continue to identify themselves as Muslim.  
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Party until he was formally recognized and had become president of the former Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia (Benson, 2001:84; Makai, 2014).  
Tito’s Yugoslavia was a federation of six republics, including what are now Bosnia-
Herzegovina29, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro. Serbia’s lands also 
included two regions containing large non-Serb ethnic majorities, known as the autonomous 
Provinces30 of Vojvodina and Kosovo31. (See map of 1946 Yugoslavia, Map 4.1.) 
 
 
These six territories officially became Yugoslavia’s Republics in 1946. Formally, each Republic 
had equal authority and voice in the central government; rights of secession and could maintain 
                                                             
29 Bosnia-Herzegovina gained Republic status in 1946. 
30 According to the constitution, the populations of Vojvodina and Kosovo were not “a people.” such as the Bosnians, 
Croats and Serbs, but were comprised of nationalities originating outside of Yugoslavia, and therefore the Yugoslav 
lands they occupied could not be recognized as a Republic.  
31 Kosovo was legally a ‘Region,’ with less status and governing authority than a Province. However, for the sake of 
simplicity, the term ‘province’ is used throughout this thesis.  
Yugoslavia 1946-1981 
Map 4.1.   Map courtesy of ICRC 
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its own language and culture (Hashi, 1992). However, the two Provinces, ethnically-Hungarian 
Vojvodina on the northern border of Serbia, and ethnically-Albanian Kosovo on the south-west 
border of Serbia and Albania, remained a part of the Republic of Serbia and their internal 
governance was closely controlled, as were the extent and conditions of their autonomy.  
4.2.1 The Nationalities Problem 
The spirit of Communism was expected to overcome national identities (Gulyas, 2014). 
However the practical details of unifying the individual ethnic groups into a single federated 
State of Yugoslavia, known as the Nationalities Problem, was unforgivingly complex. The 
dilemma of the Nationalities Problem was how to create political unity from recently 
antagonistic ethnic groups that were also on a wide spectrum of social and economic 
development levels. The relatively undeveloped republics, would require substantial investment 
from the wealthier republics for their development. In addition, each of the new republics 
contained varying proportions of its neighbors’ ethnic groups, and these internal sub-groups 
often had their own history and had established ties and alliances outside that republic (Lampe, 
2000). In addition, each of the population groups were likewise comprised of – and sometimes 
divided by – their three primary religions: Catholicism, Islam and Orthodoxy. This social-political 
mix was further leavened by the aforementioned large disparities in economic development. In 
general, those regions in northern Yugoslavia with established trade in Western Europe, or 
which had been part of the Austro-Hungarian or Hapsburg Empire, were far more socially and 
economically developed than the regions below the Sava River. The republics south of the Sava 
River had included most of Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro and the Province of Kosovo32. 
Within the first year, Yugoslavia’s central government had established a comprehensive 
investment program to lift the economic level of the less developed Republics “… to become 
                                                             
32 The development level of Serbia and the Province of Vojvodina were in the middle of these extremes. 
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closer to that of the more developed Republics. Only when the economic disparities are evened 
out can anything like the ‘equalities of nationalities’ be achieved” (Hashi, 1992:53). Yet the 
political structure of the Yugoslav government made either Republic unity, or economic parity 
alone difficult; the combination was practically impossible (Hashi, 1992; Wilson, 1980). 
Examples of the extreme disparities in social and economic development in Yugoslavia’s eight 
regions in 1947/48 are illustrated in Table 4.1, demonstrating the immensity of closing the 
social and economic gaps33. 
Yugoslavia = 100                      Slovenia Croatia Serbia* Vojvodina Bosnia-Herz. Macedonia Montenegro   Kosovo 
National income per capita       175         107             96           110              84                 62               71                52  
% of national average 
Share of population %                    9           24              26            11               16                   7                  2                  5 
Share of social product %            15           25              26            11               14                   5                  2                  2 
Share of fixed assets (1952) %    20           28              23              9               13                   4                  1                  2  
Share of industry in                      36           30               20            17              21                  20                10                20 
social products %  
Share of agriculture                     30            39              53           67               41                  55                 52               66  
in social products % 
Share of population                      44           62             72            68               72                  71                72                81  
in agriculture % 
Illiteracy % **                                  2          16              27            12              45                  40                26                  63 
Dependents per 100                    76           87            79              97             126              127              150               179 
 active population 
Natural increase                             9             9            13               9                 22                21                 22                 26  
per 1000 population 
Infant mortality                             81         112         91             130               126             136                41                133 
per 1000 births 
  Data courtesy of Iraj Hashi, 1992 
Table 4.1   Key Indicators of Regional Disparity in Yugoslavia, 1947/1948 
                                                             
33 * Republic of Serbia excluding the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina; “Serbia proper.” 
** Share of illiterate population in total population over the age of 10. 
Sources: Jugoslavija 1945-1964, p.87; Yugoslavia 1945-1985, pp.197-218; Mladenovic´ (1965) p.3004. 
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4.3  The Autonomous Region of Kosovo  
While the variance of political and economic capabilities of the Yugoslav Republics were 
substantial, the disparities between the two autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, 
were immense. Serbia had been an important state in the Austrian, Hapsburg and Ottoman 
Empires and was well developed. Belgrade, its capital, had been a key military, political and 
economic center since the 9th century. Its northern province, Vojvodina, was agriculturally well 
endowed, and had benefited from a substantial investment in infrastructure during the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. It had also realized some protection by its association with Austria and 
Hungary during the Second World War. Therefore, Vojvodina was not only considerably more 
developed before the Second World War, but also had sustained less damage during the War 
overall than Kosovo. Under the 1946 Constitution, it became the Autonomous Province of 
Vojvodina. It was lawfully allowed to “… ‘manage enterprises of provincial importance;’ manage 
its cultural and education systems and hold its own courts and elect its own judges” (Kola, 
2003:65).  
The agricultural and economic attributes of Vojvodina contrasted considerably with those of 
Kosovo. Kosovo was mountainous, and agriculturally poor, with mostly small isolated rural and 
undeveloped villages. It contained very little modern infrasructure, and much of that 
infrastructure had been damaged by the war. Kosovo was constitutionaly made an Autonomous 
Region in 1946, rather than a Province, and was required to have its economic, governance and 
judicial systems approved and overseen by the Serbian Parliament (ibid), a substantially inferior 
status to Vojvodina. The final Consititutional decision to incorporate Kosovo as a Region in 
1946, rather than a Province, was contentious among the six Republics, but its rural and 
undeveloped state is likely to be one of the major contributing factors. 
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4.3.1 Kosovo and Albania under Axis Occupation 
For Kosovo Albanians, the decision to remain a part of the Republic of Serbia, and in a 
subordinate political status as a Region, was a betrayal. During the brief period Kosovo had 
been incorporated into the Italian Axis-occupied Albania, between 1940 and 194434, Kosovo 
Albanians had been given significant autonomy as well the promise that it would join Albania 
permanently after the wars end (Judah, 2000; Pavlovic, 2013; Singleton & Carter, 1982). The 
Italian Forces occupying Albania openly encouraged Kosovo Albanians to establish their own 
Albanian language media and education systems specifically to facilitate its integration with 
Albania. These language privileges were withdrawn with the founding of the Federal Peoples 
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945, and Kosovo’s subsequent reincorporation in a lesser status as a 
Region of Serbia. The retraction of the use of the Albanian language in an official capacity led to 
widespread protests by the Kosovo Albanians, some of which became violent (Judah, 2000). 
Similar demonstrations for Kosovo’s autonomy and status as a Republic, and its demands to 
rejoin Albania occurred as well, but were swiftly quashed by Serb military forces before they 
could spread (Benson, 2001; Malcolm, 1998; Mertus, 1999).  
Italy had also encouraged a Kosovo Albanian police force and judicial system during its 
occupation of Albania and Kosovo, and critically, had given Kosovo Albanians the right to bear 
arms, providing them with weapons and ammunition to fight against the communist Yugoslav 
partisans (Vickers, 2006). The arming of Kosovo Albanians led to the intimidation and revenge 
killing of thousands of Serbs and Montenegrins living on land confiscated under Karadjordjevic’s 
Serb-centered colonization programs, (Elsie, 2011; Mertus, 1999; Vickers, 2006)35. Therefore, 
the declaration in the 1946 Yugoslav constitution for Kosovo to become an Autonomous 
                                                             
34 Kosovo Albanian’s freedom to use the Albanian language was a tactic employed by the Italian occupation to 
further Kosovo’s alliance with Albania. Italy had planned to colonize Albania and Kosovo for their resources and for 
greater control of the Mediterranean Sea. 
35 Arming the Kosovo Albanians also facilitated retribution for Serb forced emigration programs; Serb confiscation of 
Albanian land by King Peter, and the widespread killing of Kosovo Albanians occurring after the Balkan Wars, 1912 
and 1913 (Elsie, 2011). Memories of these revenge killings would be still fresh in 1945.  
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Region, instead of Province should not be considered merely a shrewd negotiation tactic for 
Tito (Benson, 2001; Judah, 2000; Mertus, 1999), but as a direct result of his enmity with Kosovo 
Albanians: their collaboration and fighting against the (his) Partisans on behalf of the Italian Axis 
powers; their anti-Yugoslavia protests in 1945, and for suspicions of Kosovo Albanian 
irredentism to join Albania (Benson, 2001; Elsie, 2011).  
4.3.2 Kosovo and Communism  
The 1945 population of Kosovo was estimated to have been just over 700,00036 inhabitants 
(Brumborg, 2002). Although ethnic Albanians comprised less than 10% of the total population 
of Yugoslavia, they comprised approximately 70% of the Province of Kosovo’s population (ibid). 
Nevertheless, the 1946 constitution both codified Kosovo Serbs’ privilege, and strengthened 
their ties to Serbia’s central government. Hence, despite population numbers which made them 
an ethnic minority, Kosovo Serbs habitually held the majority of important and influential 
government positions. This was exacerbated by the small number of Kosovo Albanians who 
were communists.  
Kosovo’s Albanian communist party was slow to gain members; the communist party was 
typically viewed by Kosovo Albanians as ‘a Serb or Slav entity,’ rather than open to all Yugoslavs 
(Malcolm, 1998:300). Therefore, with the new constitution, Serbs dominated all levels of 
government. Particularly at the Municipal level and below, the same person could hold 
positions in both the Council and the powerful communist party People’s Committee (Curtis, 
1992; Hashi, 1992), thereby occupying two seats and thus further reducing ethnic 
representation and diversity. It can be argued that the use of one language would unify 
disparate groups by promoting a common understanding (Riley, 2007). However, once Serbian 
became the sole official language, and public use of the Albanian language was prohibited, 
                                                             
36 The population figure of 700,000 for 1945 is an extrapolation based on 1948 census of 727,820, as Serbia was 
unable to conduct a census in 1941 due to war.  
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Kosovo Albanians were further limited in their political participation and excluded from full 
representation in their own communities (Palairet, 1992). This further deepened the suspicion 
and animosity between the ethnic groups.  
It should be noted that the communist hierarchal structure was unpopular throughout much of 
Yugoslavia (Benson: 2001; Glenny, 1999) including Kosovo, and especially in the small rural 
villages and hamlets37. There, an elder was selected to serve as mayor by the village assembly. 
This was a remnant of Ottoman era consensus building arrangements that were relatively 
efficient (Sevic, 2000). In contrast, under communism local governance was nearly a straight 
line from the Federal level in Belgrade to the community: Federal law was directed from 
Belgrade to the Republic level, where laws were promulgated at the municipal level. The 
municipality subsequently delegated enforcement of the laws to selected offices along with the 
minimum necessary authority to enforce them. In this way the municipality acted as an 
extension of the Central government, rather than an autonomous local administrative unit 
(ibid). As a result, much of the local civil administrative activity in Kosovo, such as resolution of 
land disputes and sale of personal property, would become a federal matter which would often 
favor Kosovo Serbs  (Dimitrijevic, 1994), rather than be addressed locally. Ultimately, the 
communist system undermined and replaced the existing community and social structure, but 
failed to promote either confidence or loyalty to the municipal or federal government (ibid). 
This rigid governance framework continued until the termination of relations between 
Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia in late 1949, when it was replaced by a succession of more 
decentralized systems (Benson, 2001; Sevic, 2000) that eroded unity and further decreased 
confidence in the federal government by the local community.  
 
                                                             
37 The Ottoman Vilayet system of governance was still common in rural villages. The traditional patriarchal clan or 
family structures with common family lands, ‘Zadrugas,’ were typical of all ethnic groups of the rural populace.  
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4.4 Yugoslavia’s break with Soviet Russia   
By 1946 Kosovo was part of the same farm land collectivization plans underway throughout 
Yugoslavia. The Federation-wide plans were permanently altered however, when Yugoslavia 
and Soviet Russia severed their political and economic relations (Glenny, 1999; Lampe, 2000). 
Tito’s unique federation of equal republics, with oversight by locally elected representatives in 
the (local) communist People’s Committees38 had been a significant departure from centrally 
directed Soviet communism. However, it was Tito’s refusal to abandon his regional Yugoslav 
aspirations and bring Yugoslavia more in line with the Soviet system (Benson, 2001:92), to 
become another “extracted-resource satellite for Soviet Russia [that] was unprecedented and 
intolerable” to Stalin (Glenny, 1999:534). Tito’s refusal permanently damaged relations 
between Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia. In 1948 Stalin expelled Tito and Yugoslavia from the 
Cominform39 (Benson, 2001:93; Judah, 2000), and ceased all military support and economic 
transactions with Yugoslavia (Curtis, 1992:48). This included refusal to deliver the post-war 
reconstruction materials and equipment that Yugoslavia had paid for in advance (Lampe, 
2000:246). Stalin imposed punishing embargos and sanctions to halt Yugoslav trade with the 
Soviet Union or with its satellites and directed the Soviet Army to conduct military maneuvers in 
the countries on the Yugoslav borders40 (Curtis, 1992:44; Gulyas, 2014:131). This threatened 
Yugoslavia and her neighbors, which led to renewed militarism in Yugoslav politics, its economy 
and in its foreign relations41 (Benson, 2001; Lampe, 2000:254). 
                                                             
38 Peoples’ Committee members were elected by the local membership by secret ballot to one to four year rotating 
positions; the committee structure was intended to facilitate the municipality to become economically and politically 
self governing (Djordjevic, 1953:189, 195; Petrovich, 1947:524).  
39 The Communist Information Bureau, comprised of communist party representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania and led by the Soviet Union (Yugoslavia was expelled in 1948). The 
Cominform provided unified communist propaganda and direction (Curtis, 1992: 321).  
40 Bulgaria and Romania  
41 The former Allied Powers and the United States in particular, welcomed the opportunity to assist Yugoslavia as a 
means to indirectly confront the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Benson, 2001:94; Heuser, 1989). 
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At the same time, Stalin openly increased his political and economic support for Albania at the 
expense of Yugoslavia (Kaser, 2013:179), which further increased animosity toward Kosovo 
Albanians (Malcolm, 1998:319). Trade between these two countries fundamentally ceased 
when Tito accepted Western aid42 to avoid Yugoslavia’s financial collapse. By the end of 1949 
Yugoslavia was politically and economically isolated from the Soviet Union, its satellites, and 
neighboring Albania. As a result, Tito abandoned rigid adherence to Soviet Russia’s model and 
“reinterpreted” Marxist doctrine to restructure the Yugoslav economy, forming the distinctive 
Yugoslav system of economic self-management (Lampe, 2000:233).  
4.4.1 Yugoslavia’s Self-Management  
The Yugoslav Self-Management was a new political as well as a new economic system, couched 
in terms of “a greater Socialist Consciousness that would supersede National Consciousness” 
(Mertus, 1999:289; also Curtis, 1992:69; Hashi, 1992). Although remaining a communist 
dictatorship, Yugoslav self-management diverged from the Soviet communist authoritarian 
model in three critical ways. The first of these was decentralized governance: The Republics 
would have substantially greater direct control over their internal administrative operations as 
well as those of their Municipalities,’ although Tito personally continued to have veto and 
overall control of the Republics activities. Likewise, the Municipalities gained an increased 
control of their responsibilities. The second difference was a withdrawal of direct involvement 
by the central communist party at the Municipal level. The third difference was a liberalization, 
and the introduction of market or “capitalist” strategies, to improve the productivity and 
efficiency of state and social enterprises, particularly by promoting worker’s ownership in their 
sources of employment. In total, the self-management changes were intended to stabilize and 
stimulate Yugoslavia’s economy by promoting regional resource and infrastructure strengths, 
                                                             
42 Hoxha pursued a hardline communism, including no economic contact with the capitalist West. Tito’s acceptance 
of Western aid was an ideological affront to Hoxha’s absolutist position; Hoxha subsequently ceased all relations with 
Tito and Yugoslavia.  
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while maintaining ideological direction by the central party. The effect however, was to 
politicize industry and revive nationalism.  
The increased nationalism that emerged by the delegation of central government operations to 
the Republic was particularly evident in the Republic of Serbia. Serbia was already first among 
equals by containing both the capitol of Yugoslavia, Belgrade and the center of the communist 
party, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Serb proximity and closeness to the central 
government also gave the Republic of Serbia an advantage, and Serbs were soon over 
represented in all levels of the Yugoslav government43 (Curtis, 1992). Serb dominance in 
government likewise extended to the two less developed provinces, where the antagonistic 
history between Serbia and Vojvodina, and Serbia and Kosovo, was often enough justification 
for ethnically repressive central planning (Lampe & Jackson, 1982; Malcolm, 1998). 
 4.4.2 Systemic Exclusion in Kosovo  
The years between 1946 and 1953, particularly those post-1950, were filled with many of the 
same demands for rapid growth and industrialization in Kosovo that were already taking place 
throughout Yugoslavia44. Yet, the majority of political changes were often negative for Kosovo 
Albanians. It was during this time that Kosovo Albanians gained a recognized education system 
which permitted use of their language in government funded schools (Malcolm, 1998), however 
the primary use of Albanian would prove to significantly limit social, political and economic 
opportunities in the future.  
In addition until 1953, Kosovo’s legal status as a Region meant its local governance continued to 
be closely directed by the Republic of Serbia. As noted earlier, local administration, including 
                                                             
43 Serb dominance in all levels of politics and governance was a source of contention with the non-Serb republics. 
Particularly with regard to the less developed regions, Serbia received federal investment monies intended for the 
economic development of Kosovo and Vojvodina, but was not subsequently obliged to invest in the provinces or be 
accountable for its use; the Federal development funds were not invested in Kosovo until 1947; significant 
development was postponed until 1957. 
44 Kosovo’s economic growth and development are discussed in Chapter 5 
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the judiciary, was conducted through the municipality bureaus and offices, most of which were 
run by Serb and Kosovo Serb officials. As a result, Kosovo Serbs typically received preferential 
treatment and adjudication in civil matters (Dimitrijevic, 1994:20). Moreover, the communist 
party could tighten its demands on local government and civil organizations informally, rather 
than officially as it had through the People’s Committees in the past. In this way, the local 
communist party would pressure for the hiring of its preferred candidates for government 
positions, and hence political acceptability to the party became the primary selection criteria 
for civil employment. Yet even as participation in the Communist Party45 offered access, the 
number of Kosovo Albanian communists remained very small. As a result, Kosovo Albanians 
continued to be a minority in government leadership and had limited influence in their own 
affairs.  
Under self-management, the Peoples’ Committee was no longer a direct part of the municipal 
government, but was teamed with the Serb secret police UBDa46 by the central government. 
These organizations aggressively searched for pro-Soviet communists, and potential and 
suspected Albanian irredentists throughout Kosovo. Individuals and groups were often accused 
of false and trumped up charges to make public examples of them and to prevent the 
emergence of a pro-Albania movement. Punishment ranged from long jail sentences, to years 
of hard labor, to execution (Mertus, 1999:290). In addition, religious schools, especially Islamic 
schools, and religious organizations were banned (Curtis, 1992:107), while Kosovo Albanians 
were encouraged to declare themselves Turks and emigrate to Turkey under a special 
Yugoslavia-Turkic arrangement in 1951 (Lampe, 2000; Malcolm, 1998:323) whereby some 
34,500 Kosovo Albanians emigrated. With the Kosovo Albanians gone, ethnic Serbs and 
                                                             
45 The Communist Party was still seen as a primarily Serb-benefitting organization, thus Albanians had little interest 
to join.  
46 The State Security Service, UBDA, was the Yugoslav secret police. It was known for its brutality, particularly against 
the Kosovo Albanians while under Aleksandar Ranković, Minister of the Interior from 1945-1966. UBDA was 
overwhelmingly Serb, especially Serb peasants and former Partisans; the UBDA was comprised of less than 15% 
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, a source of contention Kosovo-wide. 
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Macedonians were given preferential assistance to encourage their relocation to Kosovo, 
especially especially among former Partesans. This not only reduced the likelihood of Kosovo 
Albanian’s return, and but also marginalized those Albanians who had remained.  
4.5  Revision to Yugoslavia’s Constitution 
The 1953 update to the Yugoslav Constitution “so radically changed the law that it is almost 
considered to be a new Constitution entirely” (Mertus, 1999:289).  Specifically, revisions were 
initiated to promote increased self-governance at the Republic level, which had successive 
though unintended, adverse outcomes for the Kosovo Albanians. First, the new Constitution 
redefined the functions of Federal and Communist Party; and secondly, in conjunction with the 
first, it further delegated its governing authority to the Republics and Municipalities 
(Curtis,1992).  
The first revision was to separate the functions of the Republic and Municipality. The primary 
strategy was to diffuse the authority of the Republic through the establishment of small, self-
governing communities, known as communes47 (Benson, 2001; Curtis, 1992; Trifunovska, 1994; 
Vratusa, 1961). The commune was much smaller than the municipality, and each Republic 
contained several hundred of them48 (Benson, 2001; Curtis, 1992). They held “every political 
authority not specifically delegated to government at the federal or Republic level” (Curtis, 
1992). Each commune contained a source of employment,49 cultural, education and health 
services, as well as control of the local utilities and local planning (Vratusa, 1961). Law 
enforcement and elections were maintained at the larger municipal level, while defense 
remained at the national level.  
                                                             
47 Communes were self-governing local communities; most would merge into the larger municipalities. The 
Commune initially contained its own politial chamber, elected by popular vote, and the Chamber of Producers, 
formed of representatives of the Workers Councils. 
48 Benson cites over 400 communes in some Republics; Curtis states over 500 communes by 1988. 
49 Employment was typically a local factory or cooperative.  
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The Commune system unintentionally marginalized Kosovo Albanians. In Kosovo, Serbs still 
“held over 50 percent of the party positions, and 68 percent of the administrative and leading 
[government] positions, … and were 50 percent of the factory workers” (Malcolm, 1998:323), 
despite comprising a population of just 27 percent of the Province. Thus, the Commune with its 
smaller population and economic capacity, had the effect of fragmenting and reducing both 
overall political representation and economic opportunity for the Kosovo Albanians, while 
strengthing the Kosovo Serb political and economic advantage.   
A significant new responsibility for the Commune was to identify suitable representitives and 
provide a consolidated list of candidates for higher government offices, as well as the Commune 
itself, which would be subsequently vetted by the local communist party. Hence, the commune 
did not have real administrative authority over its hires, resulting in government organizations 
filled by politically appropriate candidates, the majority of them ethnically Serb. While this 
process was not limited to Kosovo, or even to local government, the comparatively small 
number of Kosovo Albanian candidates acceptable to the commmuist party, in addition to 
separation by language, ensured their near-absence in influential government offices (Malcolm, 
1998).  
At the same time, the responsibility of Peoples Committee’s increased to include ensuring 
unconditional loyalty to the communist Party, and “ … a growing obsession with hunting for 
[irredentism and] weapons among Kosovo Albanians” (Malcolm, 1998:321). Through UBDA, 
Kosovo Albanian men were increasingly detained, interrogated, and beaten; or jailed on 
ficticious charges (ibid.). The escalating security directives were fostered by Aleksandar 
Ranković, a hardline Serb nationalist, and Tito’s second in command. Ranković was the director 
of the Yugoslav Ministry of the Interior until 196650 when he was dismissed for ‘discriminitory 
                                                             
50 Ranković was relieved of his position and authority for abuse of power when it was discovered members of Tito’s 
senior staff and officers were wire tapped without Tito’s knowledge.  
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and illegal practices” (Mertus, 1998:290). However, it was only the official discrimination 
against Kosovo Albanians that ended when he was removed from office.  
4.5.1 Relative Autonomy in Kosovo 
Kosovo Albanians gained a series of new civil freedoms and authorities during the 1960’s. First 
among them was its designation as a “social-political community”,51 with significant autonomy 
of governance down to the local level. This granted Kosovo virtually all of the rights of a 
Republic (Benson, 2001).  In 1967 Tito personally directed that Kosovo Albanians be allowed 
increased admission to the Serb-controlled Kosovo government, including hiring for civil and 
industry positions (Malcolm, 1998:324); they may be permitted to establish local laws and 
judiciary,52and to receive Albanian language education to the university level53. Kosovo 
Albanians soon began to join the communist party and eventually gained nearly two-thirds of 
local administrative positions in Kosovo (Malcolm, 1998:326). In addition, the tactic of holding 
simultaneous office in the People’s Party and position in government office was banned to 
“reduce the abuse of power through bureaucratic networks” (Benson, 2001:111; Curtis, 
1992:175). This allowed Kosovo Albanians to hold high party positions that had been formerly 
out of reach. While new laws did not change the underlying antagonistic attitudes of Serbia or 
of Kosovo Serbs, the laws did reduce the overtly discriminatory practices. Kosovo Albanians 
quickly made significant civil, cultural, economic and social progress between 1966-1974. 
Moreover, despite the overall widening economic gap54 between the Yugoslav Republics and 
Kosovo (Bennett, 1995:61; Malcolm, 1998:237; Woodward, 1995), Kosovo itself had improved 
significantly. Nevertheless as Malcolm reminds, this suite of gains and improvements was a 
                                                             
51 ‘Social-political communities’ is the same verbiage used to legally define the Republics.  
52 Kosovo’s internal laws could not conflict with Federal law, or legislative direction of the Republic of Serbia, but 
were otherwise permissible. 
53 Use of the Albanian language, especially in education, became a linguistic ceiling as Albanian is not widely spoken 
outside of Kosovo and Albania.  
54 Among the greatest criticisms of the economic gap was the rise in the Kosovo Albanian population, though more 
typical of the high rural birthrates that are shared throughout the Balkans, than a concerted political strategy to push 
out Serbs (Malcolm,1998:331; Pavlovic, 2013:52).  
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response to feared outcomes of the continued uneven political and economic conditions in 
Yugoslavia, rather than a national will to elevate the social and civil rights of Kosovo Albanians 
(Curtis, 1992; Malcolm, 1998:325) .  
4.6  The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution  
The period between the adoption of the Yugoslav constitution in 1974 and Tito’s death in 1981 
is one of contrasts. First, the 1974 revison to the Yugoslav Constitution gave Kosovo increased 
legal authority55, including a veto over Federal and Serbia’s lawmaking. This gave it nearly the 
same capability as a Republic (Dimitrijevic, 1994:17). However, this new right was given 
primarily to reduce the Republic of Serbia’s dominance in Yugoslav politics (Johnson, 1974) 
rather than to benefit Kosovo.  
At the same time, the increased autonomy also brought additional demands by Kosovo 
Albanians for Kosovo to be legally recognized as a Republic. Whereas it is unlikely that Kosovo 
Albanians would have had serious intent to join Albania, Kosovo Albanians continued press for 
full status as a Republic led many in Yugoslavia to believe that Republic status was only the next 
step toward secession. Consequently, the increased freedoms and gains promolgated by the 
1974 Consitution, particularly freedom of the media and political expression, were tempered by 
closer scrutiny for evidence of Kosovo Albanian nationalism, and especially irredentism 
(Johnson, 1974; Lampe, 2000), which in turn, began a gradual reversal of the substantitive civil 
protections recently granted to Kosovo Albanians.   
Significantly, the 1974 constitution attempted to rein in growing nationalism throughout 
Yugoslavia with two decrees. The first was a further devolution of the administration of political 
and economic (industrial) activities, already at the sub-municipality or commune level, to be 
managed through local worker’s boards and committees. The second decree was a reduction in 
                                                             
55 Kosovo was not given the Republic’s “Right of secession,” but was a Republic in all but the name (Pavlovic, 
2013:56) 
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the number of Republic level representitives that could be nominated to become delegates to 
the communist party, a strategic consolidation of federal power (Lampe, 2000). As active 
political membership in government and industry by Kosovo Albanians was already 
proportionately small,  Kosovo Albanians were essentially marginalized in both the political and 
economic arenas56. 
Contributing to the rise in nationalism was Yugoslavia’s struggle with the effects of its 
centralized and heavy industry economy; meeting its debt obligations and the internal 
pressures of high unemployment. Especially in Kosovo, the rate of young adults entering the 
workforce could not be absorbed by the market (Mertus, 1999). The aforementioned use of 
Albaninan language in public education made finding work outside of Kosovo extremely 
difficult, especially as Kosovo Albanians within Kosovo competed with Kosovo Serbs, who were 
often less qualified, for the same positions (Lampe & Jackson, 1982; Mertus, 1999). Moreover, 
advanced education57 delayed Albanian youths’ entry into the workforce, severely 
overcrowding schools and universities as a result.  
4.7  Post-Tito Yugoslavia and Rise of Slobodan Milošević   
In March 1981, barely a year after Tito’s death, students at the University of Pristina protested 
their poor and overcrowded living conditions. Protests as well as riots erupted again two weeks 
later at both the University of Pristina and University of Prizren. These and later protests 
became violent. Less than a week later, thousands of “civil servants, teachers, miners, factory 
workers, students and others also took to the streets” to protest for better conditions for 
Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo (Mertus, 1999:30). The government response was tear gas; tanks, 
and the mobilization of some 30,000 JNA soldiers to patrol the streets, and, the declaration of a 
                                                             
56 Kosovo Albanians continued to hold some offices, but any substantive influence was reduced, especially outside 
Kosovo.  
57 Mertus also notes the curriculum was predominantly liberal arts, especially Albanian History, further limiting 
employment opportunities.  
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State of Emergency.  These measures were followed by a wide sacking of Kosovo Albanian 
leaders in civil service positions. Many Kosovo Albanians in senior leadership positions were 
replaced by Serbs that had held similar positions under Ranković (ibid:42).  
4.7.1 Revocation of Autonomy 
From the early 1980’s forward, Kosovo Albanians and Kosov Serbs lived in a growing apartheid. 
Sanctioned government hostility toward Kosovo Albanians strained years-long relations 
between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. As Clark reminds,”any gesture of friendship was 
percieved as treason against one’s own community” (Clark, 2000: 77). Pro-Serb and anti-
Albanian propaganda spread throughout Kosovo, and both sides accused the other of 
harassment and human rights’ abuses.  
In 1986, Kosovo Serbs formally demanded the federal government’s protection from the 
Kosovo Albanians (Mertus, 1999:294; Malcolm, 1998:339). In mid-1989 Slobodan Milošević, an 
ambitious hardline Serb politician, became the President of the Office of the Presidency, then 
elected President of the newly formed Republic of Serbia in late 1990 (del Ponte, 2002). In mid 
1990 he used Kosovo Serb demands as a reason to revoke the autonomous status of its 
provinces and consolidated their administration into Serbia (Curtis, 1992:193), followed by an 
amendment to the constitution to “centralize all essential functions” to Belgrade (Mertus, 
1999:295). The revocation of autonomy resulted in protests and work stoppages throughout 
Kosovo, wherby Milošević established ‘emergency measures’ which included compulsary work 
orders, curfews, riot police patrol and administrative detention (ibid). These temporary 
measures became permanent as the Yugoslav Army and para-military forces were deployed 
onto local military bases throughout Kosovo. The remaining Kosovo Albanian civil servants and 
government employees, including educators and medical professionals, were also removed 
from their positions. Kosovo Albanians soon established a “parallel government” to provide 
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these services for themselves, funded by a “voluntary tax” on themselves and Kosovo Albanian 
disapora.   
4.7.2 Emergance of the Kosovo Liberation Army   
Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, a popular political writer, was elected President by the dissolved Kosovo 
Assembly to lead the parallel government, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), in 1992 
(Morina, 2011:24). He promoted a non-violent position against the Yugoslav government, in 
part because the Kosovo Albanians had no meaningful defence aganst the predominantly Serb 
police and military, but also as a means to gain international attention and legitimacy to its 
political situation. This strategy appeared largely successsful until 1995, when the Dayton 
Agreement ending the war between Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia failed to include 
Serbian violence against Kosovo Albanians in its negotiations (ibid:31). The absence of Kosovo 
from the Dayton negotiations delegitimized the passisive resistance movement. In its place, a 
loose paramiltary group of a few hundred men formed, calling themselves the Kosovo 
Liberation Army, KLA, as Kosovo Albanians now came to believe violence would be the only 
means to achieve independence from Serbia.  
The KLA, also known as UÇK, Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosovës, remained a relatively small and 
unknown group of clans, family members and friends united in a common cause until 1997, 
when Albania’s economy and government collapsed due to financial malfeasance58. Military 
arsenals and weapon depots that had been established throughout Albania by its former 
President Enver Hoxha, were opened by its current President Sali Berisha and Kosovo 
sympathesizers. The weapons depots were looted and sold for cash (Abrahams, 2015:254; 
Judah, 2008), led by a network of individuals with suspected ties to organized crime. The KLA 
had become increasingly violent, however the climate of continued violence against Kosovo 
                                                             
58 Albania’s economy collapsed when pyramid schemes involving Albanian banks, including the State bank, Bank of 
Albania, and key Albanian industries defaulted on their investors nearly simultaneously (Jarvis, 2000).  
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Albanians by the Yugoslav Army and paramilitary MUP, and easy access to cheap weapons from 
Albania encouraged tens of thousands of volunteers to join the KLA in the following months 
(Morina, 2011: 38; Perritt, 2008:41).  
Especially in comparison to the professional Serb forces, the KLA was small, and virtually 
untrained. The KLA strategy therefore, was to conduct guerilla-style hit and run tactics in order 
to cause the Serb forces to overreact. It would then exploit the overreactions through 
international media and human rights’ organizations in order to gain military assistance from 
NATO (NATO, 1999; Perritt, 2008).  The strategy was extremely successful: stories and photos of 
displaced persons hiding in the snow of Kosovo mountains, and the news reports of hundreds 
of thousands of refugees59 entering neighboring Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro created 
fear of further destabilization in the Balkans and a global outrage against the increasingly 
hostile Serb nationalist Yugoslav Government. Eventually the strategy was rewarded with 
military assistance from NATO.  
4.8  NATO Intervention and Support  
The February-March 1999 negotiations at Rambouillet Chateau, France, between Yugoslavia 
and NATO members to stop the ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Kosovo failed. Yugoslav forces’ action 
against the Kosovo Albanians accelerated and resulted in an unmanageable wave of refugees 
into Macedonia and Albania. On 23 March 1999 NATO was given the order to commence 
airstrikes against select military targets (NATO, 1999). Milošević ’s escalation of hostilites 
against Kosovo Albanians and continued intransigence led to 78 days of bombing Yugoslavia, 
including inside Kosovo. Over 38,000 sorties were conducted between March and June 1999 
(OSCE, 2003). Bombing paused on 9 June with the capitulation of Milošević in Belgrade upon 
the signature of the Military Technical Agreement, and was suspended on 10 June with 
                                                             
59 In the weeks leading to the start of the war in 1999, approximately 90% of the Kosovo Albanian population was 
estimated to have been displaced by Yugoslav forces (Wentz, 2002:21).  
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confirmation of the withdrawl of Serb tanks and armed forces from Kosovo. UN Resolution 1244 
adopted the next day allowed NATO forces to enter Yugoslavia. The first NATO Kosovo Forces, 
(KFOR) entered Kosovo from Albania on 12 June 1999 (ibid).  Barely 24 hours later, over 
400,000 Kosovo Albanian refugees begin to return to their villages, while some 200,000 Kosovo 
Serbs and Montenegrins began to leave Kosovo in anticipation of retribution (ibid.) 
As NATO forces moved into Kosovo, Serb forces retreated; the victorious KLA entered Pristina, 
Prizren and other significant urban areas, and occupied the primary government buildings, 
apartment blocks, hotels and other properties, often violently displacing the legal owners. The 
KLA also installed its own members in key government and civil leadership positions, and made 
demands for financial support from the local population (Interview 73). Soon afterward, the KLA 
began a system of intimidation and killing, especially of Rugova’s LDK party members; those 
Kosovo Albanians that had protested their activities, or those individuals and families the KLA 
believed had not been sufficiently supportive during the war (Human Rights Watch, 2001; 
International Crisis Group, 1999; Interview 73). Forceful intimdation inhibited any significant 
objections to the KLA’s activities by the community60. The near-absence of law enforcement, 
and KFOR’s initial rules of engagement preventing military forces from taking action against 
criminal activity, allowed former KLA soldiers and organized crime to prey on the local 
communities (International Crisis Group, 1999) and made strong man governance a permanent 
feature in much of post conflict Kosovo (ibid). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
60 There was also likely to have been a sense of entitlement for having fought in the war. 
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4.9 Introduction to Military Bases in Kosovo 
 
This section introduces military bases. It describes the functions and activities of military 
fortifications in history in general, and military bases in the former Yugoslavia specifically. The 
section also defines the intervention in Kosovo and introduces the Kosovo Forces (KFOR) and 
their activities, established in accordance with UNSCR 1244 and the Military Technical 
Agreement, MTA, after the 1999 Kosovo War (NATO, 1999; United Nations, 1999).  
The earliest military bases were simple fortifications, typically walled villages and watch towers, 
such as Jericho, Uruk and Mehrgar, which were established as early as 8,000 BC throughout 
Mesopotamia, south-east Europe, and the Indus Valley (Fagan, 1996; Ring, et al., 1996). These 
fortifications were built to protect their inhabitants from outsiders, to safeguard domesticated 
animals from predators, and to shelter and store harvests for later use (Hammond & Bartson, 
1972). As their construction required significant commitment and resources by the community, 
fortifications also became indicators of wealth, social heirarchy and place identity (Bradley, 
2001; Fletcher, 1996). Archeology shows that settlements often bordered walled cities to take 
advantage of its wealth and protection (Hammond & Bartson, 1972). Inhabitants of the walled 
cities and the communities surrounding them typically “paid” for their physical security with 
financial and military obligations (Bar-Yosef, 2001; Hammond & Bartson, 1972) forming a very 
early type of social contract. 
Fortifications were more than a means of defense and economic opportunity. They were also a 
display of authority and power. Fortifications are equally a symbol of offense, demonstrated in 
two ways. First, the physical fortification itself is evidence of military capability: its size is a clear 
display of strength and capability demonstrated by the amount of land taken to contain its 
personnel and equipment. The location of its center, the citadel, also infers dominance. The 
citadel was typically built on the highest ground or other superior physical position to prevent 
surprise by potential enemies; its walls and materials were not only deliberately difficult to 
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breach, but were also designed in a way to channel invaders into tactically vulnerable positions 
once inside61.  
The second, and more confrontational demonstration of offense is when the victor occupied, or 
built its own fortification on the defeated peoples’ lands. This coercive power and ability to rule 
is a common theme of victory and humiliation in ancient stories and legends. Thus, for those 
defeated, the local fortification was much less likely to be a source of security and pride than a 
source of overt domination and resentment.  
4.10 Military Fortifications and Bases in Yugoslavia  
As a defensive measure, Yugoslav president Josip Tito had improved the larger bases 
established during the Second World War and introduced new ones as he strengthened the 
Yugoslav National Army, (Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija, JNA) in response to Stalin’s seizure of 
Czechoslovakia in February 1948 (Heuser, 1987). By 1952 Yugoslavia had directed 22 percent of 
its Gross National Product62 to support its half-million strong military force (Pavković, 2000), 
and its military/defense industry (Curtis, 1992). The JNA appeared to have had little interaction 
with their civilian communities63, concentating instead drills and maneuvers in the field to 
maintain a high level of readiness (Pavković, 2000). The military ranks were predominantly 
conscripts, who would return to their communities in their home republics after their two-year 
obligation64 led by a small number of professional officers who were predominantly Serbs and 
Montenegrins.  
                                                             
61 Such techniques are narrow passages, gates and dead ends which limit movement or confine assailants.  
62 The defense industry included heavy weapons and munitions production, both major Yugoslav exports. 
63 Excluding those in military policing. 
64 Conscripts performed their mandatory military duties outside of their home republic. Few if any Kosovo Albanians 
soldiers would have been posted in Kosovo.  
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Yugoslavia was further militarized in 1968 following the invasion65 of Czechoslovakia by the 
Soviet Union, whereby Tito initiated a three-part campaign for the defense of Yugoslavia, “The 
Total People’s Defense” (Opstenavodna Odbvana, ONO), to “make combatants of all Yugoslavs 
that could resist” (Dulic & Kostic, 2010:1061; Johnson, 1971:5)66. First, he constructed a 
network of small bases throughout Yugoslavia67, second, State-owned industries prepared 
standby plans to shift their operations to support war efforts when necessary (Dulic & Kostic, 
2010:1062; Johnson, 1971:5). Third, the “Territorial Defense” or TO, forces68 trained the 
Yugoslavia populace to mobilize themselves and to take arms against aggressors (Curtis, 1992). 
Even children learned of their martial responsibilites in the “Young Pioneers” program in 
primary school69 (Kostovicova, 2005:40; also Dulic & Kostic, 2010; Erdei, 2006). The ONO 
campaign was abandoned soon after Tito’s death in 1980 and most of the military facilities fell 
into disrepair. Nevertheless, as federal conscription had been in place since 1948, and each of 
the six Yugoslav constituent republics and the two autonomous republics had had some version 
of its own TO forces, the military was undoubtedly very familiar to Kosovo’s population at the 
time of the 1999 Kosovo war (Curtis, 1992; Dulic & Kostic, 2010).  
4.10.1 Military Bases under Milošević 
In the late 1980’s, then-President Slobodan Milošević restored the larger camps to train the JNA 
and a new paramilitary force under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministarstvo Unutrasnija 
Polslova, (MUP). The MUP was used extensively to control of the Kosovo Albanian populace 
                                                             
65 Yugoslavia’s fears were already raised by the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary. While Czechoslovakia had been 
governed by a communist party loosely supported by the Soviet Union, the failure of the 1968 coup for greater 
democracy led the Soviet Union to oust and replace the Czechoslovakian communist party with its own, completely 
folding Czechoslovakia into the Soviet Union.  
66 Tito understood the JNA was no match for the Soviet Army in a surprise attack. However, he believed the TO could 
hold it off long enough for the JNA to mobilize and reach the fight (Johnson, 1971). 
67 Commune/Municipality based units were approximately 500 community members (Johnson, 1971). 
68 The TO was mix of JNA soldiers, reservists that had completed their two-year conscription and civilians; both 
women and men, from ages of 15 to 65, were required to join the TO (Pavković, 2000).  
69 The declared intent of the Young Pioneers was to bring all Slavic people together in a united Yugoslav identity, 
rather than to specifically militarize children. The Young Pioneers and Total People’s Defense were also a part of the 
wider effort to deepen commitment to Socialist ideals (Erdei, 2006)  
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(Sreckovic, 2010). The JNA was a disciplined and well-respected Yugoslav institution (Curtis, 
1992; Human Rights Watch, 2001), while the MUP was less professional and antagonistic (ibid). 
Particularly in Kosovo, where the MUP was especially oppressive, their use of the former TO 
bases was viewed as Serb occupation (Interviews 35, 74).  
4.11 Modern Characteristics of the Military Base in Peace Operations  
Military fortifications, better known today as bases are, fundamentally, secured areas for the 
exclusive use of military forces to perform and sustain their military, and military support 
operations. Title 10 U.S. Code § 2801 provides a general definition of the contemporary usage 
of a military installation:  
“the term ‘military installation’ means a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, or 
other activity under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department or ... 
under the operational control of the Secretary of a military department or the Secretary 
of Defense, without regard to the duration of operational control” (Cornell University, 
1992).  
While the terms base and camp tend to be defined interchangeably, historically, bases are 
permanent facilities, while camps are considered to be temporary, even if such camps are in 
use for several decades. These terms are consistent for military land, air and sea70 facilities. 
Bases also tend to possess similar minimum infrastructure: housing for personnel; facilities for 
dining, medical treatment and recreation; offices and other work areas; training areas, and 
maintenance and storage areas. Depending upon the mission requirements, they may also 
contain weapon practice ranges, hospitals, detention facilities, port facilities, and helipads 
and/or airfields, all of which are excluded from public use and protected by armed personnel.  
                                                             
70 Naval bases are often referred to as ‘Stations’ when combined with an airfield, and are named after their home 
city, e.g. Yeovilton Naval Air Station in the UK, Pensacola Naval Air Station, in the US.  
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Military bases established to support peace operations, especially since the mid-1990’s, have 
added a new dimension to the relationship between the base and local community, as the 
occupants of the base are often viewed as liberators, rather than oppressors. This is particularly 
so in the Balkans where there is little doubt the arrival of intervening NATO forces was 
welcomed by many on the ground. However, some in the academic community view such 
interventions and the establishment of bases as hardly more than a new form of neo-
colonialism; a breach of national territory and gross affront to sovereignty (Duffield, 2011; 
Johnson, 2000; Mertus, 2001; Shimibuku, 2014; Sreckovic, 2010). These ‘intervention’ bases 
increasingly blur the lines between military interventions for humanitarian purposes and 
humanitarian activities within a military environment71. Moreover, their use of existing bases is 
described as merely the “possession of territory with concealed political motives” (Duffield, 
2011; Sreckovic, 2010).  
While the rationale for intervention is complex and often politically contentious, victors of war 
have historically occupied existing fortifications, and there are several practical reasons for 
doing so. First, the base tends to be located on comparatively elevated ground, which provides 
better views of the countryside and roadways, and are better suited for communications 
equipment (Army, 1958; Anderson, et al., 2014). Secondly, the occupation of existing military 
bases reduces competition for the use of remaining serviceable buildings, a frequent complaint 
against international intervenors, and it lessens use of industrial facilities, (farm)land or other 
scarce resources that would otherwise be taken and used for a new base in the post-conflict 
environment (Army, 1958; Anderson, et al., 2014). The earliest arriving KFOR forces therefore 
purposely occupied former JNA bases when possible, and in so doing, they occupied fewer of 
                                                             
71 Although this research fills a gap in literature concerning the effects of everyday practices of establishing a military 
base in a post conflict environment, it does not take a specific position on the political decisions made, or with the 
appropriateness of the military base itself.  
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the office buildings, hotels, factories or similar facilities that had survived bombing, looting and 
vandalism.  
Thirdly, occupation of military bases by victorious militaries denies their use by others, and 
sends a powerful political message to former belligerents. Ultimately, however, the use of 
existing military bases by victorious forces is practical: the bases have been specifically built for 
a military purpose, hence they already contain the necessary barracks, training and assembly 
areas, defensive positions and secured weapons and ammunition storage (Anderson, et al., 
2014: 43). Therefore, the primary advantage to using existing bases is simply the significant 
reduction of time necessary for military forces to become fully operational.  
4.12 Post-conflict Military Bases and Law Enforcement  
While military bases are generally similar in function, bases that have been established in recent 
post-conflict environments often perform additional and at times, controversial activities. These 
activities include law enforcement, civilian detention, and prison support operations. As an 
example, while the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was 
ultimately responsible for civil law enforcement through the UN civilian police (CIVPOL) through 
the terms of UNSCR 1244 (Jones, et al., 2005:27) Kosovo’s civil policing activities were almost 
exclusively conducted by KFOR military forces for months, as UNMIK and the police necessary 
for CIVPOL were slow to deploy into Kosovo (ibid:33), and despite law enforcement being a task 
outside of the authority and responsibility of military police. Moreover, KFOR continued to 
actively reinforce UNMIK and local police for several more years: international paramilitary 
forces,’ the Italian Carabinieri, French Gendarmerie and Netherlands Marechaussée also 
performed these duties (Etchemedy, 2010; UNMIK, 1999; Wentz, 2002) until UNMIK was 
sufficiently staffed and a viable police force was established. This tasking of military and para-
military police to perform civilian law enforcement duties was not only the result of the too-
slow buildup of a new professional police force, but also an unforeseen absence of existing 
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capable and trained police in Kosovo (Commission, 2000:7; Garcia-Orrico, 2009; Judah, 2002; 
UNMIK, 1999; Interview 27).  
A second contentious activity performed by military bases in Kosovo was the operation of 
confinement and prison facilities. Yugoslavia’s prisons were typically collocated with military 
and para-military bases, and many had been damaged during the NATO bombing campaign to 
destroy the bases (McClure, 2000:72; Wentz, 2003:237). Given that each of the Multi-National 
Brigade operational areas contained numerous damaged prison facilities, the lead nation of that 
Brigade area was directed to manage a temporary detention facility inside its base72. Then, as 
Wentz finds, the lack of prison facilities was [further] exacerbated by the lack of a trained 
civilian police force to turn prisoners over to (Wentz, 2003:247). Therefore, contrary to its own 
guidelines, KFOR operated, and then extended, several of the its temporary facilities and 
expanded others to serve as civil confinement facilities, or prisons for nearly a decade. The final 
KFOR detention facility, located at US Camp Bondsteel, closed in mid-2008 (Kramer, 2012). 
4.13 Military Intervention in Kosovo    
4.13.1 Operation ALLIED FORCE  
The memories of UN failures to protect civilians in Bosnia (1992-1996) and Rwanda (1994) were 
undoubtedly still fresh in 1998 (Kosovo, 2000; Sreckovic, 2010; Weiss, 2007), as the JNA and 
MUP were systematically terrorizing and killing Kosovo Albanians (Caplan, 1998; Commission, 
2000; Shea, 1999; Human Rights Watch, 2001). Provocative actions by the Kosovo Liberation 
Army, KLA, along Kosovo’s border with Albania and Macedonia, (Caplan, 1998; Garcia-Orrico, 
2010) and the tens of thousands of Kosovo Albanian refugees pouring into neighboring Albania, 
Montenegro and Macedonia severely strained the capabilities of these countries (Morris, 1999; 
                                                             
72 Wentz states the prisons in Ferizaj and Gjilan were small and in particularly poor condition, likely the same 
conditions applied throughout Kosovo. Civilians accused of serious crimes and Serbs (for their protection) detained 
for interviews and hearings were temporarily housed at the Camp Bondsteel detention facility until suitable civilian 
facilities could be established, 1,800 the first year (Wentz, 2003:247). 
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ReliefWeb, 2000). The enormous number of refugees greatly raised NATO and UN fears that the 
violence would spread outside of the Balkans (UNMIK, 1999; Wentz, 2002). Thus, Milošević’s 
continued refusal to cease the “ethnic cleansing” of ethnic Albanians and non-Serb minorities in 
Kosovo, despite nearly a year of negotiation, international sanctions and demands, triggered 
the UN to invoke Chapter VII73 to authorize military action, and led to Operation ALLIED FORCE.  
Initially planned as a short air campaign, Operation ALLIED FORCE began operations 24 March 
1999, intending to bomb only pre-selected Serb air bases. The objectives74 of the air campaign 
were for Milošević to:  
• Ensures a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and 
repression  
• Ensures the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces  
• Agrees to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence  
• Agrees to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and 
unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations  
• Provide credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet 
Accords in the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo in 
conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.  
The bombing was naively expected to force the end of almost seven years of fighting in the 
Balkans and decades of hostility in Kosovo in just a few weeks (Commission, 2000; Schuster, 
2014). Milošević continued to defy the international community; the well trained JNA with 
recent combat experience gained from fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia proved to be 
surprisingly difficult for NATO aircraft to locate, pin and defeat. In response, NATO first 
                                                             
73 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) broadened its interpretation of Chapter VII in 1999. This specifically 
authorized the UN to intervene in Kosovo with force on matters “related to action with respect to the Peace, 
Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression” to prevent the spread of violence and conflict, despite its affront to 
Serbia’s sovereignty and valid legal arguments by Russia and other UN members. The International Commission of 
State Sovereignty and International Commission on Kosovo both acknowledged the tension between the 
humanitarian need and Serbia’s sovereignty, stating “the NATO military intervention (in Kosovo) was illegal, but 
legitimate.”  
74 The concurrent military goals were to deter further Serbian attacks against the people of Kosovo; reduce the 
ability of the Serbian military forces to continue their offensive operations against the people of Kosovo and degrade 
Serbian air defense systems to reduce the risk and threat to NATO aircraft and crews (Global Security, 2013). 
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increased the number of sorties against Serbia’s military forces, and then extended its target list 
to include land bases, military equipment parks, and finally, Serbia’s critical infrastructure, such 
as key bridges, telecommunication sites and oil refineries (GlobalSecurity, 2013; Sreckovic, 
2010). The air campaign ceased when Milošević was unequivocally confronted with continued 
NATO bombing and further destruction of Belgrade (Wentz, 2002). Faced with his growing 
unpopularity and loss of influence over the JNA, on 9 June 1999, Milošević finally agreed to 
withdraw the JNA and all para-military forces from Kosovo. This ended NATO’s air campaign of 
78 days and over 38,000 air sorties (Security, 2013; Wentz, 2002).  
4.13.2 Operation JOINT GUARDIAN   
With the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on 9 June 1999, and the Military-
Technical Agreement (MTA) the next day, the NATO-led Kosovo Forces (KFOR), were directed to 
undertake the overarching security responsibilities as Operation JOINT GUARDIAN under 
Chapter VII75 of the Charter of the United Nations (NATO, 1999): 
• Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, 
and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and 
Republic military, police and paramilitary forces; 
• Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian 
groups; 
• Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return 
home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional 
administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered; 
• Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take 
responsibility for this task; 
• Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take 
over responsibility for this task; 
• Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international 
civil presence; 
• Conducting border monitoring duties as required; 
• Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil 
presence, and other international organizations. 
                                                             
75 Chapter VII allows use the of armed forces for “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace 
and Acts of Aggression” (United Nations, 1945) 
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The specifically directed MTA security tasks for KFOR are commonly expressed as those to 
ensure a “Safe and Secure Environment,” (SASE), and are derived from the task, “Establish a 
secure environment and ensure public safety and order.” They include:  
o Assistance with the return or relocation of displaced persons and refugees, 
including escorts for minority groups 
o Reconstruction and de-mining 
o Medical assistance 
o Security and public order, including regular patrols near minority enclaves 
o Protection of patrimonial and religious sites; and heritage and culturally significant 
sites  
o Border security, especially interdiction of cross-border weapons smuggling 
o Implementation of a Kosovo-wide weapons, ammunition and explosives amnesty 
program and weapons destruction 
o Support for the establishment of civilian institutions: law and order, the judicial and 
penal system, the electoral process and other aspects of the political, economic and 
social life of Kosovo.  
o Donations, including food, clothes and school supplies 
o Stand down the Kosovo Protection Corps, and establish the Kosovo Security Forces 
o Support the NATO advisory group to establish a civilian-led organization to control 
the Kosovo Security Forces     
 
Several of these responsibilities, particularly military assistance to returning displaced persons, 
were greatly reduced or discontinued by mid-2000. Other tasks such as demining, medical 
assistance, protection of religious and culturally significant sites, reconstruction and 
management of donations are now only performed in a secondary or tertiary support role as 
Kosovo’s stability and civil capacity to perform these have increased.  
4.14 KFOR’s Multinational Brigade in Practice 
With the adoption of UNSCR 1244 and the MTA on 10 June 1999, Kosovo was divided into five 
geographically distinct operational areas, each led by the military forces of one of the principal 
NATO states: France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States76  These lead 
                                                             
76 The NATO website relating the history of Operation Joint Guardian in 1999 identifies four operational areas, while 
the accompanying map (Map 4.1) clearly indicates five. The map is correct; the five operational areas reflect the 
“Quint,” the five principal nations: France, Germany, Italy, UK and US, and the original order of battle of their military 
forces (Garcia-Orrico, 2009). See also McGrath, 2006.  
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NATO states were coupled with additional NATO and NATO-partner countries. Partnering was 
based on physical characteristics, such as military strength and capacity, as well as intangible 
factors, such as historical relationships, such as France and Serbia (Lampe, 2000:157). The 
lobbying efforts of Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, particularly in Germany and the United States, 
are also likely to have influenced the assignment of NATO-partners and lead nation operations 
areas (International Monetary Fund, 2012:21; Mockaitis, 2004; Palmer, 2010). Ultimately, 38 
NATO and non-NATO countries participated in Kosovo Forces (McGrath, 2006:55). The resulting 
mixed-nation organizations were known as Multinational Brigades (MNB). The NATO 
Headquarters, located in Kosovo’s capital city Pristina, was inside the United Kingdom’s 
operational area (Wentz, 2002). 
The MNB forces shared a common NATO-led military command structure and mission focus, 
however, especially in the earliest days, their operations varied with individual interpretation of 
NATO doctrine in relation to specific national caveats, variances in national military doctrine or 
other normal differences in the common organizational procedures of the lead and 
participating nations77. Moreover, each Nation brought its own military culture, experience and 
prior military training to the MNB, as well as disparities in the quantity and quality of the 
resources that each military was provided. These factors, coupled with shifting political 
interests from home, contributed to inaction, frustration and unmet expectations that have 
been sources of both public criticism and lessons learned. Nevertheless, there was a remarkable 
unity of effort, in great part because the commanders themselves made the effort to work 
together (Wentz, 2002:407).  
The Multinational Brigades that entered Kosovo in June 1999 were established in the following 
locations:  
 MNB-North: led by France, located near the majority Kosovo Serb city of Mitrovica 
                                                             
77Such differences include use of the use of deadly force and roles and authority of commissioned and non-
commissioned officers and enlisted personnel (Wentz, 2003). 
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MNB-Center: led by the United Kingdom, located near the Kosovo Albanian village of 
Lipjan 
MNB-East: led by the United States, located near the majority Kosovo Albanian town of 
Ferizaj 
 MNB-West: led by Italy, located near the majority Kosovo Albanian city of Pec 
 MNB-South: led by Germany, located outside the multiethnic city of Prizren 
The NATO headquarters was located in Kosovo’s capital city of Pristina, within MNB-Center 
 
Figure 4.1 and Map 4.2 shows the national contribution of uniformed military forces and 
location.78    
 
 
  Figure 4.1: Contribution of uniformed military forces  
 
 
                                                             
78 Table and figures from GlobalSecurity: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/joint_guardian-tasks.htm 
 
Principal Nation Contributions 
Military forces deployed: 
Country 11 June 1999    1 July 1999 
United Kingdom      7,600         13,000 
Germany      4,200           8,500 
United States      1,800           7,000 
France      3,100           7,000 
Italy      2,300           2,300 
Others 
              Total 
        600 
   19,600 
         11,000 
         48,800 
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Map 4.2: June 1999 location of the five Multinational Brigades 
 
4.15   KFOR Activities and Functions  
The most visible activity performed by military forces in a post-conflict environment is 
patrolling, both on foot and in vehicles (mounted). Even months after the war’s end, Kosovo 
Albanian and Serbs continued to shoot at each other, vandalize and set fire to homes and 
property (Commission, 2000; McClure, 2000; Wentz, 2003). Hence, the KFOR patrols were well 
armed and traveled in two to four vehicle convoys to prevent or stop violence, enforcing an 
unfriendly peace. KFOR also led joint patrols with local police and civil law enforcement until 
they had completed their training and became available, eventually reversing lead roles. This 
joint patrolling has continued to provide a visible deterring presence and give support to local 
and international civil authorities. 
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Particularly along the remote and mountainous forested areas close to the Albanian and 
Macedonian borders, KFOR patrolled to interdict weapon smuggling, and deter illegal civil 
activities, such as harassment of minorities, tobacco and alcohol smuggling, and drug and 
human trafficking. Other activities performed by KFOR military patrols and combat teams varied 
widely and included stationary and mobile vehicle check points; cordon and search for illegal 
weapons and explosives; escorting minorities to markets or school; escorting returning refugees 
and refugee ‘go and see’ visits coordinated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR); protecting religious and cultural sites, and critical infrastructure; debris clearance79, 
recommending road and bridge repairs and other minor infrastructure reconstruction projects, 
and home winterization in support of UNHCR (UNMIK, 1999).   
The post-conflict literature is frequently critical of contemporary military activity, ranging from 
comments against risk-averse  ‘bunkerization,’ and its over-focus on military forces’ security at 
the expense of meaningful interaction with the populace80 (Berdal & Ucko, 2015; Duffield, 2005; 
Zaalberg, 2006:335), or for its ‘mission creep,’ the tendency to engage in humanitarian and non-
military activities outside of the military organization’s core responsibility, as had occurred in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (Haynes, 2010; Williams, 2005:84). Such arguments aptly reflect the 
tensions created by the everyday practices of maintaining ‘a safe and secure environment’ in 
Kosovo.  
These critics must recall however, that military organizations often concurrently straddle their 
peacekeeping mandates with local needs and their own organization’s capabilities on the 
ground in time-constrained environments, and by what is allowed by international law and 
permissible by national doctrine. Military leader’s decisions and actions are also filtered by their 
                                                             
79 KFOR often cleared roads blocked by mud, snow and ice. However, road clearing is only permissible when the road 
clearing sustains patrol routes; KFOR cannot clear local travel and commerce routes specifically for non-military 
purposes. 
 
80 The failure of the risk averse, standoffish posture by military forces was most recently noted in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. It has been improved by wider use of counterinsurgency doctrine (Petraeus, 2006). 
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own understanding of what is politically acceptable, globally and at home, which is typically 
explained by media coverage they cannot control. In these circumstances, both risk aversion 
and mission creep may become their best possible response.  
4.16 Base Support to Military Operations 
Base support for military operations can be best understood as two separate, but interrelated 
systems, base administration and base sustainment, which may include the employment of 
local civilians and purchasing from local businesses. It must be noted that while much of the 
terminology and activities in this section are US-specific, the general concept of base support is 
relevant for all military bases.  
4.16.1 Employment of Local Civilians  
The US Installation Management Command divides base administration into three service 
areas: Base Infrastructure (including grounds maintenance, consumable supplies, medical 
facilities, roads); Natural Infrastructure (training areas and ranges, air space, energy and water); 
and, Services (human resources, housing, food service, security services, laundry) (IMCOM, 
2014). Base administration and base sustainment activities may be performed by either military 
or civilian personnel, or a combination.  
o Base Administration -- Highly skilled and educated local civilians typically support base 
administration in select positions which require cultural and regionally appropriate technical 
knowledge, including cultural and political advising to senior leaders; interpretation of national 
and local codes or regulations, particularly for local architecture, design, or an analysis of 
construction methods (Army, 1958; Interview 43). The number of local civilians working in base 
administration is low.  
o Base Sustainment -- Base sustainment may be considered a subordinate, though equal and 
distinct function of base administration: it is the hands-on piece of base administration which 
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physically brings elements of the three service areas together for the end user and is typically 
what comes to mind as base operations, colloquially known as “life support.” These services 
and activities include housing allocation, dining facility operations, morale and recreation 
activities; military equipment issue and military equipment repair; fuel services, contracting for 
language services, internal base transportation, snow/ice clearing, base cleaning and minor 
building maintenance and are those activities that are best known for the large number of local 
civilians hired to perform. Each KFOR base recruits, screens and hires local personnel for 
services in accordance with the policies of its lead nation81. Base security, however, is 
consistently performed by the military or skilled security company employees82, a contrast with 
international organizations which tend to hire guards locally.  
4.16.2 Local Purchasing  
To sustain day-to-day operations, local purchasing may range from individual purchases for 
personal use, to multi-million dollar and multi-year contracts to support the entire base. 
Especially since the late 1990s, military bases have been organized to be as self-supporting as 
possible, hence modern intervening militaries have become increasingly reliant on their own 
forces and contractors for base supplies and material, which are imported from sources outside 
of the conflict area. Particularly concerning Kosovo, the lead countries had prepositioned 
military supplies and construction material in Albania or Macedonia to be ready for transport 
into their sectors when the NATO bombing ceased. As a result, with the exception of gravel and 
crushed stone, very little was purchased from the local community by the bases for several 
months. This practice likely prevented the emergence of a post-conflict ‘balloon economy,’ a 
condition typically caused by large numbers of peacekeeping forces and international 
organization personnel that purchase food, supplies and equipment, and lease the much of the 
                                                             
81 As example, local civilians are hired by a US contractor on the US base, while German KFOR hires directly from the 
community.  
82 On US bases, contracted security is provided exclusively by US citizens; there is no comparable contracted civilian 
security on the German base. 
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remaining housing and office buildings, that is frequently noted in post-conflict literature 
(Ammitzboll, 2007; Carnahan, et al., 2005). Although this self-sufficiency is in keeping with post-
conflict economic ‘best practices’ it generally contributes little to the local economy when it is 
needed most (Natsios, 2009). A comparison and examination of base purchasing is presented 
more fully in the individual case studies found in later chapters. 
4.17 Community Relations   
Studies of military base closure note four common characteristics relative to the positive impact 
of the base on the community: the proportion of the local community working on the base; the 
base’s proximity to a larger urban area; the technical expertise of workers on base, and the 
relationship formed between the military and community leaders. Of these, the relationship 
between the military and community leaders was the leading reason for success following base 
closure (Cowan, 2012; Dardia, et al., 1996; Lynch, 1970; Sharp, 1990). This assessment is 
congruent with post-conflict literature, where early relationships between the military and local 
community leaders can have lasting destructive effects when the military inadvertently 
sanctions informal actors who illicitly control human and material resources (Barnett & Zurcher, 
2009; Cheng, 2013:64; Münch, 2013; Pugh, 2005).  
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Chapter 5:  Kosovo’s Economy  
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of the economy of the former Yugoslavia. It presents an 
examination of the strong political and economic influence which the Soviet Union had upon 
the early Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and its break from the Stalinist system in 
1948, which led to Yugoslavia’s unique form of communist self-management governance.  
The Yugoslav government established a comprehensive investment program to address the 
Nationalities Problem, the low economic capabilities of the less developed Republics, “to 
become closer to that of the more developed Republics … [because] only when the economic 
disparities are evened out can anything like the ‘equalities of nationalities’ be achieved” (Hashi, 
1992:53), and to reinforce Yugoslavia’s resource independence. However, these economic 
policies accentuated national differences; stirred secession of its wealthiest republics; civil war 
and ultimately, the dissolution of Yugoslavia.  
This chapter is comprised of two sections: a review of key political events in Yugoslavia and 
Kosovo, and corresponding analysis of the economic effects of these events. It examines five 
major political periods in Yugoslavia where crises brought about change from the Federal to the 
local levels, noting their effects on Kosovo: (1) the establishment of Yugoslavia in 1946 through 
the ‘Administrative Years’ ending in 1953; (2) outcomes of the revised Yugoslav Constitution in 
1974; (3) investment in Kosovo after the removal of Ranković in 1966 and growing apartheid in 
Kosovo until 1988, and (4) Kosovo’s loss of autonomy in 1989 and return to an informal 
economy, and (5) economic sanctions against Serbia until the end of the war in Kosovo in 2000. 
Each of these periods facilitated direction changing economic decisions in response to domestic 
and international political crises, with consequences that were increasingly destructive to the 
Yugoslav federation, and damaging for Kosovo. This chapter concludes with an examination of 
116 
 
the significant economic decisions and events that characterized Kosovo’s economic 
environment at the arrival of KFOR in 1999.  
5.1 Establishing Communist Yugoslavia    
As described in Chapter 4, Tito reformed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia83 into a federation of six 
republics; he brought together what are today Bosnia-Herzegovina84, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, 
Macedonia and Montenegro. Serbia’s borders also included two regions containing large non-
Serb/non-Slavic speaking ethnic majorities, the autonomous ethnically Hungarian Province85 of 
Vojvodina and the ethnically Albanian Region of Kosovo86. Kosovo’s population is estimated to 
have been just over 700,00087 inhabitants in 1945, (Brumborg, 2002). Although ethnic Albanians 
comprised less than 10% of the total population of Yugoslavia, they comprised approximately 
70% of Kosovo’s population (ibid), and apart from its trade cities near the Albanian, 
Macedonian and Montenegrin borders, Kosovo was poor, and its’ economy was primarily based 
on subsistence farming.  
The 1936 Soviet Russia Constitution was the political and economic model for Tito’s Yugoslavia 
in 1945. This model, organized around a centrally managed system to direct the government 
and economy from the federal to the local level, was “designed explicitly for the social and 
economic development of Russia” (Dyker, 1990:16).88 Yugoslavia contained far less of its 
human, land, energy and natural resources (Singleton & Carter, 1982). Nevertheless, Yugoslavia 
                                                             
83 The Balkans are generally comprised of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Romania, Serbia and Slovenia. Greece and Turkey are also, but less commonly, considered part of the Balkans. The 
word ‘Balkan’ is Turkish for mountainous, descriptive of the region’s geography.  
84 Bosnia-Herzegovina gained Republic status in 1946. 
85 According to the constitution, the populations of Vojvodina and Kosovo were not “a people,” such as the Bosnians, 
Croats and Serbs, but were comprised of nationalities originating outside of Yugoslavia, and therefore the Yugoslav 
lands they occupied could not be recognized as a Republic.  
86 Kosovo was legally a ‘Region,’ with lesser status and governing autonomy than a Province. However, for the sake 
of simplicity, the term ‘province’ is used throughout this thesis.  
87 The population figure of 700,000 for 1945 is an extrapolation based on 1948 census of 727,820, as Serbia was 
unable to conduct a census in 1941 due to war.  
88 Singleton (1982) states the initial Five-Year Plan was directly based on Russia’s plan for development. Tito adopted 
it despite Yugoslavia’s land size of less than 2% of Russia’s; its absence of skilled and educated labor, and a complete 
inability to meet its own fuel and power needs.  
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created a nearly identical plan; it established a powerful central government to control all of its’ 
significant infrastructure, including media and communication, power generation/distribution, 
transportation and water works; major privately-owned income producing enterprises, 
particularly manufacturers of consumer goods; and banking and financial services (ibid).  
The resulting Five-Year Plan was a framework based on Marxist principles to manage a 
nationalized economy, which was comprised of two primary sectors, agriculture and industry 
(Gordon, 1959). The plan developed, allocated, and directed Yugoslavia’s resources to meet 
national production goals for the next five years. These goals were both idealistic and extremely 
aggressive; “overcoming technological and economic backwardness, strengthening economic 
and military power; eliminating disparities between Republics, improving the Yugoslav people’s 
welfare and fostering a greater Yugoslav identity” (Curtis, 1992:125). Like the Soviet Plan, the 
Yugoslav plan concentrated on heavy, capital intensive industries, including military vehicles 
and munitions, industrial equipment manufacturing, raw material extraction and energy 
production. The Soviet-based Plan also required collectivized agriculture, and greatly de-
emphasized the use and production of consumer goods, including basic foodstuffs. 
From its inception in 1945, the Yugoslav plan was unrealistic, especially within that post war 
environment (Singleton & Carter, 1982:99; Sirc, 1979:34). The Five-Year Plan simply assumed 
away much of the physical reality of a near-starved post-war population with a high percentage 
of war injuries; the extensive physical damage to homes and farms; the ruined or destroyed 
infrastructure and broken equipment resulting from German scorched earth tactics89 (Ramet, 
2011; Moore, 1967:3; Singleton & Carter, 1982:95; Woodward, 1995:63). This condition was 
especially the case in the southern-most regions, such as Kosovo, where fighting was both very 
                                                             
89 Scorched earth tactics refer to the destruction of an area of conquered territory to prevent its use by its owner’s. 
Destructive activities included burning buildings and crops, breaking equipment and destroying key infrastructure 
such as bridges.  
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heavy and the built infrastructure was already less robust (Ramet, 2011). Even so, “post-war 
enthusiasm90 for the new Yugoslavia motivated the Republics to meet most of the scheduled 
goals for the first two years” (Curtis, 1992:125; also, Hashi, 1992:25; Lampe, 2000:239). This 
enthusium masked the weaknesses in central planning that had already begun to emerge 
(Lampe, 2000:242; Sirc, 1979:3; Woodward, 1995:100).  
5.2  Economic Break and Blockade with Russia 
The Soviet economic model was comprised of parallel courses of collective farming and intense 
industrialization. The Yugoslav Five Year Plan was largely based on active trade with Russia and 
Yugoslavia’s neighbors. Farmland collectivization was underway throughout Yugoslavia, 
including Kosovo by 1946; industrialization was mostly concentrated in the better developed 
Republics.  
Nevertheless, those plans were permanently altered when Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 
severed their political and economic relations. Tito’s refusal to bring Yugoslavia in line with the 
Soviet system and “become another extracted-resource satellite for Soviet Russia” (Glenny, 
1999:534) permanently damaged relations between the two countries. Stalin’s response to Tito 
was to break all relations with Yugoslavia to force him to capitulate. Stalin expelled Yugoslavia 
from the Cominform91 in 1948 (Benson, 2001; Judah, 2000) and ceased economic relations 
(Curtis, 1992) including refusal to transport an estimated $135 million in raw materials and 
industrial equipment92 that the Yugoslav Plan had relied on and had paid for in advance (Lampe, 
2000:246; Woodward, 1995:101). In addition, Russia imposed an economic blockade against 
                                                             
90 More accurately, unpaid volunteer brigades of not-yet employed youth, women, war prisoners and ‘unproductive 
labor’ such as farmers between the major farm activities of plowing and harvesting, were pressed into industry 
(Woodward, 1995).  
91 The Communist Information Bureau, comprised of communist party representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania and led by the Soviet Union (Yugoslavia was expelled in 1948). The 
Cominform provided unified communist propaganda and direction (Curtis, 1992:321).  
92 Among other things, Yugoslavia exchanged raw ores and basic agricultural goods for Russian petroleum products, 
coke, farm and mining equipment, seeds and fertilizers (Woodward, 1995). 
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trade with Yugoslavia, followed by punishing sanctions against trade between Yugoslavia and 
with its neighbors – now Russia’s satellites - which had long been traditional markets for its 
products. (Lampe, 2000). Stalin also initiated military maneuvers on the Yugoslav borders93 
(Curtis, 1992; Gulyas, 2014) to intimidate both Yugoslavia and her neighbors. These actions by 
Stalin subsequently led to an increased emphasis in Yugoslavia on defense; it militarized politics 
and the economy, and warmed foreign relations94 with non-communist countries (Benson, 
2001:99; Heuser, 1987; Lampe, 2000).  
By the end of 1949 Yugoslavia was politically and economically isolated from the Soviet Union, 
its satellites and neighboring Albania; and the Yugoslav economy rapidly began to fail 
(Lazarevic, 2009). Without better options to prevent the collapse of the economy, Tito accepted 
direct economic assistance in 1949 under the United States’ Marshall Plan, and obtained 
additional loans, credits and materiel from UNRRA95 (Benson, 2001:99; Hudson, 2003:39).  
The initial Western aid package in the form of food; seeds and agricultural supplies, and bank 
loans (Bensen, 2001:95) alleviated the most urgent economic crises. Soon afterwards, the 
West96 held that supporting Yugoslavia was in its strategic interest against the communist 
Soviet Union (Heuser, 1987:26; Lazarevic, 2009:220), thus in 1950 many previously closed 
Western markets were opened to Yugoslav products, as well as its raw materials and labor 
(Curtis, 1992:104). Western markets compensated for most of the loss of the Soviet markets, 
and promoted Yugoslavia’s domestic economic growth for nearly three decades, from 1950 to 
1975. In addition, when relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had warmed again 
after Stalin’s death, Tito used his relationship with the Soviet Union as political leverage against 
the West to ensure their continued foreign aid (Heuser, 1987). However, the generous 
                                                             
93 Bulgaria and Romania  
94 The former Allied Powers, and the United States, welcomed the opportunity to assist Yugoslavia to indirectly 
confront the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Benson, 2000:95). 
95 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Yugoslavia received US $416 million between 1945 and 
1947.  
96 The West in this context is comprised of France, the United Kingdom and United States (Heuser, 1987).  
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economic packages had also allowed Yugoslavia to continue to invest in unproductive heavy 
industry, and to spend well above its means for decades, which ultimately engulfed it with 
unpayable and destabilizing debt (Curtis, 1992). 
Concurrent with the acceptance of Western financial aid, Tito abandoned the Soviet economic 
model and “reinterpreted” socialist Marxist doctrine to restructure the economy into 
“economic self-management” (Lampe, 2000:233). Yugoslav Self-Management was a new 
political as well as new economic system, intending that the “greater Socialist Consciousness 
would replace National Consciousness” (Curtis, 1992:69; also Hashi, 1992; Mertus, 1999). 
Although it remained a communist dictatorship, the Republics gained greater direct control 
over their internal administrative operations and those of their municipalities,’ while the 
municipalities were given more authority over their local level activities. However, self-
management’s most significant characteristic was the introduction of market liberalization, or 
‘capitalist strategies,’ to improve the productivity and efficiency of state and social enterprises, 
particularly by promoting worker’s ownership in their sources of employment (Curtis, 1992). 
The undergirding intent of self-management was to stabilize and stimulate Yugoslavia’s 
economy by promoting regional resource and infrastructure strengths, while maintaining 
ideological direction by the central communist party. The effect however, was to politicize 
industry and revive nationalism.  
5.3 Post War Economy of Kosovo   
Kosovo was not only the least economically developed region of Serbia, it was unquestionably 
the least developed of Yugoslavia as a whole. Even prior to the Second World War, its economy 
had been primarily barter and subsistence agriculture based on small family plots (Curtis, 
1992:124). Kosovo was known for its mineral resources, including bauxite, coal, copper, tin, 
silver, gold and lead, the latter of which had been actively and almost continuously mined since 
the Ottoman rule (Malcolm, 1998:291). However, modernization had been primarily to facilitate 
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crude ore extraction, while infrastructure improvements were chiefly to aid the transport of 
raw materials out of Kosovo to be processed elsewhere, thus there was little significant 
economic benefit to Kosovo. After the end of the war in 1945, Serbia likewise resumed mining 
operations in Kosovo with only minor repair to the mines and infrastructure (Elshani & Pula, 
2015:7). Hence, Kosovo remained a primarily agricultural and extractive economy until national 
investment began in the late 1960’s.  
5.3.1 Land Collectivization in Kosovo 
Yugoslavia accelerated its land collectivization when Russia broke relations with Tito, a tactic 
Benson decribed as “a means [for Yugoslavia] to squeeze out of the peasantry the resources it 
needed for survival” (Benson, 2001:95) 97. By 1950 approximately 96% of Yugoslavia’s most 
productive agricultural land was under state control (Curtis, 1992:125). Collectivised land in 
Kosovo was generally in the fertile north and western regions. Land collectivization was 
intended to more efficiently increase agricultural yields needed for export in order to obtain 
revenue to purchase imports, mostly consumer goods, that Yugoslavia did not to produce itself 
(Lampe, 2000:243).   
Table 5.1 shows the agricultural land collectivized in Yugoslavia between 1945 -1952.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
97 Lampe (2000) and Singleton (1982) remind that Yugoslavia’s Five-Year Plan allocated only 7% of its annual revenue 
to be invested in agriculture until 1951, an amount that was insufficient even to return to 1939 pre-war levels, thus 
impossible achieve the ambitious Plan’s production goals (Singleton & Carter, 1882).  
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Year 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 
Number of 
cooperatives  
31 545 779 1381 3325 6968 6994 
Number families 
in cooperatives 
(1000’s)  
 25.1 49.6 60.2 340.7  418.7 429.8 
Total surface of 
cooperative 
farms (1000 ha) 
121.5 211.0 324.0 868.8 1839.9 2226.2 2595.0 
Table 5.1      Source: C. Borkowski: La Yougoslavie Socialists (Armand Calin, Paris, 1956) 98 
 
 
Land collectivization, with its ruthless quotas, was consistantly unpopular throughout 
Yugoslavia, but it was particularly unworkable in Kosovo for five reasons. First, agriculture was 
at subsistence99  level for over 90% of the population of Kosovo prior to the war and had had 
only a very low commercial output. The damaged and neglected farms at the end of the war 
worsened their already tenuous condition. Secondly, collectivization still allowed private 
holders to keep five hectares. Most farms in Kosovo were small, family run and fragmented, 
typically comprised of up to six, non-contigous plots of about .45 hectares100 each, for a 
combined size of less than three hectares (Curtis, 1992:90), and therefore were not required to 
be collectivized. To give perspectve, each plot was less than half the size of an average football 
pitch, often only accessable by foot, and plowed by animal101. Thirdly, and  a causative reason 
for manual plowing, was much of the arable land was on a slope of varying degree, rather than 
                                                             
98 Table from archived material, (Heuser, 1987) 
99 Substance agriculture is a level that produces approximately enough for family consumption. Any surplus is 
typically sold to buy items/supplies that could not be made by hand, or bartered for basic services, such as medical 
treatment. 
100 The dimensions of a hectare vary by location; in Yugoslavia, a hectare is 100 meters by 100 meters. The combined 
plot size of an average farm was approximately three hectares to support up to nine adults (Curtis, 1992; 
Consortium, 2006) 
101 Private ownership of tractors was not allowed until 1957 
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being generally flat. Mountains cover over 40% of Kosovo and the sloped farm land limited the 
use of the large agricultural machinery necessary to create industrial efficiencies (ibid). The 
sloped and mountainous land also promoted erosion; valuable top soil washed away, while the 
remaining soil lacked sufficient nutrients for most commercial crops (Sauer, et al., 2010). 
Moreover, land at high elevations has shorter growing seasons, making suitable export crops 
additionally challenging. Fourth, unlike farm land in Serbia and Vojvodina, over half of the 
arable farm land102 in Kosovo was of marginal quality and best used for meadow103 and animal 
pasture. Except for foodstuffs from farms in the valleys, Kosovo’s agriculture production was 
historically of low quality and unmarketable. Finally, the anticipated surplus labor, the farmers 
themselves, proved very difficult to convert into factory workers; most farmers were illiterate 
and unprepared for work in industry or in urban professions (Singleton & Carter, 1982). They 
often left their jobs during the day to return to their farms to work, especially during planting 
and harvest seasons, causing work disruptions and stoppages in factories. Some collective farms 
that produced foods for domestic consumption did succeed104 however, particularly those in 
north and western Kosovo, where there had been a small number of farmers with large 
holdings. By 1949, however, only 22% of Kosovo’s arable land was collectivized (Cox, 2002:112; 
European Stability Initiative, 2003:6).  
 
Table 5.2 shows the pre-1999 conflict distribution of productive land of private and 
collectivized, or Socially Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Kosovo (ibid). 
 
 
                                                             
102 Literature consistently states Kosovo has a significant amount of arable land. However, this is the same land used 
for homes, transportation and industry, reducing net land available for food farming. Moreover, pasture land (for 
grazing) is of a lower quality than land used for food production.  
103 Meadow is the cultivation of grasses for animal food.  
104 The majority of Kosovo’s collective farms were marginal and unprofitable (Hudson, 2003:46). Processing of 
otherwise unmarketable produce for domestic consumption was an exception. Produce and raw animal products, 
e.g. wool and leather, were more successful than cereals agriculture (Singleton & Carter, 1982). 
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Table 5.2 Pre-conflict land distribution in Kosovo   Source: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Official Yearbook, 
1997 
Land collectivization ultimately proved politically, socially and economically untenable in 
Yugoslavia; the policy was informally abandoned by the end of 1950, and formally terminated in 
1953. However, not all of the land was returned to the original owner. Especially in Kosovo the 
better farm land was given as a reward for war service, generally to Serb and Macedonian 
Partisans (Curtis 1992:104; Singleton & Carter, 1982).  
5.4 Industrialization in Yugoslavia  
As noted, the strategy of the initial Five Year Plan required wide industrialization of the 
economy in parallel with land collectivization. Land collectivization and efficiencies in 
agriculture were expected to free farmers from the land, and the former farm labor would be 
available to work in state owned industry (Woodward, 1995:66). This industrialization was 
assumed to diffuse nationalistic tendencies as the underlying economic and development 
differences were eliminated. Yet the unintentional result of Yugoslavia’s industrialization was 
chronic and increasing unemployment. Especially in the less developed areas, industry was 
never able to provide enough employment for the growing supply of available low- and 
unskilled-labor. The influx of displaced farmers and residents of rural villages into the urban and 
industrialized areas continued to outpace the industrial sectors’ ability to absorb them. 
Hectares Private % of total SOE % of total Total
Cultivated, of which: 361,631     91% 37,377       9% 399,008         
Arable 261,045     90% 30,407       10% 291,452         
Orchard 10,312       91% 1,056         9% 11,368           
Vinyard 4,433         51% 4,285         49% 8,718             
Meadow 85,841       98% 1,629         2% 87,470           
Pasture 50,874       29% 127,435     71% 178,309         
Agricultural 412,505   71% 164,812   29% 577,317       
Forest 164,000   38% 266,000   62% 430,000       
Rural 576,505  57% 430,812  43% 1,007,317  
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Moreover, as the number of places of employment increased, new job seekers increased as 
well105,  which tended to be equally unable to absorb the surge in job seekers (ibid:210).  
Like the Soviet plan, the Yugoslav plan had concentrated on heavy industry: raw material 
extraction; energy generation and distribution; and, farm and mining equipment for export at 
the expense of meeting domestic needs106. The manufacture of military hardware107 gained 
importance after the Russian maneuvers on Yugoslav borders in 1948, and defense 
manufacturing grew from 6% of Yugoslavia’s annual budget in 1948 to nearly 22% by 1953 
(Lazarevic, 2009:219; Sirc, 1979:3). Together, Yugoslavia “routinely dedicated 50 percent to 60 
percent of its annual outlay to defense” (Curtis, 1992:267) at the expense of domestic needs. 
These industries required substantial amounts of cash or credits to purchase expensive 
machinery, as well as to house that machinery in “prestige buildings, typically too-large and far 
out of proportion108 to the availability of raw materials, skilled workers or end-product 
demand” (Sirc, 1979:37). Moreover, the high cost of machinery and long lead time before 
production could begin meant it was difficult to redirect new capital investment or modernize 
to meet the inevitable changes in domestic and external markets. Ultimately, both short and 
long-term benefits of Yugoslavia’s emphasis on heavy industry were low, and the unrecoverable 
costs109 were very high.  
5.4.1 Industrialization in Kosovo 
The rushed pace of collectivization and industrialization, fueled by growing economic and 
political uncertainties had two damaging outcomes for Kosovo. It further delayed investment in 
                                                             
105 Woodward (1995) points to the Harris-Todaro Models and the “paradox of growth induced unemployment” 
typical of less developed regions, whereby increased development draws people from undeveloped areas for better 
wages and conditions, causing a new cycle of high unemployment. Moreover, new investments were typically heavy 
industries which did not require a large number of employees. 
106 Production of exportable goods to raise income was the foremost priority of Yugoslavia; employment was 
secondary. 
107 Tanks, artillery, aircraft and ammunition were produced for both national defense and foreign sales. 
108 Sirc (1979) notes that “bigger was better” and a source of national pride, regardless of appropriateness to the 
need. 
109 Also known as sunk costs. 
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non-extractive industry and it facilitated ad hoc development. Firstly, major capital investment 
in Kosovo was impractical in the early years because of the absence of already present 
industrial resources; the prevailing subsistence economy and near-absent infrastructure of 
Kosovo offered little industry to re/invest in. “New investments had a considerable time lag 
before they were able to contribute to the national income” (Singleton & Carter, 1982:221), and 
“the frailty of the Yugoslav economy forced Tito to concentrate investment on sectors such as 
lead ore mining … where financial returns were more certain.” (Ramet, 2006:264; also, 
Singleton & Carter, 1982; Sirc, 1979:34). In addition, the necessary physical infrastructure, such 
as roadways and trains to move the large amount of materiel and equipment into, or raw 
materials and semi-finished products out of, Kosovo had to be developed for their transport 
and processing elsewhere. These factors were exacerbated as Serbia had retained and used 
Kosovo’s designated Federal investment resources for its own reconstruction. Ramet (2006) 
notes Serbia only began investment in Kosovo’s industry under pressure of the other 
Republics110 in 1955 (Ramet, 2006:265), and further delayed any significant investment in 
Kosovo’s development until the late-1960’s (Palairet, 1992:898; Ramet, 2006:274).  
Secondly, and notwithstanding the Five-Year Plans to industrialize Yugoslavia generally, Serbia 
invested in Kosovo without a balanced industrialization plan (Curtis, 1992:152; Sirc, 1979:34; 
Vanek, 1967:383; Woodward, 1995:118). Kosovo’s market was primarily vertical and internal to 
Yugoslavia. Kosovo’s firms tended to be organized as subsidiaries; as producers of raw materiel; 
or producers of  sub-components for larger industrial enterprises located within other 
Republics. The negative economic effects were fourfold: first, Kosovo’s industries did not supply 
products for markets, but provided products for specific buyers. This structure would have 
appeared to streamline the supply chain, yet it also supressed product diversification and 
therefore the ability for many of Kosovo’s industries to sell a wide-enough range of products to 
                                                             
110 Serbia used Federal investment monies intended for Kosovo to improve damaged infrastructure in Serbia proper.  
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sufficient number of industries to efficiently scale production with demand. In addition, when a 
single firm is a sole or primary supplier and becomes unable to meet quantity and quality 
requirements111 the absense of suitable alternate suppliers impaired multiple levels of 
manufacturing, especially as seen in the automotive industry (Palairet, 1992) both in Yugoslavia 
and for buyers abroad. A second factor, an ongoing failure to synchronize sub-component 
production with industrial finishing schedules, or component distribution of semi-final/final 
products to end users, meant the factory would rarely meet either domestic needs or export 
demands, whether from inside or outside of Kosovo112.   
Third, the ad hoc establishment of industry provided little ability to regionally coordinate 
manufacturing processes in order to leverage economies of scale or create some comparative 
advantage. Not until the mid-1960s were factories for products for domestic use, such as 
textiles, shoes and leather goods that were more compatible with existing local industrial 
capability113 established in either Yugoslavia or Kosovo. Palairet (1992) particularly notes the 
technical and skill requirements114 of the capital-intensive factories were likely to have been 
inappropriate and too advanced for its employees who had only recently left the agrarian 
environment (Palairet, 1992:909;  also, Singleton & Carter, 1982), citing attitude, work quality 
and absenteeism as continual challenges.  
Fourth, the unplanned industry failed to maximize the existing physical infrastructure to form 
business corridors, which would have reduced transportation and infrastructure costs, and 
generated supporting industries that would have created additional employment and local 
                                                             
111 An example is Ramiz Sadiku, a manufacturer of subcomponents for Zastava, a subsidiary of Italy’s Fiat. Yugoslavia 
attempted, unsuccesfully, to export the Yugo automobile to the United States, particularly due to its poor quality. 
112 Palairet (1992) describes perpetual work stoppage due to late or missing sub-components for Zastava 
automobiles.  
113 Small, localized foodstuffs, tobacco, leather and wooden handicrafts industry already existed. 
114 Palairet finds in his case study of Ramiz Sadiku, local Kosovo Albanians often lacked both the work habits and the 
necessary expertise for high performance machinery. Management by Serbs, including Kosovo Serbs, typically 
possessing the higher level skills were often viewed by the Albanian workers as oppressors, rather than necessary to 
the function of the plant. Similarly described by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 
1968). 
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revenue. Therefore, the absence of such an industrialization plan in Kosovo created a 
patchwork of stand-alone enterprises that neither synergized their industrial specialties for 
mutual benefit, nor substantially contributed to Kosovo’s development. The absence of 
authentic markets and the relatively low diversity of products contributed to Kosovo’s negligible 
participation in the global market after the end of 1999 Kosovo War. 
5.4.2 Significance of Industrialization  
Industrialization in Yugoslavia was more than the establishment of new factories and collective 
farms; it was the primary means to rapidly move the largely agrarian State to modernity and a 
higher standard of living. Critically, to be employed in Yugoslav State industry or civil service 
was to have access to all of the political and economic benefits of Yugoslav communism, such as 
a regular income, subsidized food and housing, monetary stipends for raising children, social 
insurance115, health care, advanced technical education, and employment opportunities for 
one’s children (Bonfiglioli, 2013:6; Palairet, 1992; Woodward, 1995:315). Women were actively 
recruited into industry with generous maternity allowances; such provisions were particularly 
welcome as benefits related to child bearing were not automatically provided to the wife of a 
factory worker (Bonfiglioli, 2013:6; Woodward, 1995:152), nor widely available through public 
or private means (Rodwin & Saric, 1993). Most factory workers could depend on at least one 
hot meal daily; many large factories offered child care as well as paid vacations at State 
subsidized resorts (Palairet, 1992).  
However, only factory workers – considered to be producers under the Marxist-based structure 
– enjoyed these benefits or had the right to vote in and hold locally elected offices. Small 
farmers who were not part of collectives, the small non-nationalized enterprises and the self-
employed did not receive the substantial majority of these benefits, nor could they vote or fill a 
                                                             
115 Social insurance protected against lost wages if workers were made unemployed by restructuring, not due to 
personal resignation.  
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communist party held office. Hence the absence, or loss, of one’s state employment “was to be 
excluded from full membership in society” (Woodward, 1995:4). This codified exclusion meant 
the unemployed and those employed in the private sector could only participate and be 
represented at the local or neighborhood level (ibid, 321). Kosovo, predominantly small farms 
and villages, had both a lower number of civil servants and limited industry. Given that its 
primary industries were concentrated in the low skill capital intensive trades; in ore extraction, 
food processing and forestry which required relatively few employees, the inhabitants of 
Kosovo, in total, realized fewer oportunities to fully benefit from industrialization. Further 
noting Kosovo Serbs held over 50% of the total industrial employment positions until 1967, 
despite their numerical minority of less than 30% of Kosovo’s population (Malcolm, 1998:323), 
Kosovo Albanians therefore established informal kin networks to provide some level of these 
same benefits for themselves, and thus laid the foundation for the shadow economy of the 
1980’s and subsequent parallel government system of the 1990’s.  
5.5 Investment in Kosovo: 1966 – 1974 
While northern and central Yugoslavia rapidly became more urban and industrialized, Kosovo 
remained far behind. The social and political marginalization of Kosovo Albanians was primarily 
through the direction of Aleksandar Ranković, Tito’s deputy, and the head of the Yugoslav 
special secret police UBDA, (Palairet, 1992; Woodward, 1995:248). Ranković was not only 
aggressively pro-Serb, he also considered the Kosovo Albanians to be a security threat to 
Yugoslavia’s unity (Ramet, 2006; Ryan, 2010:118). Ranković continued to enforce the 1945 state 
of emergency restrictions in Kosovo, including curfews, invasive weapon searches and arbitrary 
arrests, which had been lifted from the Republics and Vojvodina by 1948 (Ryan, 2010:119). 
Moreover he used UBDA to intimidate Kosovo Albanians (Clark, 2000:37; Palairet, 1992:898) 
and filled key civil positions with his supporters (Curtis, 199:522). As a result, Kosovo Albanians 
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realized only token political and economic opportunity or mobility until Ranković was 
dismisissed from his position in mid-1966 (Palairet, 1992:898).   
Tito visited Kosovo for the first time after Ranković’s removal116 and personally directed the 
Kosovo Serb controlled government to increase its hiring of Kosovo Albanians in government 
and industry (Malcolm, 1998:234). Investment in Kosovo was soon expanded to include small 
industry and light manufacturing, and several new plants were established to further 
decentralize critical defense industries (Singleton & Carter, 1982:222)117. “Political factories118” 
were also built throughout Kosovo to provide employment in areas without previous 
investment, although their locations were often logistically impractical (Palairet, 1992:900). The 
majority of these political factories were built to provide a minimum level of employment, 
rather than to support local business or stimulate sustainable local economic initiatives 
(Palairet, 1992:899; Ramet, 2006).  Table 5.3, shows in investment in Kosovo from 1947 - 1982.  
Period Infrastructure Type Heavy Industry  Small Industry  Light Manufacturing  
1947 – 1965 Primary schools, 
electricty in major cities 
Crude ore mining, 
forestry, oil 
refining, military 
hardware  
Local farm produce 
processing for 
domestic use  
Clothing, tobacco, 
leather, small wooden 
products, traditional 
handicrafts 
1966 – 1974 Asphalt roads, energy 
production, wide 
electrification, treated 
water; sanitary 
sewerage, secondary 
schools; University 
Ore refining,  
large agriculture  
equipment, 
communications, 
automobiles and  
subcomponents  
Chemicals and 
fertilizers, batteries, 
shotgun ammunition, 
cigarettes, furniture, 
textiles, tourism, 
cement and gravel 
Agribusiness, shoes, 
electronics for industry, 
irrigation, sugar, beef, 
cigarettes, wood 
furniture 
1974 – 1982 Additonal improved 
roads, electrification, 
treated water 
Metallurgy, 
electric power 
generation 
White goods, 
plastics, building 
materials 
Consumer electronics 
 
Table 5.3 Yugoslavia’s Industrial Investment in Kosovo 1947 – 1982119 
                                                             
116 Tito visited Kosovo in March 1967 to see its conditions for himself and allay tensions, as well as to promote his 
further decentralization (Malcolm, 1998).  
117 Critical defense related industries were duplicated and spread throughout Yugoslavia in response to continued 
mistrust of the Soviet Union, such as the steel mills in Niksic, Montenegro. Singleton and Carter also remind such 
industries were status symbols and a source of pride (Singleton & Carter, 1982:223).  
118Political factories are those factories and enterprises that were specifically built in a particular location to employ 
large numbers of people, often for political favor or control, rather than in response to legitimate economic needs. 
Most political factories were unprofitable and required substantial federal support to remain open (Palairet, 
1992:899).  
119 Multiple sources, primarily Curtis, (1992), Singleton and Carter (1982), and OECD (1968).  
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Nevertheless, 1967 – 1974 was a period of rapid social liberalization and modernization for 
Kosovo Albanians, and the standard of living increased for many. Primary roadways were 
asphalted and many more communities gained modern infrastructure including electrification, 
treated water and sewerage. Literacy, which had already been improving since 1947, received 
additional emphasis when Kosovo Albanians were allowed to receive education up to the 
university level in the Albanian language. Girls were not only finishing primary school, but were 
also attending university in impressive numbers. Women began working outside the home in 
significant numbers for the first time, while youth began to seek employment opportunities 
outside of agriculture.  
However Kosovo’s per capita federal investment was insufficient for its birthrate, which 
produced far more potential employees for industry than there were employment 
opportunities120, worsened by the substantial time lag for federal investment and the continued 
predominance of extractive industries. The result was both a widening of the development gap 
between Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia, and extremely high unemployment, especially for 
Kosovo’s youth ages 20-25 (Palairet, 1992:899; Pavlovic, 2013:13). The differential also 
contributed to the negative and ethnically charged stereotypes of Kosovo Albanians as 
“backwards baby-makers” (Mertus, 1996:7; also, Palairet, 1992:911; Pavlovic, 2013:12).   
5.6  Outmigration and Remittances 
The inadequate level of investment and employment in Kosovo caused both Kosovo Albanians 
and Serbs to leave for better opportunities. Kosovo Serbs were more able and likely to travel 
outside of Kosovo for employment than Kosovo Albanians until the removal of Ranković, but 
emigration of young men to work abroad as ‘guest workers’ was already well established since 
the Ottoman period (Clark, 2000:36). Beginning in the mid-1950s and through the 1980s, the 
                                                             
120 Kosovo’s population grew 220% between 1950 and 1983; Yugoslavia’s total population grew only 39% for the 
same period (Curtis, 1992). 
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number of Yugoslav guest workers increased dramatically. Benson (2001) and Curtis (1992) 
state some 20% of Yugoslavia’s employed population were employed as guest workers outside 
the country in the 1970s (Benson, 2001:114; Curtis, 1992:104), mostly rural men for unskilled 
labor (Gashi & Haxhikadrija, 2012:7). However, from the mid-1960s forward, growing 
unemployment in Yugoslavia and energetic reconstruction in West Germany and Austria 
encouraged over one million Yugoslavs, including a substantial number of women who chose to 
emigrate as well (Curtis, 1992:104), 
5.6.1 Emigration in Kosovo 
Emigration initially took the employment pressure off of the local industries, and hard currency 
remittances helped to stabilize Yugoslavia’s balance of payments (Curtis, 1992:128). At its peak, 
Gashi and Haxikadrija estimate nearly 20 percent of Kosovo’s adult population worked abroad 
as guest workers, primarily in Germany and Switzerland121 (Gashi & Haxhikadrija, 2012:7), and 
Curtis states remittances totalling an estimated $2 billion were sent home to Kosovo in the 
period between the 1970s and 1980s (Curtis, 1992:160). Yet as youth completed vocational 
training and experienced workers were made redundant, the number of educated and skilled 
workers leaving Yugoslavia also increased and mortgaged its future (Gashi & Haxhikadrija, 
2012:7). The large number of family members abroad became “socially demoralizing,” and 
ultimately did little to benefit either Yugoslavia or Kosovo (Benson, 2001:115). 
Three challenges emerged with the high numbers of emmigrants from Yugoslavia, and from 
Kosovo in particular: the drain of the most ambitious and skilled workers, lost labor on farms 
(Curtis, 1992:90) and the negative impact of continued remittances on the families left behind. 
First, the emmigration of men from the rural areas left women and the less able behind to tend 
to family farms, decreasing levels of agricultural production and thus their income. This loss was 
                                                             
121 Manual labor from Yugoslavia and other less developed European countries was invited as temporary workers to 
Germany and Switzerland as part of their own reconstruction efforts. 
133 
 
exacerbated for the elderly when the emigrant’s move became permanent, and the immediate 
family joined the emigrant (Curtis, 1992:90; Singleton & Carter, 1982:219). 
Secondly, while Gashi and Haxhikadrija (2012) found the early groups of emigrants were the 
traditional unskilled laborers from rural areas, Curtis (1992) and Singleton & Carter (1982) stress 
the later guest workers tended to be those with better skills; emigrants were those who had 
been made redundant, and the young with the highest skill and education levels. Their 
departure similarly left the elderly and unskilled behind (Singleton & Carter, 1982:219). The 
latter trend continued through the 1980’s as employment could not keep up with the output of 
university-educated youth (Curtis, 1992:90). Thus, many of the most productive members of 
society were unavailable to contribute to their communities.  
Thirdly, while remittances from family abroad enabled both better education and healthcare for 
the family members who had been left behind, remittances often tend to decrease the efforts 
of recipient family members’ to seek employment of their own122 (Gashi & Haxhikadrija, 
2012:14). Therefore, the substantial outmigration had an overall negative effect not only on the 
immediate family, but on the community as a whole.  
5.6.2  Embargos and Emmigrant Return 
The outflow of Yugoslav labor decreased in the mid-1970s, the result of both global economic 
slowdown and the Middle East oil embargos (Orford, 2003) first in 1974 and again in 1979. In 
respose to the economic slowdown, the central Yugoslav government attempted to raise hard 
capital with increased sale123 of newly-underpriced raw domestic materials on the global 
market. It also supressed imports124 and reduced domestic industrial investment, all of which 
                                                             
122 Although findings are based upon contemporary research on remittance effects in Kosovo conducted for UNDP 
and USAID between 2008 and 2009, similar effects are reasonably expected to have occurred prior to the study 
period as well. 
123 Also known as ‘dumping,’ this unsustainable tactic is a last resort to raise cash to prevent collapse  
124 This both reduced tariff income and promoted grey marketing.  
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undermined both real revenue and economic development (Radosevic, 1996). The extractive 
and heavy equipment manufacturing industries that Yugoslavia relied on for hard currency 
were almost completely dependent upon imported oil, and such industries were mostly located 
Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro. Hence, oil shortages and the subsequent four-fold125 
price increase forced cuts in those operations and subsequently reduced the production of hard 
cash generating exports. At the same time, “increased protectionism throughout Western 
Europe and led to bans and limits on a wide range of Yugoslav products” (Woodward, 
1995:251). Critically, the economic slowdowns in Western Europe caused thousands of guest-
workers to become redundant, both losing their ability to send remittance income home and 
returning to Yugoslavia at a time when employment there was stagnant or dropping126 (ibid), 
and the quality of life falling (Adamovic, 1995:276). This increased personal hardship and 
economic uncertainty made the security of one’s own family and national group the primary 
means of stability and survival, and subsequently facilitated the return of traditional and 
informal economies.  
5.7 Development of Yugoslavia’s Informal Economies  
Yugoslavia’s continual un/underemployment and strained domestic and international finances 
were partially offset by its ubiqutious informal economy. This alternate economy not only 
provided basic services127 and consumer goods that would otherwise be unavailable or 
unaffordable, it also became a means of additional income to offset continual layoffs, wage 
cuts, shortages, and the growing inflation and unemployment. Legally, income derived outside 
of a tax, tarriff or other official regulation may be considered informal128. However as Krasniqi & 
                                                             
125 The price of Middle East oil increased approximately 400% in four months. The price of Russian oil increased 
much less, providing 40% of Yugoslavia’s oil (Singleton & Carter, 1982). 
126 Curtis notes political pressure forced the hiring large numbers of returning workers; overstaffing overwhelmed 
cost reduction measures (Curtis, 1992).  
127 Services included minimal skilled workers such as drivers, casual labor for construction, farming and forestry and, 
tourism as well as mid to highly skilled professions including accounting, medicine, law and engineering.  
128 International Labor Organization; the definition tends to exclude agricultural activities such as selling home grown 
produce at a local market (ILO, 2000) 
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Topxhiu (2012) stress, informal economies are the result of “the interaction of numerous 
economic, political, social and institutional factors. They emerge particularly when the economy 
is unhealthy, and grow as the formal economy cannot absorb … participants out of the informal 
economy” (Krasniqi & Topxhiu, 2012:7). Thus,  Yugoslavia’s rapid transition toward 
industrialization, without a concurrent capacity for large numbers of its citizens to participate 
equally, created and eventually entrenched, its informal economy. 
The informal economy had been unofficially tolerated by the Yugoslav government as it relieved 
the pressure to provide these services or goods (Curtis, 1992:160), yet the outcomes had four 
increasingly negative consequences. First, the informal employment denied tax revenue to the 
local governments. Local governments were continually stretched by the devolution of social 
services that had been previously provided and funded by the Republics and Municipalities, and 
therefore limited the ability of local government, such as small town and villages, to provide 
adequate services to the public (Krasniqi & Topxhiu, 2012:9; Woodward, 1995:270). Secondly, 
informal employment harms the worker by depressing wages overall and failing to protect 
those who provided the labor or performed the service. Further, it tends to trap them in a 
continuum of low paying temporary jobs (Krasniqi & Topxhiu, 2012:7). These were especially 
the outcomes for employees in high hazard private businesses such as construction, forestry 
and day labor in which many Kosovo Albanians tended to relegated to.   
Thirdly, the channels and networks through which goods and services were acquired were often 
corrupting and malign; “the same networks that smuggled firewood, food and consumer goods 
across borders were easily adapted for arms, human trafficking, and organized crime in which 
government officials would become increasingly complicit” (Danielsson, 2015:137). 
Unsurprisingly, this informal structure would be later adapted to establish and support a 
parallel government and economy to provide Kosovo Albanians with government services from 
the 1980s forward, as well as support armed combatants in the late 1990’s. Lastly, once 
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established as the new normal, the informal economy elite are increasingly unlikely to support 
future government-led economic development and the return to a legitimate government and 
economy (Cheng, 2013; Münch, 2013).  
5.8 Revocation of Kosovo’s Autonomy 
 
Stapleton & Carter (1982) provide a fitting summary of Yugoslavia as it entered the 1980’s:  
 
“Since the passing of the 1974 Constitution … the regulation of the economy has been 
officially left to the complicated machinery of self-management. However, such an 
intricate mechanism is dependent upon a high level of civil responsibility, and an 
awareness by the decision makers of the consequences to the national economy of the 
actions they take at the local level. … [now when] the machinery fails to work … the 
federal authorities no longer have the ability to take anticipatory action … [and] they 
have relinquished most of the instruments that would enable them to fine-tune the 
economy, leaving [only] the blunt instruments of administrative orders” (Singleton & 
Carter, 1982:251).  
 
The leadership vacuum following Tito’s death in May 1980 presented political and economic 
challenges that increasingly required solutions which proved too difficult for the ineffectual 
Federal government to manage (Morrison, 2016:50) 129. Singleton & Carter (1982:161) describe 
Yugoslavia’s 1981-1985 plan130  to continue to focus on energy and engineering which were 
intended to complement its high energy-consuming industries, as ‘not encouraging’, especially 
as Yugoslavia could no longer acquire sufficient international funding to do so. Moreover, 
“Western states had already dumped stockpiles of strategic raw materials131 into the global 
market to bolster their own economies” (Woodward, 1995:254), which caused the price of 
comparable Yugoslav exports to fall. Negotiations with the International Monetary Fund led to 
the end of Yugoslav self-management, replacing it with closely monitored austerity programs 
(ibid), including a restructure toward a market economy (Morrison, 2016:50). At the same time, 
the West curtailed its wider investment in Eastern Europe in 1983 for fear that the civil unrest 
                                                             
129 Cerra and Saxena find that countries that sustain major economic shocks almost never recover, but tend to 
continue to slide downward (Cerra & Saxena, 2007).  
130 A continuation of the 1976-1980 Plan which focused on the energy producing sectors.  
131 Base materials such as aluminum and copper, and phosphates for making other chemicals and industrial products  
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seen in Poland’s anti-communist Solidarność, Solidarity Movement could spread (Woodward, 
1995:256).  
 
The ambitious Serb politician Slobodan Milošević used the economic hardships in Yugoslavia 
and fanned Serb nationalism to build his influence, rising to the presidency of the Regional 
Party, and then the President of Serbia’s Communist Party in 1986. He courted Serbs 
antagonistic to Tito’s 1974 reforms, especially those reforms that significantly benefitted 
Kosovo Albanians; Milošević was elected President of Serbia in 1989, and publicly overturned 
the 1974 Constitution soon afterward.  
By 1990 Yugoslavia’s annual inflation rate was 2,700 percent, up from 160 percent in 1986. The 
official unemployment rate was 20 percent (Bennett, 1995:117; Benson, 2001:152), but was 
unofficially much higher, especially in the less developed Republics. The economy realized a 
short improvement between 1989 and 1990 when the Yugoslav dinar was devalued, wages 
frozen and prices liberalized under IMF guidance (Bennett, 1995:118). However, the 
improvements vanished when Milošević granted himself a loan from Serbia’s central bank to 
support his reelection and the IMF recommendations were abandoned (ibid, 121). Within the 
following twelve months both the Republic of Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence 
from Yugoslavia in June 1991, followed by the Republic of Macedonia in September. The 
secession of Macedonia was barely challenged by Milošević who was heavily engaged in arming 
Bosnian Serbs to fight against Croatians, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in neighboring 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
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5.9 Embargo and Sanctions against Yugoslavia  
The United Nations Security Council adopted UNSCR 713 in 1991, an arms embargo, and 
adopted Resolution 757132 (UNSCR 757) in May 1992, which was a list of economic sanctions to 
pressure Milošević to cease fighting and undermine his popular support. Sanctions included 
freezing Yugoslav business assets in foreign banks133; denial of economic aid; embargo of 
foreign oil and embargo of trade for Yugoslav exports. Imports were limited to food and 
humanitarian supplies (Camras, 2011; Matthews, 1992). The sanctions continued until 
December 1995134, when Milošević was faced with a winter without either natural gas or oil for 
heat135. Isolated and having exhausted his cash reserves, rising inflation and trade at barely 20 
percent of its pre-war volume, Milošević signed the Kumanovo Agreement (also known as the 
Dayton Peace Accords) under the terms of UNSCR 1031136 on 14 December 1995 to end the war 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, allowing the NATO Implementation Forces, IFOR, to enter Yugoslavia as 
peacekeepers (Benson, 2001:171).  
 
By 1995 however, Kosovo had already lived in near invisibility under the apartheid conditions 
and martial law imposed by Milošević in 1989137. Thus, the failure to address Kosovo’s 
conditions in the Dayton Peace Accords and increasing ethnic cleansing tactics against Kosovo 
Albanians by Serbia in the late-1990s, led many Kosovo Albanians to conclude that violence was 
the only means for change (ibid). A loose group of men calling themselves the Kosovo Liberation 
                                                             
132 Seven resolutions had been passed prior to UNSCR 757, including UNSCR 713 in 1991 to embargo sales and 
delivery of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia, and further resolutions authorized observers and UN 
peacekeeping forces.  
133 Yugoslavia had deposits of $214 million in United States’ banks alone; the United States had already embargoed 
trade with Yugoslavia earlier in 1992 (Matthew, 1992). 
134 UNSCR 1022 removed sanctions from Bosnia and Croatia; sanctions against Serbia continued. 
135 Russia upheld the sanctions of UNSCR 757, but continued to sell natural gas to Yugoslavia for household use. 
Yugoslavia failed to pay for its gas, and Russia’s own post-communist financial crisis prevented its ability to continue 
support.  
136 Terms of UNSCR 1031 include peacekeeping with NATO Implementation Forces, continued sanctions on weapon 
and limits/responsibilities of civilian police  
137 Kosovo’s martial law had been established in 1989 during the war between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
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Army, KLA, emerged and initiated provocative guerilla actions to bring Kosovo to international 
attention. Negotiations between Milošević and the Contact Group138 failed to halt the Yugoslav 
Army ethnic cleansing tactics in Kosovo and UN economic sanctions were re-instated in March 
1998139. These new sanctions were followed by NATO airstrikes on Serb military targets and 
supporting infrastructure, including inside Kosovo, from March 1999 and continued for 78 days 
until early June. By 9 June 1999 Milošević conceded and directed the Yugoslav Army to cease 
offensive operations in Kosovo.  
 
5.9.1 Embargo and Sanction Effects on Kosovo  
The airstrikes and five years of sanctions against Yugoslavia ended the fighting, but the 
economic sanctions also had wide-ranging and enduring damaging effects on the Yugoslav 
economy (Garfield, 2001), and on Kosovo in particular.  
First, in addition to the lack of imported raw materials to restart operations, much of 
Yugoslavia’s heavy industry and manufacturing sectors were crippled by air strikes140. Kosovo’s 
facilities, already degraded by a lack of maintenance, vandalism and pilferage became nearly 
useless. Yugoslavia’s output was further impaired by the destruction of supporting 
infrastructure to transport products to market. Second, the lost income from Croatia and 
Slovenia since 1991, and restrictions on export trade meant little income had been generated 
that could rebuild infrastructure or the more critical industries. Third, many foreign businesses 
and investors closed or had relocated their offices out of Yugoslavia during the sanctions, and 
considered the post-war environment still too risky to resume operation (Garfield, 2001). 
Similarly, restoration of the pre-sanction relations with Yugoslav businesses, academics, 
                                                             
138 The Contact Group was comprised of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom and United States 
139 UNSCR 1160 
140 Serbia contained many large military equipment, munitions and weapons manufacturers, while smaller factories 
were spread throughout Yugoslavia often served as local military bases making them legitimate military targets, as 
well as their supporting infrastructure.  
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professionals, and researchers remained too complicated to reestablish. As a result, Yugoslavs, 
including Kosovars, were increasingly excluded from participation in international conferences 
and organizations where they were once welcome (ibid).  
5.10 Kosovo’s Deindustrialization  
In a developed economy, deindustrialization can be the positive result of moving from low-skill 
industries to services and digital technology, which require fewer employees and physical 
resources. This was not the case in Kosovo, where deindustrialization was the physical loss of 
industrial assets, resources and infrastructure, and societal return to subsistance living.   
Benson notes as early as 1965 a “third of Yugoslav enterprises operated at a loss” (Benson, 
1982: 112) and by the 1970’s, a few of the worst performing and non-essential industries were 
likely to have been closed or consolidated with profitable industries to establish some 
economies of scale (ibid). Their labor expenses141 were contained by “not expanding, by 
lowering wages, or by shedding those employees with other means of support”142 (Woodward, 
1995:233). Such deindustrialization typically effected regions in the least developed areas of 
Yugoslavia with high concentration of extractive industries, such as Kosovo (ibid). While the 
reduced or lost industries increased unemployment and promoted outmigration througout 
Yugoslavia, the sanctions dramatically accelerated deindustrailization in Kosovo for two 
reasons.  
First, Kosovo had already been fully incorporated into Serbia by 1992 when the UN sanctions in 
protest of Serb violence in Bosnia began, thus the transfer of the assets out of Kosovo’s better 
State owned enterprises to Serbia was well underway (Clark, 2000:112). As the sanction terms 
prohibited trade by or with Serbia, asset stripping of Kosovo’s industry was an uncomplicated 
means of acquiring suitable material and equipment that could be used by Serb industry for its 
                                                             
141 Consolidation often required the employment of all or the majority of the employees from the failed enterprise. 
142 Particularly youth and women. 
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wars with Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or sold for cash to support the Serb government 
(ibid). Asset stripping was worsened by Serb forces who looted any remaining useful property 
as they withdrew from Kosovo in June 1999.  
Secondly, the loss of State and civil employment led many Kosovo Albanians to return to family 
farms (Clark, 2000:113; Warrander & Knaus, 2010:23), or open small retail businesses and 
coffee shops (ibid), which often relied on barter or on the extensive government-protected sub-
economy market of smuggled food and basic medicines (Benson, 2001:171; Camras, 2011). By 
the mid-1990s only minor local trades remained in Kosovo. Ironically, this same informal 
economy allowed the Kosovo Albanians to weather Yugoslavia’s economic crisis during the 
1990s and the collapse of Yugoslav banks far better than Serbia or the Kosovo Serbs (Zaum & 
Knaus, 2013). 
5.11 A Political Economy View  
Noting political economy includes “the relations between formal and informal political and 
economic structures” (Berdal & Zaum, 2013:5), and occurs “within its historical and structural 
context” (Collinson, 2003; Youngman, 2000:3), political economy is therefore an outcome “of 
the social relations, particularly the power relations that mutually constitute the production, 
distribution and consumption of resources ...” (Mosco, 2009:2). Thus, the social, political and 
economic condition of Kosovo can be studied through a political economy of development lens, 
already identified by Zaum & Knaus (2013) as a missing perspective to understand Kosovo’s 
economic environment. This section will focus on three interrelated economic factors: 
persistent deficit of Federal investment in Kosovo; structural discrimination; and, economic 
isolation, especially in the decade preceding the Kosovo War in 1999. 
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5.11.1 Insufficient Federal Investment 
Federal investment in Yugoslavia may be further divided into three broad areas, 1) industry, 2) 
agriculture and 3) human resources, and their analysis reveals where many investment 
decisions had substantial contradictory outcomes.  
The first, insufficient investment in less developed Republics, was a decision compelled by 
Yugoslavia’s post war conditions in 1945; scarce reconstruction monies were invested first in 
the industrialized Republics to generate working capital and begin its national development 
toward full communism. The presence of functional infrastructure and a skilled workforce also 
made investment in the more developed Republics less of a risk. Yet as described earlier, heavy 
industry is not only costly, but has a very substantial lag time between equipment purchase and 
income generation. While economically prudent, the conditions of less developed Republics 
including Kosovo only continued to worsen. Years without investment unintentionally starved 
them of the basic resources to re/build, and already possessing fewer resources and 
opportunity for income generation, widened the already substantial development gap. 
Particularly in Kosovo where there was little investment until the late 1960’s, more than 20 
years after the end of the Second World War, the resources necessary to close that gap had 
become unobtainable. Moreover, as industry and enterprise eventually established in the less 
developed Republics were rarely economically viable, the more developed Republics came to 
view investment in the less developed Republics as wasteful and at the expense of their own 
economies, and thus began to openly consider separation from Yugoslavia. Yet the rigid Soviet 
model did not provide for less ambitious enterprises than heavy industry, such as the small 
consumer goods which had to be imported, nor the establishment of transportation 
infrastructure to facilitate commerce. These, if engaged earlier and in a wider area, would likely 
have generated local income and help to reduce the extreme economic differences between 
the Republics.  
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Secondly, insufficient Federal investment in agriculture:  Yugoslav-wide land collectivization 
added additional uncertainty to farmers whose farms, homes and equipment were damaged, 
compounded by the fact that, at the war’s end in late spring, farmers would have lost not only 
their autumn wheat and oat sowing, but the spring planting of maize and vegetables as well 
(Rashid & Cheng-Hopkins, 1999). Moreover, farms in the less developed Republics were already 
at the subsistence level, and only emergency foreign aid of food and seeds prevented 
widespread starvation. In addition, collectivized agriculture gave priority of agricultural 
equipment, and imported seed and fertilizer inputs to cooperative and collective farms, most of 
them in the more developed Republics. This was both to improve their yields, and discourage 
private farms through ensuring scarcity and high input costs. Moreover, despite land 
collectivization having been officially discontinued in 1953, private farmers were unable to 
purchase motorized farm equipment, such as tractors until 1957. For agriculturally dependent 
Kosovo, such policies directly undermined its development.  
Thirdly, even under the best of conditions, the official use of a single common language is highly 
political in nature. Serbia contained two substantial non-Slavic language populations, Albanian 
in Kosovo and Hungarian in Vojvodina, and both minority groups were heavily pressured, then 
directed by law, to forgo their native language and exclusively adopt the Serbian language 
(Committee, 1993). As languages often represent culture, and national or ethnic identity, 
suppression and denial of one’s native language is typically perceived as the stripping of one’s 
own identity (Jansen, 2012), thus such language requirements tend to meet significant 
resistance (Judah, 2008). Yet Yugoslavia’s language accommodation also had significant 
drawbacks. Public education was provided in minority languages through primary school until 
approximately 15 years of age (Curtis, 1992:114) while secondary and university education was 
only provided in Serbian, which immediately limited all minority’s access to higher education 
and subsequent employment opportunities.  
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Ironically, access to better employment opportunities was further reduced when Tito allowed 
use of the Albanian language through the university level in 1967143, as this allowed Kosovo 
Albanians to become more insular, and at the same time more easily marginalized by Kosovo 
Serbs and Serbia. As Yugoslavia began to establish additional industry in Kosovo, the 
management were most often Serbs who possessed both better education and vocational skills 
(Palairet, 1992). Moreover, as further opportunities for advanced and technical education 
continued to be provided through State and civil employment, Kosovo Serbs, rather than 
Kosovo Albanains, tended to be chosen (Woodward, 1995). Therefore, as a larger number of 
Kosovo Serbs were employed in Kosovo’s industry and government overall, Kosovo Albanians 
were increasingly left behind, both impairing development, and contributing to animosity 
between ethnic groups. 
5.11.2 Structural Discrimination 
Use of the Albanian language similarly contributed to structural discrimination of Kosovo 
Albanians. Nationalist tendencies were especially pronounced in the Republic of Serbia (Curtis, 
1992:203), and Kosovo Albanian pressure to use the Albanian language perpetuated Serb fear 
of Albanian irredentism. Moreover, the provisions and freedoms granted by the 1974 
constitution to the two Autonomous Provinces were well known to be largely intended to 
reduce Serbia’s dominance (ibid). Together they increased Serbia’s insecurity, and coupled with 
Kosovo’s still-low skill and literacy level, made the exclusion and ensuing discrimination of 
Kosovo Albanians appear to be reasonable.  
                                                             
143 Teachers and textbooks were brought in from Albania, which used the Tosk dialect of Albania, rather than the 
Gheg dialect of Kosovo, making instruction difficult, but also inspired national identity as an Albanian, rather than a 
Yugoslav. Taught university subjects were typically in the liberal arts, hence not suited for industry. In addition, 
Albania’s education system was less advanced than Yugoslavia’s, thus Kosovo’s education was a lower quality overall 
(Curtis, 1992:88).  
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Yet as the Kosovo Albanians’ literacy and skills improved, their participation in government 
activities and political awareness also increased. These in turn, gave rise to additional demands 
for equity from Serbia, then for recognition as a republic.  
Emboldened by its growing nationalism under Slobodan Milošević, Serbia revoked the 
autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and sacked Kosovo Albanians from public employment 
soon afterward. He used the subsequent violent protests in Kosovo as pretext for the 
establishment martial law in Kosovo in 1989, including heavily enforced curfews and travel 
restrictions. 
5.12 Kosovo’s Economic Isolation and Arrival of KFOR   
Kosovo had already been sidelined by the more developed republics, with its difficult terrain, 
poor roadways, and an under-skilled populace. Hence, when Kosovo Albanians were dismissed 
from their civil and state positions, and the most viable industries were either dismantled and 
moved to Serbia, or its equipment sold, and the buildings shuttered, Kosovo returned to 
economic invisibility. With the loss of its largest income sources, Kosovo Albanians turned again 
to working abroad; to family, and to the ubiquitous informal economy; small retail trade, cafés, 
and subsistence agriculture. But the constricted, apartheid environment had also promoted 
corruption; the smuggling and organized crime networks which developed extended beyond 
the end of the Kosovo War in June 1999, especially in in the absence of better economic 
alternatives. The arrival of Kosovo Forces, KFOR, in June 1999 was therefore an opportunity to 
replace this environment with new economic opportunities, and strongly suggests Kosovo 
Albanians were particularly open to the establishment of military bases and their prospect for 
change.  
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Chapter 6:  Camp Bondsteel Case Study 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines the two United States’ bases in Kosovo, Camp Monteith and Camp 
Bondsteel, in two sections. It opens with a brief history of the region and the municipalities of 
Gjilan and Ferizaj, followed by a description of the functions and activities of the US KFOR 
bases, both established after the 1999 Kosovo War. A discussion of the effects of the 
establishment of the military bases, including hiring local employees, purchasing and 
community leader relations completes Section One. 
Section Two contains a closer examination and analysis of the social, political and economic 
changes attributed to the military base, with an emphasis on the economic impact of very high 
salaries and purchase of millions of dollars of construction material on these two base 
communities. The Section concludes with a summary of effects, finding the military base 
significantly increased local prosperity, but did not catalyze sustainable growth.  
6.1 Section 1: Establishing US Camps  
The US KFOR was staged at the borders of Albania and Macedonia on 12 June 1999 waiting 
authorization to enter Kosovo and move into the Multinational Brigade-East (MNB-E) area of 
responsibility (Interview 8). The initial 1,800-Soldier US KFOR contingent convoyed to two 
geographically separate locations. The majority went to a small Yugoslav Army (JA) artillery 
training base located in Gjilan, renamed Camp Monteith, which would temporarily house the 
US, NATO and NATO-partner headquarters and logistic forces. A much smaller group of military 
engineers and Corp of Engineers civilians traveled approximately 20 miles southwest to a 900-
acre field near the town of Ferizaj144, the site of the yet to-be-built Camp Bondsteel (Interview 
73; McClure, 2000; Security, 2000; Wentz, 2002), which would become the MNB-E 
                                                             
144 The Serb-language name for this Municipality and town is Uroševac. The conventionally recognized Albanian-
language name ‘Ferizaj’ is used throughout this thesis and this Chapter for simplicity.  
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headquarters. The US contributed approximately 7,000 military personnel and was joined by 
Greece, Poland, Romania, Russia and Ukraine for a combined total of 17,000 troops by the end 
of December 1999 (Security, 2000). Map 6.1 shows the general location of the two US camps. 
                       Map 6.1. Location of Camp Monteith and Camp Bondsteel 
 
6.2 Establishing Camp Monteith 
Prior to the Kosovo War, the Gjilan Municipality numbered approximately 119,000 residents; its 
ethnic profile was 79 percent Kosovo Albanians, 16 percent Kosovo Serbs, and 5 percent of all 
other minorities (OSCE 2005). The same-named City of Gjilan was Kosovo’s fourth largest. Camp 
Monteith was located at the north-eastern edge of Gjilan’s city center and business district; it 
had been an artillery training camp for the 52nd Mixed Artillery Brigade and 243rd Mechanized 
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Brigade, containing barracks, ranges and a small airstrip.145 Although only the storage and 
maintenance areas were bomb-damaged during the war, most buildings required substantial 
renovation as most of the buildings had been intentionally vandalized by retreating Serb forces, 
then looted for usable materials by the community, particularly for metal pipes, plumbing 
fixtures, wire to sell for salvage or reuse elsewhere (GlobalSecurity.org, 2000; McClure, 2000).  
Photo 6.1 shows the condition of a storage and maintenance facility destroyed by bombing 
during the Kosovo War. It is unlikely any sizeable number of local civilians worked on the base 
prior to the war due to the availability of conscripts for general labor (also, Prizren interview 
62). 
   
  
 
Camp Monteith operated as a staging area for US MNB-E forces, supporting approximately 
2,000 Marines, Army infantry and demining personnel, known as “sappers”; US Navy engineers 
and Navy “SeaBees” 146, German military engineers, and liaisons from the Greek, Polish, Russian, 
Ukrainian forces. Camp Monteith also housed the US logistic services firm, Brown and Root 
                                                             
145 Statements made by an interviewee that the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, had used the Camp briefly could not 
be verified 
146 Sea-Bee is an adaptation of the US Navy abbreviation ‘CB’ for Construction Battalion 
(https://www.navy.com/careers/engineering-applied-science/civil-engineering) 
Photo: R. McClure, Engineering in Europe.  
Photo 6.1  Destroyed maintenance building, Camp Monteith  
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Contractors (B&R) (Interview 8; McClure, 2000). While military forces had made a small number 
of hires and purchases in the first weeks, B&R subsequently hired all local workers, and 
contracted for the majority of construction services and materiel for both Camp Monteith and 
Bondsteel (ibid). The perception that the military had performed these activities is likely due to 
the nearly identical uniforms worn by the US military, US civilians and contractors; to the local 
residents, all uniformed personnel represented KFOR (Interviews 8, 73).  
Prior to construction’s start, military engineers, sappers and B&R contractors demined acres of 
surrounding fields and roadways. Within the Camp’s grounds proper, “engineers set up seven 
kilometers of fencing; constructed self-sufficient electrical, water and waste treatment facilities; 
built 75 South East Asia huts (SEA-huts)147 for offices and accommodation, and an indoor dining 
facility by 1 October 1999, just over 90 days since the construction start of 1 July 1999”, 
(GlobalSecurity.org, 2000; McClure, 2000).  
Photo 6.2 below show the construction of Camp Monteith from 1 July 1999 to 15 October 1999.  
 
 
 
                                                             
147 South East Asia, SEA-huts, were developed for Viet Nam. Typically, SEA-huts are gable roofed single-story 
buildings designed to be quickly built with dimension lumber and plywood sheathing, and able to be modified for 
nearly any use.  
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6.2.1 Recruiting and hiring local residents  
Expatriate Kosovo Albanians from the US, and translators from Albania accompanied KFOR into 
Kosovo (Interview 84). Aside from a small number of additional translators148, few local 
residents were hired during the three or four-week pre-construction phase of Camp Monteith. 
None of those interviewed in Gjilan had knowledge of how these first employees were 
informed of the jobs, and most speculated some combination of outreach and word of mouth 
was used149 (Interviews 8, 73, 84). Nevertheless, within 30 days approximately 7,000 local 
residents and 1,000 expatriates were employed to build Camp Monteith, together with, 
according to McClure, “German engineers, US Army engineers, SeaBees and B&R contractors 
operated 24-hours a day to meet their 1 October deadline until Camp Monteith was close to 
completion” (McClure, 2000:5).  
With up to 7,000 local residents employed to build Camp Monteith at salaries of 1,000 to 2,000 
USD per month for at least 12 months, the re/construction of Camp Monteith was a source of 
unprecedented economic opportunity for the residents of Gjilan. A conservative estimate of 
1,000 USD per month for 1,000 employees150 adds 1 million USD to Gjilan Municipality’s 
economy each month, and an infusion of approximately 12 million USD into the Gjilan 
Municipality per year. Interviews find base employees primarily used their salaries to support 
family members, and repair or improve their homes151. Additional interpreters, cleaners, dining 
facility and maintenance workers, and mechanics would likely have been hired at similar rates 
                                                             
148 At least some of these first hires were Serb language speakers. (Interview 7) 
149 Favoritism, or gatekeeping, by expatriate Kosovo Albanians did occur initially, but the wide casting into the 
community substantially reduced its effect (Interview 8, 84). 
150 1000 Gjilan residents is used for simplicity. However, it is likely there would also have been a small proportion of 
base employees that originated from outside of the Gjilan Municipality.  
151 In several cases, young adult children built their own houses and moved out of their parents’ home, a significant 
break from patriarchal tradition.  
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to support Camp operations in late August and September in preparation for the October 
deadline.  
These high salaries are likely to have contributed to localized price increases, particularly for 
fresh food and meat following the conclusion of the World Food Program blanket food 
distribution (FAO, 2000)152. Although Kosovo saw an annual inflation rate of 11.3 percent in 
2001, it had fallen to 4 percent in 2003 (Provisional Institutions of Self Government, 2003); 
Kosovo’s average annual inflation rate for the entire study period was 3.4 percent (Kosovo 
Agency for Statistics, 2017). Gjilan may have experienced some localized inflation in the earliest 
years, but the localized rate appeared to have also decreased with that of Kosovo until Kosovo 
unilaterally converted its currency from the Deutschmark to the euro in 2002, then the annual 
inflation rate was contained in Kosovo’s average.  
Tyrbedari (2006) in her research of euroization outside of the Euro zone, affirms international 
community demands for housing, food and other goods and services had significantly 
contributed to localized price rises and inflation throughout Kosovo, as is noted in the post-
conflict literature (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007). However, such increases were also 
temporary, as the inflation decreases when the new levels of demand are satisfied (Carnahan, 
et al., 2005). Regardless of its’ accuracy, Gjilan interviewees widely believed prices increased 
during the change from the Deutschmark to the Euro153 in 2002 (Interviews 26, 73; also, 
Tyrbedari, 2006) rather than due to the presence of KFOR, international organizations or other 
outside factors. Ulaj (2015) also found transportation costs rose nearly 60 percent in 2007, a 
world-wide outcome of the global oil-related events surrounding the 2008 and 2011 price 
                                                             
152 While this free food was essential for the first year after the war, anecdotes by farmers stated the concurrent 
“dumping” of food products into Kosovo by its neighbors drastically reduced their profits. For example, farmers could 
not raise chickens in Kosovo for the price of frozen chickens shipped in from Macedonia (Interview 37, also Beilock, 
2005).  
153 The official bank conversion rate for Deutschemark (DM) to Euro (€) conversion in 2002 was 1.9551 DM to 1€, 
which had the perceived effect of doubling the cost of goods and services for the purchaser.  
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spikes (Ulaj, et al., 2015), which was likely to be a larger contributor to the overall increases in 
food and consumer goods throughout Kosovo than the international community. Hence, from 
2003 until the end of the study period, 2012154, Gjilan’s inflation rate was included in Kosovo’s 
overall; Kosovo’s rate was the same or below the rate of its neighbors, between 2 and 3 percent 
(Central Intelligence Agency Factbook, 2017), even accounting for the significant spikes in 
Kosovo’s overall inflation: 26 percent in 2008, and 19 percent in 2011 (Kosovo Agency of 
Statistics, 2017)155 that had resulted from external economic conditions.  
6.2.2 Local purchasing  
Food, fuel, supplies and building materials for military use were prepositioned156 in Albania, 
Macedonia and Montenegro and trucked in by military or B&R convoys (Interviews 8, 84; also, 
GlobalSecurity.org, 2000). According to the US military, civilian personnel, and local residents 
with personal knowledge, shops and businesses were not open in Gjilan157 at the conclusion of 
the war in June 1999, and very few opened until weeks or months afterward (Interviews 23, 24, 
25, 26, 34). Most Gjilan residents had moved to live with family in safer areas, or had left 
Kosovo completely as refugees (ibid). Those residents that remained in the area had survived by 
smuggling, or trading for food that had been smuggled in from outside Kosovo, sold from the 
back of automobiles (Interviews 23, 24, 25, 26, 34, 73). By October 1999 retail shops that sold 
hardware and spare parts, plastic household goods, and consumables (cigarettes, drinks, and 
packaged food and snacks) were open regularly. The first significant businesses to reopen in 
Gjilan were two small petrol stations, both in late October or early November 1999 (Interview 8, 
73). See Photo 6.3. 
                                                             
154 This average includes inflation spikes in 2008 and 2012 which are due to global events. 
155 Consumer Price Index CPI figures are available from 2007 forward (Statistics, 2017).  
156 All MNB lead nations did this; informal conversation with US Air Force logistics officer based in Tirana in April 
1999.  
157 Most recall KLA took over buildings and many homes; when shops opened, the KLA extorted money, food and 
supplies from the owners. 
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 Photo 6.3 Gjilan retail, October 1999                      Photo: McClure (2000) 
It is important to state here that only mounted patrols and a very small number of KFOR 
personnel such as deminers, civilian logisticians and engineers had the opportunity to leave the 
base (Interviews 8, 72, 73, 84), in part because arson and armed fighting had still not ended. 
Opportunities were further limited to daylight working hours158 except the 24-hour patrols, and 
by the Kosovo-wide curfew imposed by KFOR from 10:00 pm until 4:00 am. This significantly 
limited the number of base personnel able to purchase merchandise from the local businesses 
that began to emerge. In addition, only bagged foods and non-alcoholic bottled drinks were 
permitted to be consumed. Restaurants were ‘off limits’ to prevent food borne illnesses; 
Soldiers were directed to eat solely in base dining facilities or consume pre-packaged food such 
as Meals, Ready to Eat, MREs, while on patrol. Therefore, the expected price spikes and 
shortages typically associated with a rapid influx of wealthy outsiders consuming local food159, 
fuel, housing, and transportation (Ammitzboll & Tychsen, 2007) did not materialize in Gjilan 
specifically because of KFOR.  
                                                             
158 Both military and civilian personnel required advance approval for travel off base. These requirements were still 
in effect for military during the research period in 2014.  
159 Due to the extreme number of refugees and two lost growing seasons, the World Food Program conducted a 
‘food blanket’ and provided food aid to nearly 100 percent of Kosovo residents for approximately one year, where 
after it continued based on need (FAO, 2000). An unintended consequence was Kosovo’s own agriculture sector 
could not compete with the wide availability of free food.  
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While small amounts of gravel and rock had been initially purchased from local quarries, most 
building materials for Camp Monteith originated from outside of Kosovo for several months 
(Interviews 8, 25, 73), especially gravel and concrete from Skopje, Macedonia to fill the demand 
for an average of 4000 cubic meters/day (Interviews 8, 25, 73; McClure, 2000).160 To reduce 
transportation costs, KFOR engineers at Camp Monteith located the former managers of the 
shuttered socially owned gravel company ‘Glama’ for gravel and crushed stone (McClure, 
2000:15). KFOR repaired its equipment and resumed quarrying operations (McClure, 2000:15; 
Mertens, 1999), and Glama became the primary gravel materials supplier for KFOR161 by the 
end of 1999. 
Few business owners were willing to be interviewed concerning their previous or current work 
with KFOR. One agreed, a Gjilan-based gravel and construction material company, through a 
referral provided by a US civilian162 that worked in facility management on Camp Bondsteel. 
This company had started as a family owned wood cutting company, and it had specifically 
redirected its business to take advantage of the new ring road construction163. His daughter, the 
company accountant and co-owner of the family business described the company origins:  
“My father cut and sold wood before the war. In September or October [1999] my 
father borrowed money from family to buy a kombi (a type of passenger van) and 
became a transportation company to shuttle Camp Monteith employees living in 
remote villages to and from the Camp until late Spring 2000. During the winter, he got 
the rights to a small unworked quarry, and started a construction material business 
specifically to provide materials to KFOR for roads. He went directly to KFOR to inform 
them of the business and they used him right away.  
                                                             
160 Interview 73 noted the Macedonian government resisted losing KFOR business, which had significantly improved 
its own economy.  
161 Glama had been poorly maintained in the decade before the war. KFOR purchased existing stocks of stone and 
gravel; repaired and restored quarrying equipment and managed quarry explosives (McClure, 2000:15). Glama was 
contacted, but not willing to interviewed during the field visits.  
162 Interview 8; this individual had been a military police Soldier in 1999, but returned to Kosovo as a US civilian in 
2004. He gave one interview because he was among the first to arrive and wanted to provide his experience. He 
confirmed few US or Kosovo civilians will agree to be interviewed due to fear of loss of KFOR’s business or 
employment. See also Chapter 3.   
163 The ring road was requested by the Gjilan Municipality. KFOR agreed to build the ring road to improve patrol 
movement and to reduce congestion made worse by convoys and heavy construction traffic that had negatively 
affected Gjilan’s City center. The new road also improved commerce on the north side of the city and facilitated the 
return of Kosovo Serb refugees and IDPs.  
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The company started with 20 people and we employed up to 300 people at the peak in 
2005. One of the most important things Camp Bondsteel did for us was to pay every 
week in cash so we could meet the payroll and other obligations. The demand for road 
materials is much less now, but our company continues to operate with a regular 
workforce of 150 to 180 people. We work mostly for the Gjilan Municipality today, but 
KFOR was the reason for our success” (Interview 26). 
 
This interview and several other informal conversations suggest KFOR bought gravel from a 
small number of local companies for road repair and re/construction, and the construction was 
performed in conjunction with the Gjilan municipality, which similarly hired local workers. This 
material is in addition to KFOR’s materials purchases from Glama for its own use in camp 
construction.  
The economic contribution of the construction material business to Gjilan is substantial. Based 
strictly upon the aforementioned daily demand of 4000 cubic meters of gravel, and an estimate 
of 11 USD164 per tonne, over 63,300 USD was purchased through the Gjilan economy for 
materials per day. More significantly, the local salaries for the 200-300 quarry employees create 
a purchasing value of 1,000-1500 USD daily165, which combined, contributed nearly 2 million 
USD per month for this project alone. Therefore, while the US KFOR made very few direct local 
purchases, the purchasing volume created a large economic contribution to the Gjilan 
Municipality and its communities between 1999 and 2005.  
6.2.3 Community Relations     
Interviews with US personnel, Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb residents, and officials in 
Gjilan, find the US KFOR based at Camp Monteith generally had had positive relations with the 
local community and the Gjilan-based civilian international organizations from the bases’ initial 
establishment through hand-over to the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) in 2005. Interviews with 
first hand observers especially point to the close collaboration between KFOR Military Police 
                                                             
164 Kosovo retail for crushed stone. Estimate based on Cost Benefit Analysis in Kosmac Limestone Deposit, Republic of 
Kosovo, 2013. https://www.insikapub.com/Vol-01/No-03/23IJBAS(1)(3).pdf 
165 Estimate based on monthly salary of 150 USD for 200 and 300 employees.  
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patrols and United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to oversee and protect 
returning internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees of all ethnicities (Interviews 8, 23, 29, 
72; Morris, 1999), and of KFOR patrols assisting UNHCR efforts to shelter and meet the physical 
needs of all the local population by sharing security information (Etchemendy, 2010:15). Similar 
cooperation with KFOR was noted between UNMIK and Kosovo Police, who attended many of 
the same anti-crime meetings (Interview 8, 27, 28). The refurbished Camp Monteith was turned 
over to the KPC in the mid-summer of 2005, and all US military activities were relocated to 
Camp Bondsteel.  
6.3 Establishing Camp Bondsteel  
The 900-acre site for Camp Bondsteel is located in the Ferizaj Municipality, approximately 20 
miles southwest of Camp Monteith. Ferizaj was a trade city prior to the Ottomans, with one of 
the more ethnically diverse communities. It was slowly industrialized after the Second World 
War; its primary industries included agriculture, forestry and wood processing; metal 
processing, and transportation (Cardno, 2015; Etemi, 2005). Although the Ferizaj Municipality 
had sustained relatively little war damage to its urban infrastructure, homes and farms were 
damaged by ethnically motivated arson and destruction from mid-1998 through the end of the 
war in June 1999 (OSCE, 2003) and much of its industry has been dismantled and buildings 
shuttered. The estimated ethnic profile of the Ferizaj Municipality166 before the war was 82 
percent Kosovo Albanians, 9.4 percent of Kosovo Serbs, and 8.5 percent combined of all other 
minorities. The City was slightly more homogeneous, with 90 percent Kosovo Albanian, 6.5 
percent of Kosovo Serb, and 3.5 percent combined of all other minorities (ibid).  
Despite its unusually large size, Camp Bondsteel was designed as a temporary facility (Global 
Security, 2000; McClure, 2000); its size was the response to wider regional security concerns 
                                                             
166 Ferizaj City is the seat of the Ferizaj Municipality. The percentage given of Kosovo Serbs in Ferizaj City specifically 
reflects the Serb proportion of city’s population; the majority of Kosovo Serbs live in mono-ethnic villages in the 
Ferizaj Municipality.  
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and their corresponding physical operational requirements. First, NATO forces were still 
conducting Chapter VII peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina in June 1999 under Stabilization 
Forces, SFOR, which had been established by UNSCR 1088 in 1996, as relations were still tense 
between the Federation (Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats), and the Republika Srpska, (Bosnian 
Serbs) (SFOR, 2007). Secondly, the influx and expense of hundreds of thousands of refugees 
from Kosovo into Albania and Macedonia were feared to further destabilize and spread 
violence into these also-poor countries that were contending with their own political challenges 
(International, 1999; Suhrke, et al., 2000). Finally, Serbia’s President Milošević’s continued 
intransigence and hostility toward Kosovo and NATO undermined confidence of any long term 
regional stability (SFOR, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2001). Thus, a substantial regional self-
sufficient military base became a practical answer to be able to respond to security related 
events within these unsettled conditions. 
Camp Bondsteel’s semi-permanent structures were the result of the recently experienced 
expense, danger and overall substandard performance167 of the canvas tents used in Bosnia-
Herzegovina during the Balkan winters (McClure, 2000:2). Canvas tents proved largely 
inadequate for long-term use as work or sleep areas; most of the tents had to be reinforced 
with wooden frames, floors and interior plywood walls within the first year for adequate wind 
resistance and insulation, over which the canvas fabric covering had to be continually repaired 
or replaced. Thus, the wood frame buildings and additional semi-permanent metal structures, 
such as those used for aircraft hangars, storage and maintenance, were ultimately more 
practical and cost effective (ibid) in addition to providing more comfortable working and living 
conditions.  
                                                             
167 The canvas tents with plywood walls and floors were a constant health and fire hazard, especially as sleeping and 
office tents were heated in the winter with diesel space heaters, or electric heaters powered by large diesel-fueled 
generators. Tents were impossible to cool in the summer, difficult to heat and leaked during and after heavy rains or 
snow (McClure, 2000:2; author’s personal experience). 
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Prior to KFOR’s arrival in June 1999, the US Army Corps of Engineers (COE)168 had researched 
aerial photographs and maps that were used in earlier business relations with the former 
Yugoslavia169 (Curtis, 1992:144; McClure, 2000). Camp Bondsteel’s location was selected 
through the evaluation of these aerial photographs and terrain modeling of several potential 
sites suitable for the MNB-E base construction (Interviews 8, 73, 84; McClure, 2000), a regular 
practice for site selection (Anderson, et al., 2014). The senior civil engineer on site in June 1999, 
stated Camp Bondsteel‘s present location was a sound design and a practical military choice 
(Interview 73),  
“This location was one of few sites large enough to contain all the necessary facilities to 
support up to 5,000 troops and an airfield. It also contained relatively few buildings that 
would need to be removed or relocated.  
The site had good access to two major roads: the north-south highway leading to 
Pristina, Kosovo’s capital city, and Skopje, the capital of Macedonia, and the east-west 
road that connects Ferizaj and Gjilan. Finally, the sites’ elevation allowed unrestricted 
views of the surrounding landscape for nearly 360 degrees.”  (Interview 73) 
 
Once on the ground, the COE visited landowners and neighbors adjacent to the property, and 
later worked with the Ferizaj Municipality to locate remaining landowners and arrange for their 
compensation (Interview 18, 65, 73) per US Army and COE policy (Army, 1958; McClure, 
2000:9). Due to the short construction schedule, some individual parcels of land within the site 
were taken before each owner could be notified, but all property owners were eventually found 
(Interviews 65, 73; McClure, 2000:9). Annual lease payments were based on the market value of 
the property before the war, an accepted real estate valuation method (Army, 1958), and were 
believed to be fair by the land owners (Interviews 18, 65, 73). Photo 6.4 below shows the 
construction of Camp Bondsteel from 15 June 1999 to 15 October 1999.  
                                                             
168 The US Army Corps of Engineers is a US federal civilian, not a military, civil engineering organization. 
169 The US had partnered with Yugoslavia for agricultural improvements such as for wheat and sugar beets, thus had 
aerial photographs.  
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Photo 6.4 Camp Bondsteel construction 
6.3.1 Recruiting and hiring local residents   
The construction of Camps Monteith and Bondsteel was concurrent. Announcement of 
opportunities to work on Camp Bondsteel was initially made by radio messages and posters, 
but was more quickly spread by word of mouth; interested residents could go directly to the 
main gate to apply for a position (Interview 8, 11, 13, 14). Brown and Root (B&R) similarly hired 
all local workers. To meet the 1 November 1999 deadline,170 several thousand local men were 
trained in construction skills and plumbing and electrical trades (McClure, 2000). See Photo 6.5.
     
 Photo 6.5 Local workers on Camp Bondsteel, September 1999 (McClure (2000) 
                                                             
170 The 1 November deadline was set to have all personnel housed in semi-permanent buildings before winter began, 
a lesson learned in Bosnia when military and civilian personnel lived and worked in canvas tents for over a year.  
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At the completion of their training, the new workers, military engineers and B&R managers, 
were formed into teams to build the SEA-huts171 and other base structures (ibid). A similar 
recruiting process was used to hire and train workers for the dining facility, laundry, cleaning 
and light maintenance. Base construction continued 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 
stopping only for equipment maintenance breaks, for over 90 days. At its height, some 7,000 
workers had been hired and were working on Camps Bondsteel and Monteith (McClure, 2000; 
Interview 73). Men and women were likely to have been hired at the same rates, but were also 
hired into typical gender-stratified positions. Women and gender roles are discussed in Section 
Two of this chapter.  
Official KFOR and B&R information concerning local worker salaries is absent. Anecdotally, 
however, early salaries ranged from a high of 5,000 USD per month (Oye, 2010) for skilled 
professionals to a more typical 1,000 USD per month for dining facility, maintenance and 
laundry workers, at a time when most local salaries were barely 200 Deutschmarks (Héthy, 
2000:14)172. Using only the lowest salaries of 1,000 USD/month for a low estimate of 5,000 
workers, the Ferizaj Municipality would have realized 5,000,000 USD per month through work 
at Camp Bondsteel. Like Gjilan, Ferizaj’s inflation was included in Kosovo’s annual 11.3 percent 
rate and had dropped to a similar 4 percent inflation rate in 2003 (Kosovo Agency for Statistics, 
2017). 
6.3.2 Local Purchasing 
Although the Ferizaj Municipality was less damaged than Gjilan, it was also far more rural. 
Interviewees stated no businesses were open at their arrival, or had opened for many weeks 
                                                             
171 SEA-huts are simple wood buildings designed for temporary use. Developed for Viet Nam, SEA is an abbreviation 
for South East Asia.  
172 Per informal conversation: According to an US Air Force logistics officer working in Albania in 1999, the high 
salaries were based on Western European hiring salaries, and had not yet been adjusted to the local level. See also  
http://prishtinainsight.com/kosovars-follow-money-warzones-mag/ 
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(Interviews 8, 73, 84). As the community businesses reopened, and new construction services 
and material companies were established in October and November, B&R and the US military 
engineers visited and invited local companies to bid for work on Camp Bondsteel, particularly 
for the precast concrete sections used for SEAHut footers (Interview 73). The co-owner of one 
of the first construction and materials company hired for Camp Bondsteel describes his visit:  
“My three brothers and I were working in Switzerland, waiting to be able to return. 
When we learned that NATO was going to bomb Serbia, we knew the time had come 
and we left [for Kosovo]. We combined our savings, about 200,000 DM, and bought this 
property to start our construction business because we wanted to rebuild Kosovo.  
Each of us has his own area of responsibility: mine is business development. One 
brother manages the materials yard, another the fleet of vehicles and the fourth has 
project management. KFOR came to us because we specialize in earthwork and 
horizontal construction – excavation; roads, bridges and other heavy operations. Our 
company employed between 200 and 300 at the peak, today we’re about half that. We 
continue to do some road repairs on Camp Bondsteel, but the (Ferizaj) Municipality is 
now the largest customer (Interview 9).”  
Contracts with KFOR appeared to have had negative as well as positive effects. Working for 
KFOR was a source of prestige, and inferred both a high level of competence, and financial 
capability, as companies were required to meet US Federal Acquisitions Regulation173 
requirements for insurance and bonding. In addition, a contract with KFOR would be expected 
to be at higher value than with a local client, thereby generating a higher income for the 
company. At the same time, a large contract with KFOR would also have likely taken these 
contractors and their subcontractors174 ‘off the market’ for use by the local community, thereby 
setting conditions for an artificial scarcity and subsequent higher costs for products and 
services. Several business owners also acknowledged their success had increased expectations 
for employment and other favors by family, friends and the community, and therefore found it 
better to maintain a very low public profile (Interview 9, 20).  
                                                             
173 The Federal Acquisition Regulations, FAR, requires contractors and vendors to be bonded to guarantee project 
completion. This requirement is rarely substantially relaxed in post-conflict environments.   
174 Contractors and vendors were not obligated to pay their employees or subcontractors at higher than local rates. 
Thus, local companies contracted by B&R should not be assumed to have paid high salaries to their employees or 
subcontractors (McKenna, 2002:16). 
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6.3.3 Community relations   
The academic and gray literature often states local elites and community leaders attempt to 
represent “their people” to the military forces in order to increase their personal influence and 
status in the community, (Cheng, 2013:11; Pugh, 2001:350) a point also specifically made in the 
1999 OSCE Verification Missions report (OSCE, 1999). However, the Mayor of Ferizaj and other 
officials in Ferizaj did not appear to have more than a thin relationship with KFOR’s leaders. 
(Interviews 52, 56, 58, 69, 70, 71; also, Etchemendy, 2010:15). Both senior community and 
military leaders interviewed mention little more than attending the monthly formal luncheon 
meetings on Camp Bondsteel with the US KFOR commander to discuss topics of common 
interest, such as infrastructure repairs and local security. Also absent in literature concerning 
Kosovo are the frequent informal meetings between civil-military personnel, mid-level 
community officials and technical staff regarding the details of these same issues; military 
patrols, and the daily interaction with the community by the Liaison Monitoring Teams 
(Etchemendy, 2010:15). The LMTs are discussed more fully in Chapter 10.  
6.4 Base Operations Summary 
This study of the military bases established by the US KFOR in Gjilan and Ferizaj reveals 
physically self-contained systems for base administration and sustainment operations; a 
substantial demand upon the local community for employment at very high salaries; a low level 
of local purchasing to establish and maintain the base (with the exception of stone and gravel), 
and very low level of interaction with political and business leaders. These are balanced by a 
significant interaction at the mid-and low-levels of both Municipal employees and military 
personnel.  
Table 6.1 compares the initial hypothesis with the results of these characteristics observed in 
the field:  
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 Hiring Purchasing Community 
Relations 
Hypothesis  Direct hires in large 
numbers at high 
salaries  
Inflated prices emerge 
due to IC demand for 
scarce housing, food, 
fuel; become too high 
for local incomes  
Local leaders attempt 
to influence military 
forces for own benefit; 
may infer return to 
violence  
    
US KFOR Centralized hires:  
very large numbers; 
over 7,000, at very 
high salaries, $1,000-
$5,000/month for ~ 
five years. 
Centralized purchasing. 
Low demand for local 
resources. Very high 
volume of construction 
materials for ~ 10 years. 
Infrequent, mostly 
formal relations with 
local leaders. Frequent 
informal relations with 
military personnel 
Table 6.1: Comparison of hypothesis expectations and field observations.  
 
The variance between the initial hypotheses, which were based on academic and organizational 
literature, and the findings from the field research, suggest both the early material self-
sufficiency to establish the base and the limited personal freedom of KFOR military personnel 
substantially reduced many of the anticipated negative characteristics to establish these camps. 
Intentional or not, their actions were aligned with best practice recommendations to reduce 
peacekeeper crime and unprofessional behavior that were found in the United Nations’ 
investigation of the economic impact of their peacekeeping operations (Carnahan, et al., 2005; 
Carnahan, et al., 2006).  
6.5 Political, Social and Economic effect of Camp Bondsteel 2000 – 2012 
This section of the Ferizaj case study is founded on the central research question, “How do the 
everyday practices of military bases established in post-conflict environments affect the post-
war political economy and what are the implications for peacebuilding?” Among the criticism of 
international and non-governmental organizations are the “widespread societal and economic 
changes in the community caused by the employment of community residents for their daily 
organizational operations” (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007:277; also, Carnahan, 2005; 
Sciarra, 2008). This sub-section specifically examines the social, political and economic changes 
in Ferizaj, including the communities’ perception of employment on the base, and how those 
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employed by KFOR saw themselves. These areas are further considered by gender to identify 
changes in cultural and social standing, and vulnerability and exploitation (Carnahan, et al., 
2005; Enloe, 2000; Higate & Henry, 2004; Sciarra, 2008), finding general agreement with 
feminist literature. The base’s long term economic effects are primarily examined as new 
business development.  
6.5.1 Political Effects  
Like most Municipalities, Ferizaj’s municipal and city government offices were taken over by 
former KLA members directly after the war (Cheng, 2013:72; International Crisis Group, 2000:i), 
who both established an unofficial provisional government and often challenged the authority 
of understaffed UNMIK. The hero-status of the KLA, coupled with an intense sense of justified 
privilege after years of exclusion, made the removal and eviction of former KLA members from 
these offices particularly destabilizing (ibid). Consequently, the KLA remained in place, closely 
monitored until elections, whereby most were voted out for their violence and poor 
performance (KIPRED, 2006). According to KIPRED, elections held in Ferizaj from 2000-2004 
were also highly influenced by central party offices of the Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës 
(Democratic League of Kosovo), LDK, and later the Partia Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic 
Party of Kosovo), PDK in Pristina (KIPRED, 2006; Morina, 2011). Moreover KIPRED stresses, 
there is “tremendous pressure on the [local] parties to respond to the international community 
rather than its voters {as] their greater vulnerability is to the former,” which has subsequently 
led to both a decreased confidence and legitimacy of local governments, and a parallel 
increased reliance on informal local community leaders (KIPRED, 2006:28). Such loss of 
confidence in Kosovo institutions ultimately undermined the work of UNMIK and governance 
organizations, such as the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG), the European 
Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and therefore, long-term Kosovar political and economic 
development (ibid).  
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Thus, while the academic and grey literature provides ample evidence of malign actor’s attempt 
to build relations with military forces to benefit themselves, (Cheng, 2013:70; Münch,2013), it is 
the PISG, UNMIK and EULEX that have a direct impact of the on local leaders’ present and 
future activities in Kosovo. Accordingly, local leaders’ do not gain substantially from an alliance 
with KFOR, nor gain leverage in favor of their political party, so have little incentive to approach 
KFOR. Hence, a distant and formal relationship has resulted between the KFOR’s leaders and 
those of the local communities. In addition, KFOR175 and especially the United States military, 
attempt to take a firm apolitical stance in an effort to circumvent political no-win situations, 
thus avoiding unintentional support for ‘the wrong’ individual or organization. This in turn, has 
generally allowed KFOR to appear unbiased and more trustworthy than UNMIK and other 
organizations which actively engage in Kosovo’s political affairs. This positive reputation further 
encourages KFOR not to deviate from this hands-off approach with local community leaders. 
 A very small number of former US KFOR employees were found have developed careers in local 
and federal politics, less than five of the thousands of Kosovars hired, therefore, KFOR was 
unlikely to have major influence through its former employees (Interviews 13, 80). 
At the same time, the UNDP report Kosovo Mosaic 2012 found an exceptionally high 
satisfaction and confidence level with the Ferizaj Municipality leadership (UNDP & USAID, 2012: 
35). Given that the Ferizaj Municipality’s personal income is one of the highest in Kosovo 
(KOSME, 2014:1), and higher degree of paid property taxes, point of sale taxes, and permitting 
fees, this satisfaction in community leadership is likely an indirect result of the overall greater 
prosperity afforded by the high base wages. Thus, the base had widespread indirect and 
unintentional effects on the politics of local community, though chiefly as a large employment 
center, rather than a political actor.  
 
                                                             
175 Although the NATO countries at the international level have openly displayed their preferences for Kosovo’s 
candidates and parties, the military forces on the ground attempt to act as impartially as possible.  
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6.5.2 Social Effects 
A common criticism of the military, and international and non-governmental organizations are 
the changes in acceptable behavior and attitudes caused by the employment of local residents 
(Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Carnahan, 2005; Sciarra, 2008). Nevertheless, interviews 
and informal conversations176 with community members were unwaveringly positive 
concerning Camp Bondsteel and with those that had worked on the base. Nearly all had 
personal knowledge, or substantial second-degree knowledge through family members, close 
friends or neighbors, that presently work or had worked on the base. Base employment was a 
source of respect and pride. Individuals were not only familiar with both the very-high salaries 
paid by Camp Bondsteel177, but also approved of the high salaries “because the money was 
spent in Ferizaj” and therefore, “the whole community benefitted” (Interviews 19, 31, 32, 40-
43, 64). This community-benefit perspective was most pronounced concerning friends and 
family of the considerable number of Ferizaj residents that had worked at Camp Bondsteel and 
were later recruited by Brown & Root for truck driver, mechanic, carpenters, food service and 
maintenance positions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Up to 8,000 Kosovar’s worked in these positions 
between 2001 – 2011; over 2,100 Kosovars worked for Brown & Root in Afghanistan during 
2011 alone (GAP, 2011), a substantial number of them originating from Ferizaj (Halili & Fazliu, 
2015).  
For individuals, working on Camp Bondsteel, the job was not solely a source of income, but of 
status and pride. A former Camp Bondsteel warehouseman178 recalled during an informal 
conversation:  
                                                             
176 Conversations other than interviews, including informal talk while waiting in queues; taxi/parking lot attendants; 
business, service and wait staff, and with professional administrative staff.   
177 Salaries for unskilled workers in June 1999 were 1,500-1,200 USD per month; by May 2014 salaries were 500-700 
USD per month.   
178 Continued employment required English language skills. English classes were provided, but this employee had 
declined.  
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“When I worked on Camp Bondsteel people looked up to me; I was someone.  
  Now I am nobody.”  
 
This sentiment of status was consistent with all interviewees who had worked on a KFOR base, 
regardless of the duration and position held (Interviews 9, 10, 20, 48, 50, 53, 55, 57). 
Respondents also stated their prior employment on base was a significant advantage when 
seeking new employment or business in their community (ibid). Although many residents did 
continue to seek additional employment with B&R and similar logistics contractors179, few base 
employees sought employment with other international non-governmental organizations. Most 
were thought to remain in their community using their new skills in carpentry, groundworks 
and other trades (Interviews 19, 73), in contrast to criticism found in international organization 
literature (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007:277; also, Carnahan, 2005; Sciarra, 2008). 
Translators, with their more marketable expertise to the international community, were the 
exception, and actively sought employment with these organizations when their contracts with 
KFOR were complete (Interviews 13, 38, 73). Very few highly skilled Kosovar professionals were 
hired to work on base; none were known to be working on base outside of their career field180.  
However, the reputation of those who had been fired from their job with KFOR was badly 
damaged. These former employees were generally unable to find work locally despite their 
employment on the base, and instead joined a family business, become self-employed, left the 
municipality or migrated out of Kosovo entirely (Interviews 11, 38, 73).  
 
 
                                                             
179 Dyn-Corps and Fluor also held contracts for these services in Afghanistan, Iraq and Central African Republic, and 
similarly recruited former Camp Monteith and Camp Bondsteel worker to fill positions at salaries from 4000-6000 
USD/month (Plesch, 2015). 
180 Author’s personal knowledge of two local high-skill professionals, an architect and a civil engineer.  
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6.5.3 Employment and Influence on Women  
The experiences of women working on Camp Bondsteel were more complex. Women who had 
worked on base described similar increased pride and self-respect (Interviews 11, 30, 64, 78). At 
the same time, many older male family members, typically those living abroad, openly 
disapproved of their employment (Interviews 11, 30, 31, 32, 64, 78, 85). Economic need for the 
woman’s income generally overruled such disapproval (ibid), but some women were 
exploited181 by their families and personally gained little benefit from their salary (Interviews 
78, 85).  
In addition, women and the families of women working on the base were often subject to 
community disapproval. Accusations such as “indecent, shameful wives and disgraceful mothers 
working with strange men” and “terrible women leaving their children (with other family 
members)” were common, especially if the woman had accepted a position in Afghanistan or 
Iraq (Interviews 31, 32, 64, 78, 85). Unmarried women that worked on base were usually 
considered to be less desirable for marriage, or simply unmarriageable (ibid). None of the 
women interviewed had personal knowledge of women that had left their jobs due to family or 
social pressure, but individually assumed there would have been some. These women also 
stated the negative attitude toward women working on base decreased significantly with the 
increase of women employed, and the continued presence of the military base (Interviews 11, 
64, 78, 84). Congruent with feminist literature, women tended to be hired into traditional 
gender appropriate positions182, mainly cleaning, kitchen, laundry and retail.  
                                                             
181 An example is a woman’s salary would be controlled or given to her husband or father for distribution to family 
members.  
182 Kosovar women remain primary caretakers of the family, thus women might accept less responsible positions to 
accommodate their family responsibilities, rather than have been denied them. This condition was already common 
for working women in Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, prior to the establishment of Camp Bondsteel. 
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Men and women in similar positions appeared to have been paid at the same rate, but far 
fewer women than men were managers (ibid).  
In some cases, the women’s job on base challenged acceptable gender roles. As example, 
women in Kosovo rarely work where alcohol is served, and coffee shops in Kosovo typically 
serve alcoholic beverages. Thus, a woman working in a Camp Bondsteel coffee shop described 
her experience:     
“I used to work at the jewelry counter at the PX183, but that closed, and I was 
transferred to work at one of the coffee shops. At first, everyone, even my best friends, 
were against me working in a coffee shop on the camp. I couldn’t tell some of my family 
where I worked. But we only have coffee and hot chocolate and cold drinks – no 
alcohol. The military and everyone is respectful and there was another girl working 
there already, so eventually it was OK. Even my parents got used to it. Now it’s nothing 
and about half of us that work in the Bondsteel coffee shops are women” (Interview 
11). 
 
The women interviewed stated they did not personally experience harassment or gender 
discrimination by military personnel or contractors184 nor did they have knowledge of others 
that had. However, the number of women interviewed was small, thus while the statements 
may be individually accurate, they cannot be considered completely representative.  
Nevertheless, women’s groups, both local civil society and international organization leaders, 
stated the military base has been an overall positive influence for women: 
“The base hires many women; they earn their own money and are more respected by 
their families. Military women are also good role models (for the community) because 
everyone can see women in charge of men and doing a good job (Interview 29).  
“The KFOR soldiers have shown a lot of support for us and our work [for women]. They 
have helped us by repairing and painting our (domestic abuse) shelters; by providing us 
with all kinds of donations185 and they spend time with the children186. The community 
                                                             
183 Post Exchange, PX, the non-food retail store typically found on US and other military bases.  
184 Rather, it was more typical for Kosovo Albanian men to be rude, or act and speak inappropriately toward Kosovar 
women working on base.  
185 KFOR soldiers often ‘adopted’ a local school or charity during their four-month to one-year deployment and made 
minor building repairs, and distributed clothing, school supplies, toiletries and toys donated by their families and 
friends ‘back home.’  
186 Typically sports: soccer/football and basketball or English language lessons. 
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knows this. They also tell us what they see during their patrols, so we can help the most 
vulnerable children and women.”  (Interview 30). 
A women business owner interviewed likewise believed military women are good role models;  
“It is good to see military women in our community; they behave well and set a good 
example. However, it is more important that the improved security has made it possible 
for our women to come ‘out of the house’ and enjoy the rights we already had (during 
communism.) The young girls today are so happy to go out for a coffee, but in those 
times, we could do anything.” (Interview 26)  
Male political leaders in Ferizaj and Gjilan stated they were unsure whether the military base 
had made a specific difference for women, but agree they have been more open to hiring 
women since its establishment: 
“I am not sure it is because of KFOR, but now, if I have two candidates for the same job, 
I will take the woman. Women are more loyal; they work hard, and they don’t become 
corrupt like men” (Interview 19) 
“My wife does not work but I want good opportunities for my daughters. I had never 
thought of this before, but I do believe we need to have the women out in our society.” 
(Interview 34)  
Other interviewees also expressed the end of the “Serb oppression” or “Serb 
occupation” was the most significant factor that made it safe for women to work and 
move freely. (Interviews 26, 50, 53, 62).  
 
Yet, despite the economic benefit and an increasing acceptability of women working outside 
the home, just 10.5 percent of women in the Ferizaj Municipality were employed outside of the 
home in the Ferizaj Municipality between 2000-2012, lower than the Kosovo average of 12.4% 
(UNDP & USAID, 2012). This is likely to be the result that fewer ‘feminine industries,’ such as 
textiles had been established in Ferizaj during its industrialization period, thus 10.5 percent may 
be on par, or higher than past figures. Nevertheless, these examples suggest that Camp 
Bondsteel provides exposure and acceptability of non-traditional opportunities for women, and 
appears to have had an overall positive influence on women and men.  
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6.5.4 Economic Effects  
 
The Municipality of Ferizaj was industrialized later than Gjakova and Prizren; its same-named 
central city only developed in the late 1900’s and “more closely resembles a large village than 
an urban space despite its location at the crossroads of primary east-west and north-south 
roadways” (Warrander & Knaus, 2010)187. Like Gjakova, many of Ferizaj’s SOEs were 
agriculturally based including meat and leather processing; forestry, and wood furniture and 
wood building material manufacturing. According to the European Stability Initiative (2003), 22 
of Ferizaj’s SOEs have been privatized, however, they continue to employ far fewer workers 
than they had in the past (Asanaj, 2009; European Stability Initiative, 2003). As in other 
municipalities, it is small businesses, mostly sole proprietorships, that have replaced SOEs as the 
primary sources of income in Ferizaj (UNDP & USAID, 2012).  
Camp Monteith and Camp Bondsteel were built at the same time and under the same US KFOR 
leadership and conditions, hence the majority of economic changes in the Gjilan and Ferizaj 
Municipalities are similar. Additionally, many of Camp Monteith’s workers transferred188  to 
Camp Bondsteel upon Monteith’s handover to the KPC. Therefore, this subsection includes 
Gjilan in its assessment, and examines construction services, construction trades, and retail 
trade, which represent the sectors most often identified in post-conflict literature (Cerra & 
Saxena, 2007).  Transportation and Hotels and Restaurants are not analyzed: KFOR’s 
improvements to transportation was specific to military freedom of movement, and KFOR 
personnel had had negligible use of hotels or restaurants during the research period.  
                                                             
187Warrander & Knaus (2010) state this effect is primarily due to the influx of residents of small rural towns 
relocating to Ferizaj for employment on Camp Bondsteel.  
188 The transfer of Camp Monteith to the KPC was well known in advance. Locally hired workers required English 
language skills, in addition to their individual skills, to be transferred to Camp Bondsteel. Language lessons were 
provided, however, not all personnel participated or were able to take advantage of them. 
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Table 6.2 provides a view of Ferizaj and Gjilan business starts by population size in comparison 
to Kosovo’s average, showing business starts in both Gjilan and Ferizaj are higher than the 
Kosovo average.  
Municipality 
(Kosovo average)  
Business Starts per 
1000 residents189 
Business Entry 
Rate 
Business Exit Rate 
Ferizaj 101 14.2% 6.0% 
Gjilan 91 12.2% 5.4% 
Kosovo  76 13.6% 6.5% 
                Table 6.2 Business Starts by Registration as of 2013                          Data source: KOSME, 2014 
Noting the low employment of the former SOEs in Ferizaj and Gjilan, Camps Bondsteel and 
Monteith employed over 7,000 workers for camp construction, from July 1999 until Camp 
Monteith closed in 2005. Camp Bondsteel continued to employ nearly the same number in 
combination with its own employees and additional workers recruited by KBR for employment 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Table 6.3 provides sources of income for the Ferizaj and Gjilan municipalities. 
Municipality Work / Employed Supported by 
Others in Kosovo* 
All Other Sources 
of Income 
Ferizaj  28.1% 45.6% 26.3% 
Gjilan   27.7% 47.1% 25.2% 
Prizren  29.1% 45.7% 25.2% 
Kosovo  28.9% 44.2% 26.9% 
Table 6.3 Sources of individual income. Dependents; supported by others includes children, and 65 years 
and older. All other sources of income include pensions and remittances from abroad. Source: KOSME 
(2013). 
 
                                                             
189 Based upon the 2011 Census 
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The figures in Table 6.4 likewise show the employment rates of the three municipalities are low, 
but constant. Gjilan’s percent of workers outside of employment is lower, likely due to the 
higher average age of workers, (KOSME, 2014) 190 . Table 6.4 provides a comparison of 
economically active population, as of 2013 
Municipality Percent 
Employed 
Percent 
Unemployed 
Percent 
Outside*of the 
Employment 
Market 
Average 
Wages 2004 
 
Ferizaj  26.1 43.7 30.2 208€ 
Gjilan  26.4 45.6 28.0 Not available 
Prizren  25.4 43.4 31.2 199€ 
Kosovo  24.7 44.8 30.5 209€ 
Table 6.4 Percent of population employed, unemployed and outside the employment market. *Includes children 
below 15 years, elderly over 65, and infirm. Data source: KOSME (2013), Kosovo Agency of Statistics (2005).  
Therefore, noting Tables 6.3 and 6.4, Camp’s Monteith and Bondsteel appear to have 
contributed very little to their local economies. This assessment is based on three factors that 
may be directly attributed to the military base: first, despite the high number of local residents 
employed on bases or by B&R, these numbers are still low in proportion to the municipality 
population; second, with the exception of basic construction materials, there was a very low 
volume of building materials, food, fuel or other materials purchased for use by the Camps191, 
and third, a low level of consumption in local café’s, restaurants or shops by military personnel 
due to health concerns and restrictions in movement off the base.  
6.6 Municipal Profile    
Using the Kosovo Small and Medium Enterprise Promotion Programme (KOSME) categories, 
Figure 6.1 provides an overview of the five primary business sectors, indicating retail trade was 
                                                             
190 Youth, persons under 19 years old and typically dependents, comprise 36.9 percent of Gjilan’s population, while 
youth comprises 39.2 percent of Ferizaj’s population (KOSME, 2014) 
191 Based upon usual construction practices. Contractors purchase building materials according to the construction 
schedule.  
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most active, followed by transportation and hotel/restaurant business starts. The spike in 
business starts in 2003 is the result of a successful Kosovo-wide business registration campaign 
(Interview 83; also, Tax Administration of Kosovo, 2014)   
Figure 6.1: Business starts of NACE primary sectors, 2000-2012. Data source: Kosovo Ministry of Trade 
and Industry; Kosovo Agency of Statistics    
As noted in the first section of this chapter, over 7,000 individuals worked on Camp Monteith 
and Bondsteel at its peak and at rates much higher than the local salaries until mid-2005. Up to 
5,000 individuals continued to be employed on Camp Bondsteel through the 12-year study 
period. Although the compact size of Kosovo would allow workers to commute, poor roadways 
limited that number, hence, the majority of employees lived and spent their salary in the Ferizaj 
or Gjilan Municipalities, especially for home repair and construction.  
Ferizaj’s business starts from 2000-2003 were typical of post-conflict reconstruction (Cerra & 
Saxena, 2007), showing a dramatic rise in small businesses in response to individual initiative 
and donor spending, a trend that occurred throughout Kosovo. However, such rises are also 
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fragile “because post-conflict countries often do not have sufficient economic and human 
resources necessary to self-stabilize when shocks occur” (ibid, 15) and consequently close. This 
was seen in Ferizaj where the number of construction business starts decreased by 50 percent, 
from 15 starts in 2005 to eight starts in 2006. However, this pronounced drop in business starts 
was consistent across business sectors and municipalities, indicating exogenous factors, likely 
the emerging effects of the global economic slowdown of 2007-2008, were the primary drivers. 
Particularly in Ferizaj and Gjilan, these outside factors are likely to have had a greater influence 
on businesses than the transfer of this base to the KPC, and transfer of Gjilan employees to 
Camp Bondsteel.  
The 2005 handover of Camp Monteith to the KPC completed the employment contract for 
many construction workers. Statements from interviews and informal conversations noted 
several former employees had opened businesses of their own (Interviews 14, 16, 19, 25, 73). 
As most workers learned a construction trade, such as roofing, plumbing and electrical works, 
rather than for construction services, the management of construction operations, the increase 
in business starts for construction trades was expected to be perceptibly higher than for 
construction services, particularly as would-be construction companies may have postponed 
their starts in order to earn a high income while employed at Camp Monteith. Surprisingly, the 
expected increase in construction-related businesses in Gjilan did not occur, although business 
starts with 2-4 employees is higher in Gjilan than Ferizaj. While Cerra & Saxena (2007) find 
econometrically that new business starts taper off and tend not return to their high post-
conflict levels, construction business starts in Ferizaj exceeded Gjilan’s soon after the transfer of 
Camp Monteith to the KPC, therefore, construction businesses may have indeed “followed the 
money” to Ferizaj.  
Figure 6.2 provides a view of Ferizaj and Gjilan’s construction business starts.  
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Figure 6.2 Construction business starts 2000-2012. Data source: Kosovo Ministry of Trade and Industry   
 
Ferizaj and Gjilan retail businesses start figures appear to better fit Cerra & Saxena’s model; 
retail business starts stabilized well below their post-conflict level. See Figure 6.3, retail 
business starts. 
Figure 6.3 Retail business starts 2000-2012. Data source: Kosovo Ministry of Trade and Industry 
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6.7 Camp Bondsteel Analysis and Summary  
This study using KOSME, online Kosovo Municipality data and publications; Kosovo Ministry of 
Trade and Industry list of business registration statistics, and field interviews, find the 
establishment of Camps Monteith and Bondsteel have had an overall low to low-moderate 
positive effect on their communities in the political, social and economic areas of interest. This 
assessment contrasts with much of the academic post-conflict literature which points to 
increases in malign political activities; dramatic price increases for basic housing, fuel and 
foodstuffs, and a rise in criminal activities, particularly prostitution and trafficking, that can be 
directly attributed to the military bases. 
Reasons for their absence appear threefold:  First, the close governance and law enforcement 
oversight of UNMIK and the trustee-like relationship with the Provisional Institutions of Self 
Government (PISG) enabled KFOR to concentrate on its security responsibilities and remain 
relatively separate from political activity. In addition, KFOR military leaders individually 
refrained from any appearance of political interest, while civilian contractors were responsible 
for local employment and purchasing. Thus, community elites had little reason, or reasonable 
access, to actively influence KFOR’s military leaders to benefit themselves as had occurred in 
Afghanistan, Somalia and other post-conflict environments. 
Secondly the social ills usually associated with military and peacekeeper bases, such as 
prostitution and trafficking, drug use and organized crime, appear to have been significantly 
mitigated by the US KFOR’s strict policies against alcohol, and measures to greatly limit the 
ability of Soldiers and US civilians to leave the military base. As a result, very few instances of 
unprofessional behavior were described, and no instances of prostitution or trafficking, drug 
use or involvement with crime were noted, despite almost 100 field interviews and 
conversations, including conversations with military intelligence, law enforcement and 
representatives of local and international women rights and women’s health organizations.  
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For the community residents, working on the military bases was overwhelmingly a source of 
pride and higher personal social status. The role of women employed on the military base was 
consistent with feminist literature, particularly that women were hired mostly for line positions 
in cleaning, laundry, retail and food services, though both men and women were reported to be 
paid the same salary, and have had the same opportunities for advancement. Yet, the women 
interviewed also consistently stated they enjoyed an increase in self-respect by earning their 
own money, which generally mitigated the family and community reproach for working with 
“strange men” and criticism for “leaving their children” to go to work. Strong disapproval of 
women working on base had almost entirely subsided at the time of the interviews in 2014.  
Thirdly, in contrast with a wide range of post-conflict examples, the economic effects of the 
bases did not include the usual emergence of a balloon economy caused by peacekeepers’ 
demand for scarce resources. The military forces self-housed, and food and fuel were imported 
for Camps Monteith and Bondsteel’s needs. Localized inflation for housing and food peaked at 
11.3 percent annually in the cities of Ferizaj and Gjilan in 2001, but inflation overall appeared to 
be contained to the urbanized area of the Municipalities. In addition, KFOR engineers 
refurbished a local quarry that had been idle for over a decade and used that quarry for most of 
its construction materials, and therefore did not compete with businesses in the Gjilan or 
Ferizaj Municipalities or its residents for those resources. Finally, as KFOR repaired or built 
roadways and bridges it needed for patrolling, these also directly benefited the mobility and 
commerce of both municipalities.  
While military base salaries were substantially higher than those of other international and 
civilian organizations, many community members stated those earnings were mostly spent 
inside the community, and therefore “everyone benefitted.” Per capita, business starts for 
construction services, trades and retail business were higher in Ferizaj than the Kosovo average; 
Gjilan’s businesses starts were somewhat lower, but the business sizes in Gjilan were larger 
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than the Kosovo average,192 which is a better indicator of economic confidence and stability. 
Particularly in Ferizaj, the dormant textile and furniture industries appear to have been revived 
to meet the demand for home furnishings (Cardno, 2015), albeit a much lower level, in addition 
to the emergence of new building product importers and manufacturers. Further research is 
necessary to determine what percentage of these newly locally manufactured products 
remained in Ferizaj as local consumption as a result of base-related income. Nevertheless, their 
operations clearly supported local employment and reconstruction.  
Camp Monteith and Camp Bondsteel have significantly contributed to the prosperity of both 
the Municipality of Gjilan and Ferizaj. However, the military bases’ political and social effects 
were relatively minor, and the economic effects were mostly concentrated within the general 
urban area within those municipalities, rather than the wider region. Ultimately, the self-
contained nature of the bases structurally limits the military base to act as largely as an 
employment center, rather than a catalyst for sustainable business and industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
192 Gjilan contained a larger percentage of businesses with 2-4 employees in comparison to Ferizaj, which contained 
more sole-proprietorships.  
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Chapter 7: Camp Prizren Case Study  
 
7.0 Introduction 
The Camp Prizren case study is comprised of two sections. The first section describes the 
functions and activities of the German KFOR base, Camp Prizren, established after the 1999 
Kosovo War. It opens with a brief history of the region and the city, and a discussion of the 
establishment of the military base, including hiring local employees, purchasing and community 
leader relations. The second section contains an examination of the subsequent social, political 
and economic changes attributed to the military base.  
7.1 Prizren Background   
Germany was the lead nation for MNB-South (MNB-S) headquartered in the multi-ethnic city of 
Prizren. Germany contributed approximately 8,500 military personnel, and was joined by 
Austria, The Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland and Turkey for a total of 17,000 troops in MNB-S 
by the end of 1999 (Global Security, 2013).  
Prizren is one of the oldest cities in Kosovo; it had been a major trade city for centuries before 
becoming the regional administrative center of the Ottoman Empire in the mid-15th century193. 
It remained the political and cultural center until 1947, when Pristina became the political 
capital of Kosovo. Prizren had been occupied by German Forces from 1943 through 1944 when 
Kosovo and Albania were occupied by the Axis Powers.  
Prior to the Kosovo War in 1999, the Municipality of Prizren’s population was approximately 
221,000194 residents, comprised of the City of Prizren and 74 surrounding villages. Its ethnic 
profile was approximately 77 percent Kosovo Albanian, 16 percent Kosovo Bosniac, 5 percent 
Kosovo Turk, 1 percent Kosovo Roma and less than one percent Kosovo Serb and other 
                                                             
193 Curtis (2000) states 1459 – 1829.  
194 A 2001 UN estimate based on the 1991 Yugoslav census, and natural growth.  
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nationalities. After the war, many of the non-Kosovo Albanian residents moved195 to villages 
with a majority of their own population outside of the municipality, increasing the Kosovo 
Albanian majority in the Municipality to 82 percent (OSCE, 2013). Nevertheless, the 
Municipality and City of Prizren remain among the most ethnically diverse in Kosovo, with 
Albanian, Bosnian, Serbian and Turkish all recognized as official languages.  
 
The Prizren Municipality had contained approximately 40 state industries prior to the war, 
mostly for basic construction materials, textiles and agricultural processing, such as fruit 
products, tanneries and pharmaceuticals, and had employed some 15,000 residents (Saunik & 
Buzhala, 2002). These industries, like the majority of others in Kosovo, were largely inefficient 
and unprofitable (Palairet, 1992). Many had been stripped of usable assets during 
deindustrialization in the 1990s (European Stability Initiative, 2002:7), and again for salvage 
after the war in 1999 (Interviews 35, 62, 73). Prizren was very well known as a regional tourist 
and shopping destination. The cities’ economy was supported by over a thousand sole 
proprietorships and family enterprises, especially for silver filigree work, leather items, and 
traditional wedding-related goods (Warrander & Knaus, 2010). Unlike the surrounding 
Municipality, which saw very heavy fighting during the war, the City of Prizren196 itself was 
mostly undamaged, and instead sustained extensive ethnically motivated intimidation, arson 
and revenge property destruction immediately after the war (Cocozzelli, 2009).  
 
 
 
                                                             
195 Several villages became near mono-ethnic after the war, such as Mamushë, a majority Kosovo Turk village. In 
2008 under the Ahtisaari Plan to improve self-governance, Mamushë among others became Municipalities following 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence.  
196 The Municipality and City share the same name, however when Prizren is used, it refers to the Municipality. The 
City of Prizren will be so stated.  
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7.2 Establishing Camp Prizren  
Before the war, Prizren had been the headquarters of the 549th Motorized Infantry Brigade. The 
subordinate units of this nearly 14,000-strong brigade197 were stationed throughout southern 
Kosovo (Humanitarian Law Center, 2013). Its three motorized infantry battalions, and its anti-
aircraft battalion were located in Gjakova, while its two artillery batteries, a howitzer battalion 
and 31 tanks were distributed throughout the countryside in teams near key towns and terrain 
(OSCE, 2003). The brigade headquarters, located directly outside of the Prizren city boundary, 
contained the command staff and headquarters facilities. The headquarters building also 
housed the brigade’s logistic unit, with maintenance and storage facilities; a security unit, and 
housing for an estimated 1,000 personnel on site (Humanitarian Law Center, 2013).  
The headquarters’ base had been moderately damaged during the 1999 NATO bombing. Local 
residents interviewed that had lived in Prizren during this time, both of whom were interpreters 
for the German KFOR, hired in 1999 and 2000, stated,  
“The bomb damage was concentrated to the motor pools, artillery [park] and the 
ammunition/storage buildings. However, the Serbs vandalized the headquarters 
buildings, barracks and living quarters before they left. They even stripped out the 
plumbing fixtures and electrical wire” (Interviews 35, 62).198   
Despite the damage sustained by the compound during the bombing and the withdrawing Serb 
forces, MNB-S selected the former Yugoslav Army camp as its headquarters in June 1999.  
The first German KFOR contingent, the 12th Panzer Brigade, crossed the Albanian border into 
Kosovo on June 12, 1999; MNB-South was officially established on 13 June when the 12th Panzer 
Brigade entered the city and occupied Camp Prizren (McGrath, 2006:53; Interviews 35, 62, 73). 
In accordance with the Military Technical Agreement, (MTA) and Security Council Resolution 
                                                             
197 According to the Center for International Law dossier against the commanding officers of the 549th. This total is 
likely to include JA reserves, the ‘Pristina Corps’ and the “hundreds of volunteers from various countries including 
Russia and Ukraine” (Center, 2013:7: also, OSCE, 2003)  
198 Some looting by Prizren residents may also have taken place, but due to the relatively brief time between JA 
withdrawal and KFOR arrival, the amount of opportunity theft was likely to be low.  
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1244 (SCR 1244), the Serb forces concurrently began their withdrawal from Kosovo. 
Eyewitnesses interviewed state “JA and other Serb forces vandalized and burned or destroyed 
personal and public property as they left199” (Independent International Comission on Kosovo, 
2000:309; Interviews 35, 53, 62; also, OSCE, 2003). Photo 7.1 shows the MBR-S headquarters, 
“The Blue Residence” upon arrival of the German forces in June 1999.  
 
Photo 7.1 Prizren Kaserne June 1999 “Blue Residence.” Photo: Patrick Theutone 
 
German communication teams arrived first and secured the small, mostly undamaged radio 
sites just outside the city (Interview 75). Over 4,200 soldiers formed the first tranche200 of the 
MNB-South KFOR security mission (Bundeswehr, 2014; Global Security, 2000; Theutone, 2000), 
followed by an additional 4,300 a few weeks later. Military personnel were temporarily housed 
in a nearby hotel and in abandoned industrial buildings of the SOE Elán, a preformed concrete 
materials manufacturer, and of SOE Progres, a synthetic industrial fiber manufacturer (Saunik & 
Buzhala, 2002)201.  
                                                             
199 These may be conflated with actions taken by Kosovo Serb civilians who followed the withdrawing JNA forces.  
200 Tranche is often used in NATO operations to refer to a portion of the designated troops and equipment that are 
deployed to support a larger multi-phase operation.  
201 The use of the hotel and SOEs was noted by UNHCR in its 2002 Municipality Development report, further details 
are absent.  
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7.2.1 Administrative Procedures   
The German armed forces administrative and sustainment systems are highly self-contained, 
requiring little support by civilian workers. These limited both the number of opportunities, and 
type of positions that would be available to the local population. However, civilians had not 
been known to have been employed on the JA base prior to the arrival of the German KFOR 
(Interviews 35, 62). As noted earlier regarding Camp Monteith, civilian employment would have 
been unlikely in the past due to the availability of conscripts, thus there would have been a 
fairly low expectation for local employment opportunities on the German base.  
Nearly all of Camp Prizren’s administrative and sustainment functions were performed by 
German military personnel, including base security. This practice is typical of NATO militaries 
but in contrast with most international organizations (Carnahan, et al., 2006), which generally 
employ a substantial number of local civilians for security. For those services which the German 
forces did not obtain internally, administrative guidelines allowed individual departments to 
recruit and hire personnel from the community, and purchase directly with local businesses for 
supplies and services as needed (Interview 75). In addition, the German headquarters’ central 
logistics section coordinated for extensive common-need services such as health care and 
laundry; printing and publishing; vehicle maintenance and repair to local firms on behalf of the 
base (Interviews 35, 50, 51, 53, 62, 75).  
7.2.2 Recruiting and Hiring Local Residents 
While the initial German contingent of over 4,000 MNB-S soldiers included a company of 
military engineers, primarily builders, specifically to rehabilitate the camp, a small number of 
local workers were also hired. A longtime base employee provides his observations:  
“The German engineers were the project managers, and the German soldiers did most 
of the physical labor. Between 150-200 local people were hired in the first two months 
for unskilled construction work and cleaning. Although recruiting was officially through 
posters and radio messages, the information was mostly spread by word of mouth. The 
primary qualification was to have some German or English language ability.  
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Most people left when the construction was finished. A few people stayed on for 
maintenance, or to be cleaners and dining facility workers. Jobs were generally filled in 
the usual male and female roles: men went to construction and facilities maintenance 
jobs and the women worked in the kitchen as cooks and cleaners. More men than 
women were in the management jobs. A few women were hired later for the small 
souvenir shops, or as cooks and servers in the base cantinas. Men and women were 
paid the same rates, from 600-800 euro/month for the same positions, and probably 
would have had the same opportunities for any advancement202. 
Most of the people that stayed were interpreters, because Prizren [Municipality] has 
four official languages: Albanian, Bosnian, Serbian and Turkish. Both men and women 
interpreters work with the military patrols and the LMTs to visit the communities and 
attend meetings. Interpreters also work at [Camp Prizren’s] security gates, but only the 
military performs base security.203  Right now (2014) there are probably less than 80 
local people working on Camp Prizren” (Interview 62).  
 
Overall, the number of local residents employed during the reconstruction phase or for daily 
operations was low. However, such a low number of Prizren residents employed on the German 
KFOR base is a frequently recommended ‘best practice,’ based on the recognition of negative 
externalities, (e.g. wage inflation and bubble economy), and the “brain drain” effect from local 
businesses and government that base employment, with its far higher salaries, can have on the 
local community (Anderson, et al., 2014; Carnahan, et al., 2005). Hence, the small number of 
residents initially employed on base  – barely 200 out of a population of over 220,000, and up 
to another 200 employed in the additional lodging and barracks located within Prizren – clearly 
meant employment with KFOR is unlikely to have contributed to an unsustainable balloon 
economy as the result of the much higher wages.  
Non-governmental and international organizations tend to rely more heavily on local labor and 
likewise pay higher than prevailing wages, often creating new tensions over who has access to 
these incomes (Ammitzboll & Tychsen, 2007; Anderson, 2000; Carnahan, et al., 2006; Sciarra, 
2008). However, while the number of such organizations in Prizren was not small, between 30 
                                                             
202 Advancement opportunities were few, generally limited to shift leaders or similar ‘first among peers” positions. 
203 Military controlled base access not only improves base security, but also reduces opportunity for local civilians to 
act as gatekeepers and hold undue influence against others. This gatekeeping had occurred for a brief time at Camp 
Bondsteel by Kosovo Albanian expatriates who had become US citizens and were hired by B&R as hiring supervisors 
(interview 78, and informal conversations with US Air Force logisticians.) 
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and 40, the number of both expatriate and local hires with their higher salaries were low, 
typically ten or fewer (Cocozzelli, 2009; Integration, 2012), and therefore would similarly not 
have contributed to inflationary effects. 
7.2.3 Local Purchasing  
The buildings and camp grounds of the former 549th Motorized Infantry Brigade headquarters 
were not badly damaged by the war. Hence, when the MNB-South Task Force entered and 
occupied the compound, the construction materials that had been pre-placed in Macedonia 
and Albania, including cement, plaster and gravel, were sufficient to begin initial building 
repairs by the military engineers (Interview 78). Similarly, within the City of Prizren, and despite 
the vandalism by retreating Serb forces, there was relatively minor damage to the physical 
structure of the office buildings and shops (Interviews 35, 62), thus many local businesses were 
able to open shortly after the major fighting ceased (ibid).The local purchase of construction-
related goods by KFOR was therefore necessarily limited, as it largely focused on restoring and 
upgrading the existing infrastructure in the camp, and other facilities it used, rather than 
constructing a new facility. As a result, KFOR would not have created competition for these 
resources and inflated their prices above the reach of the local population. Moreover, only 
small amounts of new and replacement items were purchased locally.  
Interviews and informal conversations strongly suggest the German military forces visited 
Prizren’s businesses primarily to get a sense of the local economic conditions and become 
familiar with this civil environment, and secondarily to locate sources for future purchases or to 
add to the local economy. First, it was German military personnel that initiated the majority of 
the early business relationships in Prizren204 (Interview 35), and second, purchases tended to be 
limited in type and at a single location particularly if multiple options were possible. Two of the 
                                                             
204 This is not surprising, as it is unlikely the present Kosovo Albanian community would have had economic relations 
with the JA base.   
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business owners interviewed stated nearly all local businesses were visited individually by 
German KFOR officers, as theirs had been, and that the visits were believed to be specifically 
intended to establish a wide range of vendor relationships (Interviews 48, 57, also 35).  
The first vendor, the owner of a produce company, described his visit: 
“A German KFOR officer visited my father’s company in summer 1999, to look at 
[inspect] his store and, because it was clean, he contracted for one item, potatoes, 
which we soon started to deliver to the camp on a regular basis.”   
At that time, foodstuffs, particularly fresh produce and meats, were trucked in from Germany 
and other European countries, therefore the German KFOR’s choice to buy only potatoes locally 
was practical for three reasons. First, although potatoes are relatively inexpensive, they are 
bulky and heavy, which adds to their overall cost when transporting them, and if transported 
from one’s home country, it is also at the expense of military unique equipment and supplies. 
Secondly, potatoes are not highly perishable, thus local vendors could acquire sufficient 
quantities of this vegetable from a variety of sources with little loss to spoilage. Finally, 
potatoes are cooked before consuming, and variations in quality could be masked by 
preparation. In the case of this vendor, the single item contract continued for almost 10 years. 
This company was eventually awarded the contract to provide all fresh produce for Camp 
Prizren in 2010 (Interview 57).  
The second business, a large hardware and tool retailer, was located on the main roadway 
some five kilometers from Camp Prizren. It carried construction safety equipment and offered a 
wide selection of hand tools by German manufacturers such as Bosch and Stihl as well as lower 
priced, less well-known regional brands. The owner of this local hardware store described his 
experience:  
“A German KFOR officer came to our store in the summer [of 1999] to see what we had 
to offer. In the beginning, KFOR bought exclusively from our company because they 
[Germans] buy good-quality tools and use safety equipment, such as vests and hard 
hats, which only our company in Prizren carried at the time (Interview 48).”  
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Versions of these visits by German KFOR to buy a single type of item were stated anecdotally by 
several others in Prizren. For the community, such single-item contracts were a means of 
income when legitimate employment opportunities were still low, moreover, many small 
contracts may have reduced the likelihood of local firms vying for exclusive business 
arrangements with the base at the expense of the community. These instances strongly suggest 
German KFOR leaders had an appreciation of both the positive and the negative potential 
economic effects that intervening military forces’ spending could have on the local community.  
7.2.4 Contracting for Services 
The German forces, rather than members of the community, typically initiated business 
relationships. More specifically, the German KFOR contracted for its common-use services,205 
including laundry, printing and vehicle maintenance. Only the laundry services business was 
found to have opened specifically to support the German Camp, and its owner directly solicited 
its business.  
Camp Prizren’s laundry is washed by a single laundry firm approximately four kilometers from 
the main gate of the Camp. According to the company owner and manager:   
“This laundry was started in summer of 1999 specifically to service Camp Prizren. The 
German KFOR had first visited us when my family reopened the small quarry and 
construction materials company we had had prior to the war. We still have it, but it’s 
completely separate, with separate management.  
“When I saw a lot of small companies opening up to sell the same materials we had, I 
decided to open the laundry specifically to fill this niche for KFOR, because I knew there 
was no competition. I went to their gate and told them (KFOR) about our business and 
we got this contract right away. We still have the exclusive laundry contract with Camp 
Prizren, and it’s our main customer. We now also offer ‘sterile laundry’ service for 
hospitals and clinics. The laundry employs 11 local women, and one man, who is a 
(distant) relative.” (Interviews 50, 51). 
 
                                                             
205 Health care for the military was also contracted, but through an international, not local, health care provider.  
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A second contracted service is printing and desktop publishing, provided by a local, family 
owned and managed publisher with a retail print shop. The owner of the shop describes his 
experience: 
“This print shop is the storefront for our large printing concern offsite206. The German 
KFOR came to us to print a large number of color programs for them and we were able 
to complete their order in 24 hours. Since then we have designed and printed all of 
Camp Prizren’s paper products, including calendars, camp publications/newspapers, 
diaries, gift books and special event brochures.  
Our core business is textbook publishing. However, the (regular) work contracted by 
Camp Prizren allowed us to invest in modern equipment and continue to be 
competitive with the smaller printers and [low-overhead] desktop publishers, 
maintaining employment for up to 15 skilled workers (Interview 53).  
 
The third contracted service, vehicle maintenance, is best described as a partnership between 
KFOR and local business. Here German KFOR mechanics and technicians provide comprehensive 
training to locally hired employees for the servicing, maintenance and repair of the military-
unique vehicles used by the German KFOR207 at Camp Prizren. KFOR also provides all oversight 
of these local employees and maintenance operations. Due to the Camps’ security restrictions, 
the vehicle maintenance operations were off-limits to visitors and its employees did not 
participate in research, and hence, further details of its operations are not available. However, 
it can be expected that the on the job training for the maintenance of a wide range of gasoline 
and diesel-powered vehicles directly contributes to Prizren through the establishment and 
employment in logistics companies, repair garages and industry using similarly fueled 
equipment, such as electrical generators. 
As noted concerning base employment and local purchasing, the relatively small amount of 
spending by the German KFOR is also in keeping with UN best practices (Carnahan, et al., 2005) 
and prevents the formation of an unsustainable “balloon economy” created by the 
                                                             
206 This print shop provided small retail services to the public, such as copying, invitations and promotional materials.   
207 Other national MNB-S contingents, such as the Swiss Company, SWISSCOY, performed their own maintenance 
and services.   
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international community, described by Ammitzbol & Tychsen (2007). However, both Carnahan 
and Natsios remind that this low-level spending does little to energize the local economy at a 
time when it is needed most (Carnahan, et al., 2006; Natsios, 2009: 65). Nevertheless, the 
businesses interviewed in Prizren believed the German military purchasing system was “fair and 
reasonable” (Interview 48, 50, 57), and that the “purchase of one or two items from each 
business probably kept [vendor] corruption to a minimum” because no one company could get 
the advantage over another (ibid).  
7.2.5 Community relations   
The post-conflict academic and grey literature often states that local community leaders and 
elites will attempt to represent their community and ingratiate themselves with the military 
forces to develop and extend their personal influence and position in the community; to extract 
rents from international aid, or threaten to return to violence (Cheng, 2013:70; Münch, 2013; 
Zaalberg, 2006). These negative relationships appeared not to have occurred in the 
establishment of Camp Prizren. Indeed, the local officials interviewed in Prizren, most of whom 
are appointed to their positions through their political parties rather than directly elected, were 
consistently positive in their opinion of KFOR, but indifferent to actively influencing KFOR’s 
leaders (Interviews 52, 56, 58, 69, 70, 71). This suggests the political leader’s party, UNMIK or 
other political organizations, held more influence or opportunity for personal or professional 
advancement than KFOR. In addition, the informal relationship between local leaders and the 
Liaison Monitoring Teams, who were established in late 2004 after the Kosovo-wide riots, 
supplied an avenue to directly reach out to KFOR at a community level that was absent in the 
past. This new relationship may have replaced any previous interest in attempting to influence 
military leaders.  
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7.3 Base Operations Summary  
 
The military base established by the German KFOR in Prizren demonstrates a highly self-
contained system for base administration and sustainment operations. There was relatively 
little demand upon the local community in terms of employment and purchasing to establish 
the base, and a low level of interaction with political and business leaders within the 
community. Indeed, relations between the military leaders and the community leaders were 
much more formal and far less frequent than anticipated.  
 
Table 7.1 provides a comparison of these three characteristics observed concerning Camp 
Prizren with expected results of the initial hypothesis:      
 
 
 Hiring Purchasing Community 
Relations 
Hypothesis  Direct hires in large 
numbers at high 
salaries  
Inflated prices emerge 
due to IC demand for 
scarce housing, food, 
fuel; become too high 
for local incomes  
Local leaders attempt 
to influence military 
forces for own benefit; 
may infer return to 
violence  
    
German KFOR Direct hires in small 
numbers; high 
salaries ~ 600-
800€/month. 
Low demand for local 
resources. Direct 
purchase of single-item 
or a small amount of 
consumables. 
Contracted directly for 
military-unique needs 
Infrequent, mostly 
formal relations with 
local leaders. Frequent 
informal relations with 
military personnel.  
 
Table 7.1. Comparison of hypothesis expectations and field observations.  
 
The variance between the initial hypotheses, which was based on current academic and 
organizational literature, and the findings from the field research, as described in Table 7.1, 
suggest both the early self-sufficiency to restore the former JA base and the limited personal 
freedom of KFOR military personnel substantially reduced the many of the anticipated negative 
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characteristics of establishing and maintaining the Camp. Strategies such as a low number of 
local hires and limited local purchasing are generally aligned with the best practice 
recommendations found in the United Nations’ investigation of the economic impact of their 
own peacekeeping operations (Carnahan, et al., 2005; Carnahan, et al., 2006:51), As a result, 
the initial hypotheses were reexamined to discern reasons for the variation in the expected and 
realized findings.  
7.4 Political, Social and Economic effect of Camp Prizren 2000 – 2012 
Among the chief criticisms of the arrival of international and non-governmental organizations, 
including military peacekeeping forces, are the widespread societal and social changes in the 
community. These are typically caused by the employment of local residents at 
disproportionate and unsustainably high salaries; emergence of a ‘balloon economy, and 
involvement in illicit activities (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007:277; Carnahan, et al; 2005; 
Sciarra, 2008). When the arrival of international organizations is examined through base closure 
literature, the factors that most clearly demonstrate the influence of a military base are the 
relationship between the base leaders and local elites; shifts in acceptable and unacceptable 
social behavior, and changes in local economy. This sub-section therefore, examines the social, 
political and economic changes in the city of Prizren, including the communities’ perception of 
employment on the base to answer the central research question, “How do the everyday 
practices of military bases established in post-conflict environments affect the post-war political 
economy and what are the implications for peacebuilding?”  These areas are further considered 
by gender to identify changes in cultural and social standing, and vulnerability and exploitation 
Carnahan, et al., 2005; Enloe, 2000; Higate & Henry, 2004; Sciarra, 2008), finding general 
agreement with critical and feminist literature.  
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7.4.1 Political Effects 
Since the Ottoman era when Prizren served as its seat in the Balkans, Prizren has been 
influential in Kosovo politics, and many of Kosovo’s senior leaders have roots in the 
Municipality. Yet, the relations between Prizren’s municipal leaders, and leaders of the German 
KFOR appeared be limited, and mostly formal. This contrasts with many post-conflict studies 
demonstrating local leaders attempt to secure favorable relations for themselves and their 
people. In Prizren specifically, these relations may be the outcome of the early encounters 
between the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, and German KFOR. 
Prizren was among the first cities to be claimed by the KLA in June 1999. Hours after UNSCR 
1244 and the MTA were adopted, members of the KLA returned from their hiding places in the 
mountains and entered Prizren, taking over the Municipal buildings, including the police station 
(Human Rights Watch, 1999) before the arrival of KFOR (Daltveit, 2007:90). The withdrawal of 
the JA and other Serb forces had left a law enforcement vacuum that was quickly filled with 
self-appointed – often armed and criminal – former KLA members (Janssens, 2015:100). 
Therefore, while Prizren City was relatively undamaged during the war, ethnically motivated 
retribution killing and destruction erupted and rapidly spread through the Kosovo Serb 
neighborhoods and Roma enclaves, often initiated by the hugely popular KLA. The German 
KFOR which had only arrived within the previous 24-hour period, was neither trained and 
positioned208, nor adequately manned to effectively respond to the spontaneous outbreak of 
civil violence. Even if they had been so trained and ready, the hero-status of the KLA would 
have likely caused the local residents to turn against KFOR209. Consequently, KFOR “appeared to 
watch helplessly as Kosovo Serbs, Roma and moderate Kosovo Albanian’s were terrorized and 
killed, and their property burned or destroyed” (Human Rights Watch, 1999), undermining the 
                                                             
208 While the German KFOR, the 12th Panzer Brigade, was well trained for their conventional wartime-tasks, law 
enforcement functions including civil disturbance and organized crime, are well outside of a typical tank brigade’s 
combat training (Janssens, 2015:107; Wilson, 2006:154).  
209 KFOR feared wider regional destabilization. A wide complaint was KFOR was far more concerned with the safety 
of its own forces than the population is was sent to protect. 
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communities’ confidence in both KFOR’s willingness to protect it, and its sense of its real ability 
to do so (ibid).  
 
According to Kifner, the KLA was physically removed from the Prizren police station by KFOR 
and CIVPOL, the UNMIK police (Kifner, 1999) but the KLA members that had occupied the 
municipal buildings would remain in place until the results of the elections in October 2000, 
whereby candidates of the Democratic League of Kosovo, LDK, (Research Directorate, 2003) 
were elected, and most former KLA were replaced. Yet in that fifteen-month interim before 
removal from office, the “KLA provisional government” was able to operate and conduct 
criminal activities with virtually no interference by either UNMIK or KFOR (Cheng, 2013:72; 
Janssens, 2015:103). Unsurprisingly organized crime flourished and KFOR’s early reputation and 
credibility were further compromised. Therefore, the KLA’s ability to operate almost entirely 
outside of UNMIK framework as the de facto government for over a year ‘under the nose of 
KFOR’ suggests strongly that KFOR would not have been viewed as an influential powerbroker 
worth courting by Prizren’s community leaders.  
 
KFOR, however, was an early and strong reconstruction partner with the Municipality, 
particularly with the Municipal urban planners. From 2000 onwards, German and Turkish KFOR 
provided engineering assistance as well as assisted with contracts established in collaboration 
with non-governmental and aid organizations for the repair of roads, bridges and waste 
management and historic buildings (Cidiroglu, 2005; Saunik & Buzhala, 2002). Details are rare, 
yet small, local road repairs involving KFOR funds and equipment appear to have been 
coordinated and contracted directly with local leaders, some local labor and possibly 
contractors210 (Cidiroglu, 2005). KFOR and the Municipality also worked together in the 
                                                             
210 The KFOR Chronicle, KFOR’s own publication, describe several occasions where the local government or residents 
participated in the site selection of a football pitch or community clean-up in preparation for road and bridge repairs. 
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administration of several multi-year, multimillion euro reconstruction contracts (Saunik & 
Buzhala, 2002). However, subsequent major reconstruction and infrastructure development 
contracts were coordinated by prime donors, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (ERBD) directly with Kosovo’s central government (EBRD, 2017), and would 
have used international design-build engineering firms. KFOR and Camp Prizren is unlikely to 
have had any role in these projects211.  
 
7.4.2 Social Effects 
Prizren experienced the same mass ousting of its teachers and other state employees by 
Milošević’s policies in 1989 that had occurred throughout Kosovo, and even with its history as 
an intellectual center, education in Prizren had stagnated in the absence of resources. Given 
that the German KFOR had hired very few workers to support Camp Prizren, and had hired even 
fewer skilled workers, it is unlikely that Prizren’s best educated would have left their positions 
for low-skill or unskilled jobs. Therefore, Camp Prizren is unlikely to have had a substantial 
“brain drain” effect on the community.  
Referrals made by the two KFOR interpreters for additional individuals to be interviewed 
declined their invitations. Nevertheless, anecdotally the KFOR base was considered a good 
place to work; employees were treated well and earned good salaries, but little else was 
known. This is not unexpected considering the far smaller number of local residents that would 
have been hired in proportion to the size of the municipality. It may also suggest base 
employees believed they were not at liberty to discuss their employment with the base, or they 
may not enjoy the same level of prestige as base employees do in Ferizaj. While Prizren 
retailers, vendors and local company owners interviewed were generally open and positive 
                                                             
There is no mention of either local contractors or paid labor. Nevertheless, the Municipality was likely to have hired 
contractors as a result of its larger projects with KFOR, and at local prevailing wages. 
211 If involved at all, the Municipality and local contractors would have had a very minor role, unlike the collaboration 
with KFOR, which actively engaged the local community 
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about their sales to KFOR, the sale of only one or two items meant having KFOR’s business did 
not make a significant difference in their business, or in the community’s perception of their 
business (Interviews 48, 50, 57, also 35, 62). Nonetheless, several businesses expressed a 
request for the interviews to remain discrete to prevent stirring ill feelings in the business 
community who may believe their sales were higher than they actually were (Interviews 50, 57).  
 
7.4.3 Influence on Women  
Prior to 1989 nearly half of the able women in Prizren worked full time outside their home. Yet, 
in the two decades afterward, only nine percent of adult women in Prizren did so (UNDP & 
USAID, 2012), and Prizren’s level of female employment was the lowest of the three 
municipalities studied. However well prior to the study period, in addition to retail, women 
generally worked “behind the counter” in bakeries, lunch counters and similar positions. Given 
the long restriction from eating and drinking locally produced food and drink, KFOR military 
personnel and the base generally, are likely to had little lasting effect on the role of women in 
the city, noting further Camp Prizren’s hiring practices reflected typical male/female gender 
roles for cleaning, cooking and retail work. This contrasts with the military forces’ participation 
in prostitution. 
 
7.4.4 Peacekeeper Prostitution in Prizren 
There is a substantial body of literature concerning prostitution and peacekeepers (Interviews 
29, 39, 78; also, Amnesty International, 2004; Autesserre, 2014:214; Enloe, 2014; Carnahan, 
2005; Ingimundarson, 2003; Mendelson, 2005; Inspector General, 2003; Stefanova, 2005:48). 
Particularly in Kosovo, according to UN Women, prostitution in Kosovo had been uncommon 
prior to the war212, the result of the closed, conservative culture and years of extreme lack of 
freedom of movement for Kosovo Albanians (Sadiaj, 2010:3). Both of these changed with the 
                                                             
212 Uncommon, but not unknown. Prostitution was mostly conducted in private homes through personal networks. 
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Kosovo war. As the Kosovo Albanian and Macedonian borders opened and most restrictions on 
travel were lifted, the post-war lack of law enforcement facilitated organized crime. Hence by 
July 1999, Kosovo had become both a destination and source of women trafficked for 
prostitution intended to service the UN and KFOR peacekeepers and the over 300 non-
governmental organizations that had arrived by then (Amnesty International, 2004:1; Godec, 
2010:12; Sadikaj, 2010:3). Moreover, in a break from the past, Albanian men began to regularly 
visit prostitutes, whereby “only 10 to 30 percent of brothel clients are international” (Andreas, 
2008) a percentage which had become typical in the Balkans (ibid), and henceforth Kosovo’s 
prostitution was sustained213 by local residents, rather than KFORs’ demand. Prizren contained 
more brothels than any other municipality (Stefanova, 2005:48); Amnesty International and the 
International Organization for Migration specifically highlight that the German KFOR, for whom 
prostitution is legal at home, was among the most permissive concerning the patronization of 
prostitutes. NATO established a KFOR-wide “Zero Tolerance” policy on human trafficking and its 
related activities including soliciting prostitutes in 2004 (Mendelson, 2005:5).  
 
Interviews conducted in Prizren with the KFOR interpreters, local business owners, municipal 
officials, and numerous informal conversations found negative responses by the interviewees 
concerning prostitution; none expressed knowledge of KFOR personnel patronizing prostitutes 
in Prizren. Yet as KFOR is well regarded, and prostitution is a particularly taboo subject, such 
admitted knowledge of prostitution may have social repercussion. Therefore, while “no 
personal knowledge of KFOR and prostitution” may have been reported truthfully by those 
interviewed, the literature describing its presence and subsequent shift in cultural acceptability 
by key post-conflict feminist authors is substantial (Enloe, 2014; Godec, 2010:12; Mendelson, 
2005; Mertus, 1996) and merits attention, although not to the extent typically assigned to 
                                                             
213 Stefanova (2005) states internationals paid much higher rates so their business more profitable despite the lower 
number.   
198 
 
military forces. Concerning social effects therefore, the military forces of Camp Prizren appear 
to have promulgated unfavorable social outcomes within the Prizren Municipality, particularly 
for women, and offered no observable positive offsetting opportunities such as higher 
education, training or employment.  
 
7.4.5 Economic Effects  
As the former Balkan seat of the Ottoman empire, Prizren had sufficient political influence and 
civil infrastructure to be among the first municipalities in Kosovo to be industrialized in the mid-
1960’s (Morina, 2011:57). Prizren’s early industries were unprocessed building materials, 
pharmaceuticals textiles, and agricultural processing, particularly fruit products, tanneries and 
tobacco. These eventually replaced most of Prizren’s traditional trading professions (Saunik & 
Buzhala, 2002:13).  
Prizren has since successfully privatized and reopened a small number of SOEs, but the number 
of their employees are still a fraction of the pre-war number. Privately owned trade oriented 
micro-enterprises, typically having less than ten employees, and most often sole 
proprietorships, have largely replaced the high-employment manufacturing SOEs (KOSME, 
2014).  
Table 7.2 provides Prizren sources of income.  
Municipality Work / Employed Supported by 
Others in Kosovo 
All Other Sources 
of Income 
Ferizaj  28.1% 45.6% 26.3% 
Gjakova  25.6% 48.6% 25.8% 
Prizren  29.1% 45.7% 25.2% 
Kosovo  28.9% 44.2% 26.9% 
Table 7.2 Sources of individual income. Supported by others includes children and those 65 years and 
older. All other sources of income include pensions and remittances from abroad. Source: KOSME (2013). 
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The figures in Table 7.3 below similarly found the employment rates of all three municipalities 
are low, however, wages in the Prizren Municipality are the lowest, a condition that Cocozzelli 
(2009) attributes to the urbanization caused by the tremendous influx of rural residents that 
resettled in the City of Prizren after the Kosovo War (Cocozzelli, 2009:151).  
Municipality Percent 
Employed 
Percent 
Unemployed 
Percent 
Outside*of the 
Employment 
Market 
Average 
Wages 2004 
 
Ferizaj  26.1 43.7 30.2 208€ 
Gjakova  22.6 48.8 28.6 213€ 
Prizren  25.4 43.4 31.2 199€ 
Kosovo  24.7 44.8 30.5 209€ 
Table 7.3 Percent of population employed, unemployed and outside the employment market as of 2013. 
*Includes children below 15 years, elderly over 65, and infirm. Data source: KOSME (2013), Kosovo 
Agency of Statistics (2005). 
 
Therefore, noting Tables 7.2 and 7.3, Camp Prizren appears to have contributed very little to 
Prizren’s economy. This assessment is based on three factors that may be directly attributed to 
the military base: first, the very small number of Prizren residents employed in Camp Prizren in 
proportion to the Municipality population; second, the low volume of building materials, food, 
fuel or other materials purchased for use by the Camp214, and third, a low level of consumption 
in local café’s, restaurants or shops by military personnel due to health concerns and 
restrictions in movement off the base.  
The Camp has uniquely contributed to Prizren in other ways, however. In addition to KFOR’s 
usual re/construction of roads and bridges necessary for its patrolling within its area of 
                                                             
214 Based upon usual construction practices. Contractors purchase building materials according to the construction 
schedule.  
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responsibility, the German KFOR also makes an annual payment to the municipality215 for its 
water/waste treatment services. Moreover, German KFOR engineers have actively worked with 
donors and investors to reestablish Prizren’s water purification and waste management 
facilities (UNDP & USAID, 2012), which will likewise improve services for Camp Prizren. 
Moreover, the German KFOR CIMIC initiated funding for an agricultural training center (Asanaj, 
2003: 105) in support of the recently privatized SOE ‘Progres – Export’ in 2003. These are in 
addition to the aforementioned vehicle mechanics’ training to repair and maintain the German 
KFORs’ own vehicles, which benefits both KFOR and Prizren’s corporate knowledge of large 
equipment.  
7.5 Municipal Profile    
According to the Kosovo Small and Medium Enterprise Promotion Program, KOSME, Prizren is 
‘average’ for active businesses, although exits are slightly higher. See Table 7.4.    
Municipality Business Starts/ 
1000 residents216 
Business Entry Rate Business Exit Rate 
Ferizaj  101 14.2% 6.0% 
Gjakova  91 11.0% 3.9% 
Prizren  75 11.0% 7.8% 
Kosovo  76 13.6% 6.5% 
Table 7.4 Business performance, 2000-2012. Data source: KOSME (2013). 
 
To examine post-conflict business activity, Figure 7.1 provides an overview of the five primary 
post-conflict business sectors, showing retail trade was consistently the most active throughout 
                                                             
215 Approximately 210,000 €/year. 
216 Based upon the 2011 Census 
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the study period, likely the source of the higher business exit rate, followed by transportation 
and hotel/restaurant business starts.  
The large spike in business starts in 2003, especially for retail sales, is the result of a successful 
Kosovo-wide business registration campaign.  
Figure 7.1 Overview of the five primary economic sectors.  
 
 
Figure 7.2 below, demonstrates business registrations do not show the usual pattern of a rapid 
rise in the number of construction services and associated trades businesses that tend to 
emerge after conflict to benefit from the flood of donor funding and humanitarian aid (Cerra & 
Saxena, 2007). 
This likely reflects that Prizren’s overall housing and municipal infrastructure were not overly-
damaged, and therefore few contruction and construction trade businesses wwould be 
established to meet a rise in demand for those services. Moreover, the relatively whole 
infrastructure would have allowed retail trade businesses to recommence with minimal delay, 
indicated by consistantly strong retail. This contrasts with the manufacturing sector, seen in 
Figure 7.3, which would have already been low due to deindustrializization before the War, and 
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only made worse by theft, vandalism, and a shortage of the human and physical resources 
necessary to resume operations.   
 
Figure 7.2, Comparison of Prizren’s business starts in the ten Kosovo economic sectors 
7.6 Camp Prizren Analysis  
A study of Kosovo’s official federal and Municipality publications and websites, academic and 
grey literature and field visits, finds the early political and social practices of the KFOR base in 
Prizren were described negatively. This is chiefly due to KFOR’s inability to adequately respond 
to the immediate ethnic violence and criminality in the Prizren Municipality, and for the rise and 
permanence of prostitution. However, these negative opinions appear to have been mitigated. 
Both in terms of wider community investment, such as the repair of roads and bridges; the 
establishment of a new municipal water purification/waste treatment facility; providing 
technical expertise to newly privatized enterprises, and through the military specific practice of 
purchasing a small number of items from a wide range of vendors. In addition, despite limited 
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detail, KFOR’s use of several SOE buildings for almost three years was likely to have resulted in 
substantial improvements to those buildings, thus increasing their value and usefulness when 
they were returned to the municipality.  
The establishment of the Liaison Monitoring Teams in late 2004, discussed more thoroughly in 
Chapter 10, and relaxation of restrictions for KFOR personnel to consume food and non-
alcoholic drinks off base a few years later, would have generated additional local income 
without causing the typical spike in unsustainable businesses often described in post-conflict 
literature. Thus, this overall assessment contrasts with much of the academic post-conflict 
literature which asserts dramatic increases in malign political activities and unsustainable new 
businesses that service the international community. 
Three strong trends come to mind. First politically, KFOR’s risk aversion is well known, including 
its preference for limited and formal contact in order to be perceived as well outside of Kosovo 
politics. Particularly in Prizren, where the KLA controlled government offices for over a year, this 
had resulted in only negligible effort by local leaders to attempt to influence military leaders to 
benefit themselves as had occurred in Afghanistan, Somalia and other post-conflict 
interventions because there was little need to do so. However, the psychological presence of 
the base may have denied malign actors and criminals a sense of complete freedom, especially 
after the establishment of the community-based Liaison Monitoring Teams in 2004. Based on 
field interviews and anecdotes from visits to Prizren in 2014 and 2016, KFOR is firmly believed 
to be a trusted source of stability and security despite its’ early failures.  
Secondly, Camp Prizren’s investment in social development appears to have been minimal. 
While social development is not a military responsibility, ‘actions speak louder than words.’ The 
small number of locally hired workers did not contribute to the loss of the best educated to 
work with the military forces, yet it also reduced opportunities for social interaction with Camp 
Prizren’s personnel. In addition, the long-restricted ability to eat in restaurants and café’s 
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limited opportunities to have a positive influence, particularly as an offset to participation in 
prostitution. Nevertheless, KFOR’s involvement and investment in the restoration of several 
historical buildings was a well-known meaningful and enduring contribution to the City of 
Prizren’s culture.  
The third factor, economics, generally appeared to have primarily given support to the 
aforementioned social factors. Notwithstanding the blurring of the work usually accomplished 
by the international and humanitarian communities, KFOR’s investment in the Prizren 
municipality (water/ waste) and agriculture (vineyards) as well as the road network it used for 
patrols, directly contributed to Prizren’s long term growth, and are far more lasting than local 
employment and purchasing alone. Based on these observations, Camp Prizren has had a low 
but net positive influence on the Municipality of Prizren.  
  
205 
 
Chapter 8   Municipality of Gjakova Case Study 
 
 
8.0 Introduction  
The Municipality of Gjakova provides a basis for comparison of the political, social and 
economic effects military bases established after conflict have on local communities. Gjakova, 
which does not contain a military base, is compared with Ferizaj and Prizren which both contain 
a military base established within 24 hours of the end of the Kosovo War in June 1999. This 
chapter is comprised of two sections; Section 1 opens with a short background of the 
Municipality and region, including an examination of the political, social and economic 
characteristics of Gjakova. Section 2 provides a comparison of Gjakova and the municipalities 
containing a military base. The case study concludes with an analysis of field research results, 
finding Gjakova was largely unaffected politically or socially by the absence of a military base. 
However, economically, Gjakova presents a structurally more mature and sustainable 
environment than either Ferizaj or Prizren, indicating the military bases have primarily 
increased local prosperity in their municipalities, rather than stimulated enduring business 
development.  
8.1 Gjakova Background 
Prior to the Kosovo War in 1999, the Municipality217 of Gjakova’s population was the third 
largest in the Kosovo Province, with approximately 132,000218 residents within the City and 91 
villages (Human Rights Watch, 1999). According to the OSCE Municipality Communities Report, 
Gjakova’s ethnic profile was 92.7 percent Kosovo Albanian, 5.4 percent Kosovo Egyptian, and 
0.9 percent other nationalities including Bosniac, Roma, Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Turk (OSCE, 
2010) . 
                                                             
217 Gjakova refers to the municipality of Gjakova. References to the City of Gjakova are specifically noted.   
218 OSCE (1999), Human Rights Watch (1999) and UNHCR figures; UNDP states 145,000 based on 1991, the last 
census, and natural growth. Gjakova’s population dropped to ~ 95,000 by 2014. 
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The same-named City of Gjakova is the seat of the Municipality, and the city alone accounted 
for some 95,000 residents219. Gjakova is one of the oldest trade cities in Kosovo, predating 
Prizren and the Ottoman Empire. It was also long considered to be an important cultural and 
intellectual center (Vishaj, 2017:268), and had established an active tourism trade supporting 
hundreds of small traditional crafts’ businesses, generally sole proprietorships and small family 
enterprises (ibid, 269). The City of Gjakova has long been politically active and has been the 
home or birthplace of influential political figures, and recently, former KLA leaders (Kosovar 
Stability Initiative, 2011).  
 
The Municipality of Gjakova was industrialized in the mid-1960s, early in comparison to most of 
the former Yugoslavia era’s investments in Kosovo, and remained a major industrial center until 
1988 when the first wave of Kosovo Albanians were sacked from their employment in 
government and industry in 1989. Investment in agriculture was initiated first in Gjakova under 
the initial Yugoslav Five Year Plan, which took advantage of its flat, fertile farmland. Local 
farmers and factory workers later benefitted from the establishment of large food processing 
factories, which manufactured for domestic use rather than export. A small agriculture airport, 
located just outside the city, was used extensively until it was closed and abandoned in the 
1990’s220, likely the result of deindustrialization and transfer of Gjakova’s industrial assets to 
Serbia during international sanctions.  
 
Gjakova had also benefitted from substantial textiles manufacturing, metals processing, and 
commercial transportation and storage (ECOI, 2008) enterprises. Its proximity to the Albanian 
                                                             
219 Unless specifically discussing the City, Gjakova henceforth refers to the Municipality. 
220 The Gjakova airport was not used or damaged during the war. It was restored and used by the Italian KFOR for 
troops and supplies until it was turned over to the Republic of Kosovo in 2013. The Ministry of Trade and Industry 
operated the airport for passengers for only two years before transferring to the Ministry of Economic Development 
in January 2016. The airport ceased operations in 2016 to concentrate investment in Kosovo’s commercial aviation in 
Pristina (Gjakovës, 2016; interview 84).  
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border, just eight kilometers to the west, likewise made the Municipality especially 
advantageous for the nearly 40 State-owned export industries, including chemical ores, and 
construction materials (Kosovar Stability Initiative, 2011). This extensive trade network and 
proximity to the border also made the municipality an ideal location for smuggling and 
organized crime. Hence the porous Kosovo - Albanian border region became a convenient 
haven for the KLA as it conducted its guerilla hit-and-run operations against the Yugoslav Army, 
JA (OSCE, 1999, Human Rights Watch, 2001). Damage to Gjakova’s State industries was mostly 
the result of bombing and fighting during the war. However, the JA intentionally destroyed and 
vandalized hundreds of small, privately-owned family businesses, especially in the oldest 
Ottoman-era section of Gjakova City (OSCE, 1999, Interview 84).  
 
8.2 Local Yugoslav Bases  
Prior to the 1999 War, Gjakova had contained two JA military bases that were under the 
command of the 549th Motorized Infantry Brigade headquartered in Prizren: the 53rd Border 
Guard Battalion221 and the 311th Air Defense Regiment. A principal JA defensive tactic during the 
war was the dispersion of individual air defense teams away from the base to prevent their 
discovery. Hence, air defense artillery pieces, tanks and other large military equipment were 
regularly moved and hidden in houses and barns to avoid detection, which destroyed the 
building in the process (Human Rights Watch, 1999:63). Gjakova’s villages and countryside were 
also delibrately damaged by Serb forces in retaliation for NATO bombing. Thus, coupled with 
months of aerial bombardment and heavy tactical fighting between the KLA, JA and para-
military forces, Gjakova had become one of the most damaged municipalities in Kosovo by the 
end of the war (Human Rights Watch, 2001). 
                                                             
221 The border with Albania was historically contentious; KLA was especially active in the Gjakova Municipality and 
along the Kosovo-Albania border (HRW, 2001).  
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8.2.1 KFOR in Gjakova  
The Gjakova Municipality is located within the area of operations of the KFOR Multinational 
Brigade Southwest, MNB-SW, led by the Italian 132nd “Ariete” Armored Brigade (McGrath, 
2006:53) which is headquartered in the predominantly Kosovo Albanian city of Peja, 
approximately 35 kilometers (21 miles) northwest of the City of Gjakova.  The Italian KFOR 
arrived in Peja on 14 June 1999 (NATO, 1999); Italy contributed approximately 2,300 military 
personnel, and was joined by Bulgaria, Finland, Portugal, Spain and later, Russia (Mockaitis, 
2004:9; OSCE, 2003:49), for a combined total of 5,200 troops by the end of December 1999 
(OSCE, 2003:48; Security, 2000). Italy also contributed 250 Italian carabinieri units, a military 
police force with civil law enforcement authority who are specially trained in riot control, and 
the Guardia di Finanza, a dedicated military police force responsible for border control, 
counter-trafficking, and currency fraud. These together formed the Multinational Specialized 
Unit, or MSU, and was headquartered in Pristina (Bedin, 2001). See Map 8.1222.  
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Map 8.1 Locations of Gjakova and Peja in MNB-SW 
 
                                                             
222 The Serb spelling for Peja is Pec; the Serb spelling for Gjakova is Djakoviča 
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Both the Municipality and City of Gjakova were included in the regular MNB-SW patrolling 
schedule upon arrival of the Task Force in June 1999, and KFOR military police and carabinieri 
provided additional support to Municipal law enforcement. However, as the Italian KFOR was 
the smallest NATO task force in Kosovo, and it was unable to maintain a large or continuous 
presence in the Municipality.  
Gjakova was well known in Kosovo as a cultural, intellectual and political center, (Kosovar 
Stability Initiative, 2011), and had contained an active and powerful branch of the League of 
Communists of Kosovo. The municipality has long benefited from the large number of civil 
servants from Gjakova that worked in senior Party positions in Pristina, several of which would 
favor Gkakova over other municiplaities, particularly Mr. Mahmut Bakalli, who served as the 
president of the League of Communists of Kosovo for ten years, 1971-1981, (Morina, 2011:20; 
Warrander & Knaus, 2010) during Yugoslavia greatest period of investment in Kosovo (Morina, 
2011:21). Senior government officials, including the Kosovo president Ms. Atifete Jahjaga, 
continue to originate from this municipality. Nevertheless, while a substantial number of senior 
officials and political leaders now in Pristina may have originated in Gjakova, in practice this 
group would have little contact with the military KFOR Task Forces. Instead, these leaders 
would coordinate directly with their peers in civilian international organizations, and in 
conjunction with them, senior military leaders and representatives of KFOR Headquarters. 
 
8.3 Basis for Comparison 
Gjakova was among the most economically and socially developed Kosovo municipalities223 
under the former Yugoslavia. It is a useful comparison to Prizren with regard to its similarly 
well-established history of trade, culture and history; a correspondingly robust tourism industry 
                                                             
223 Municipalities to the west of the Kosovar Mountains were already more developed through better agricultural 
land and ancient trade routes, hence, the first to receive Yugoslav investment.  
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and traditional craft businesses, as well as a comparably high level of industrial investment 
during the former Yugoslavia. Gjakova is likewise comparable to the Municipality of Ferizaj with 
relation to population size, 131,700 to Ferizaj’s 127,333 (OSCE, 1999:657) and its substantial 
agricutural industry.  
 
8.3.1 Kosovo’s Road Network  
Although relatively close, Gjakova is not expected to have contributed a signifiant number of 
workers for Camp Prizren or Camp Bondsteel due to Kosovo’s overall poor road infrastructure. 
As Pettifer (2002) notes, Kosovo’s roadways were primarily built to support Yugoslav industries’ 
ability to transport raw materials and semi-processed components out of Kosovo to be 
processed elsewhere, and the roads remained in this configuration after the war (ibid). 
Kosovo’s road network was primarily designed in a hub-and-spoke pattern, with secondary 
paved roads leading from the resource area to the municipalities’ industrial periphery. Gjakova 
was located on a secondary paved road connecting it ‘out’ to Albania and Pristina; roadways did 
not connect eastward, or in toward either Prizren or Ferizaj. While all primary roads, and the 
few secondary/regional roads built by Kosovo’s central government were well constructed and 
paved, by 1999 many were cracked, pot holed and had delaminated.224 Local-level road 
construction and maintenance had been the responsibility of the municipalities and villages, 
and these roads were usually built to the minumum standards (World Bank, 2009:6). Likewise, 
minor municipal and farm roads were not paved, but comprised of hard-packed gravel. Indeed, 
the World Bank affirms Kosovo’s roads, predominantly built in the 1960s and 1970s, were not 
damaged by the war in 1999 but had already deteriorated through lack of maintenance in the 
two decades after Tito’s death (World Bank, 2009:6; Meyer, 2000).   
                                                             
224 Paved roads are built in successive layers of compacted rock and gravel with a protective asphalt topping. 
Degradation is caused by flooding or breaks in the road surface causing one or more layers to break down and begin 
a progression of structural failures in and between the layers causing the road to fracture and crumble, especially in 
cold climates.  
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As a result, the overall number of roads was not only small, most were poorly constructed and 
all  were undermaintained (Pettifer, 2002), hence were in very poor condition after the war 
(World Bank, 2009:6). Road quality worsened after the war by increased traffic, particularly 
from returning refugees and expatriates, and the heavy military and aid-carrying vehicles 
(Meyer, 2000). As a result, seeming short distances would be exagerated by too-few and poorly 
maintained roadways (World Bank, 2009:6).  Noting Gjakova was not on a primary road, and 
Gjakova and Ferizaj were not connected by either primary or secondary roads, the long travel 
time caused by travelling minor and broken roadways was likely to have prevented any 
meaningful number of workers from Gjakova to have traveled to Ferizaj for employment at 
Camp Bondsteel 225unless able to stay with friends or family (Interview 73). Therefore, Gjakova’s 
isolating circumstance and distance from Ferizaj and Prizren make it a suitable municipality and 
community for comparison.  See Map 8.2, primary and major secondary paved roadways.   
 
Map 8.2. Map courtesy of Independent Commission of Mines and Minerals (2017) 
                                                             
225 The distance from the Municipality of Gjakova to Prizren was just 36 km, 21 miles; the distance to the Ferizaj 
Municipality was 88km, or 53 miles  
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8.4 Municipality Factors for Evaluation 
Governments at every level are composed of interconnected local political, social and 
economic factors. Examined through both the post-conflict and base closure literature, 
the factors that most clearly demonstrate the influence of a military base are the 
relationship between the base leaders and local elites; shifts in acceptable and 
unacceptable social behavior, and changes in community economics, including 
employment levels, business starts and increased local-level economic development. 
Therefore, the municipalities containing military bases, Ferizaj and Prizren, are 
compared to Gjakova in these areas, and changes in these factors are assumed to be 
the most pronounced for the base having the greatest contact and interaction with its 
community.  
Thus, the Municipality of Ferizaj containing Camp Bondsteel, which had employed 
thousands of local residents at very high salaries and had locally purchased millions of 
dollars’ worth of materiel, should exhibit the greatest variation from Municipality of 
Gjakova which does not host a military base, did not provide materials for purchase nor 
supply a significant number of base employees.  
 
8.4.1 Political Factors 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the failure to address the status of Kosovo, or to offer any 
remedy to the Serb violence against Kosovo Albanians at the 1995 Dayton Accords, 
undermined the cautious passive resistance movement. It also gave credence for 
violence against the Serbs by the previously unknown group calling themselves the 
Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA. This group was initially comprised of small, independent 
clan and village groups, predominantly from Kosovo’s south and western municipalities, 
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including Gjakova. Kosovo’s western border became the KLA’s “operational zone” 
where the short distance to Albania and the mountainous terrain allowed training and 
movement to be relatively unnoticed (Morina, 2011:58). After the war, the KLA’s 
western region commander Ramush Haradinaj, established the political party Aleanca për 
Ardhmërine e Kosovës, Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) as his entrée to national politics 
(ibid: 44)  
 
Upon the announcement of withdrawal of Serb forces per the Military Technical Agreement, 
Gjakova’s Municipal offices, which had been vacated during the fighting, were filled and 
controlled by local KLA fighters, KLA supporters and organized crime elements - just hours after 
UNSCR 1244 was adopted (Interviews 77, 86; Daltweit, 2007:84; Human Rights Watch, 1999:24; 
Taylor, 2002:72). The KLA’s intimidation and hardline domination of the Municipality which had 
overwhelmingly favored former KLA members, was soon felt to be illegitimate and caused 
resentment by the municipal population (Human Rights Watch, 1999:50; Taylor, 2002:72). Yet, 
by mid-2000, many of the former KLA members joined the nascent AAK, which by then had 
established itself as the majority political party in Gjakova and the western Kosovo 
municipalities226 (Morina, 2011:58; Skendaj, 2014), displaced the ubiquitous, but passive 
Democractic League of Kosovo, (LDK).    
  
While the Gjakova municipality did not contain a KFOR military base, it did contain a unit of the 
temporarily formed para-military emergency services organization Trupat e Mbrojtjes së 
Kosovës, (TMK), chiefly comprised of now-unemployed former KLA. The TMK was officially 
disbanded a few months later with completion of the KLA’s demilitarization, and was 
                                                             
226 Peja, Decan and Junik (Morina, 2011:63)  
 
214 
 
immediately formed into the Kosovo Protection Corps, (KPC)227. The KPC was developed jointly 
by UNMIK and KFOR, where KFOR helped develop daily administrative operations and provided 
professional training per its UNSCR 1244 tasking (Cockell, 2003:125; Haussler, 2008:63). Yet, 
while military personnel from the Italian military base would have had regular interaction with 
both the community and KPC, actual contact time was short228, and the relatively low rank of 
both the KPC members in training and KFOR trainers themselves allowed little opportunity for 
the development of significant working relations between the military leaders and Gjakova’s 
community leaders to develop.  
Despite KFOR leaders having had little direct political dealing with local community leaders 
concerning the KPC, KFOR did have some indirect influence through the interactions of daily 
patrols. More substantial relations developed in 2005 through regular visits by the Liaison 
Monitoring Teams, where community information and local concerns were habitually shared 
and exchanged with the local government (Svensson, 2008). Nevertheless, the usual attempts 
by community leaders to influence military leadership that are found in base closure, as well as 
much post-conflict literature, was minimal in Gjakova (Cheng, 2013; Dardia et al.,1996:1; 
Zaalberg, 2006). This thin overall interaction between KFOR and the community indicate the 
military bases’ influence on the political activity in the Gjakova Municipality was likely to be low, 
and in the absence of corresponding social and economic influences through employment or 
purchasing, its influence would have been less than that which was found in the Municipalities 
of Ferizaj and Prizren. 
 
 
 
                                                             
227 Created through agreement of then political minister of the KLA, Hashim Thaçi and Commander of KFOR 
(COMKFOR). UNMIK retained overall responsibility for the TMK and KPC. 
228 While each contributing nation had its own policy, early KFOR units generally rotated out of Kosovo on a four to 
six-month schedule.   
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8.4.2 Social Factors: Women in Gjakova  
Among the chief social factors in post-conflict literature directly attributed to the presence of 
military bases are changes in locally acceptable behavior and attitudes toward women and 
sex/gender-based exploitation, especially prostitution.  
Gjakova had had a long tradition of regional trade and hundreds of small handicraft shops, and 
it is assumed that women would have had some part in these activities, and therefore had 
participated in the local economy. In addition, Gjakova’s early industrialization is likely to have 
brought women into the industrial labor force as well (Wolchik, 2016). Indeed, by 1976 nearly 
half of the able women in Yugoslavia were working outside the home229 (Damachi & Seibel, 
1982). Women tended to be channeled toward the more “feminine” industries of textile 
manufacturing and food processing230 (Bonfiglioli, 2013; Woodward, 1995:316) among the first 
industries established in the Gjakova Municipality. By the early 1980s, women comprised over 
70 percent of those employed in these industries (Bonfiglioli, 2013; Bonfiglioli, 2015; 
Woodward, 1995).  
Nevertheless, while women were working away from the home in increasing numbers in 
Yugoslavia overall, the number of women employed full time outside the home in Kosovo in 
1987 achieved just 20 percent of the workforce (Curtis, 1992:100). This figure dropped 
immediately with the ousting of Kosovo Albanians from industry and civil service by Milošević’s 
policies and was reinforced by a return to the traditional protection of women (Sadikaj, 2009). 
By 2012, women employed outside the home in Gjakova had fallen to ten percent (UNDP & 
USAID, 2012). At the same time, Gjakova contains a disproportionate number of widows and 
female heads of family due to the especially heavy fighting in the municipality. Thus, especially 
                                                             
229 It is important to note that not all women that worked specifically wanted to work, rather ‘work’ was national 
duty.  
230 “Feminized industries” tended to pay less, with fewer opportunities for advancement. Women were also more 
likely to be laid off during economic constriction and not rehired, therefore losing their health care, housing and 
social standing. 
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in comparison to Ferizaj containing a military base with a substantial number of female 
employees with high wages, women in Gjakova tend to have had far fewer opportunities to 
earn a self-supporting income (Kosovar Stability Initiative, 2011:39).  
8.4.3 Economic Factors 
According to the Municipality of Gjakova, one of every three residents had been employed in 
Socially Owned Enterprises (SOEs) at their peak in the early 1980’s (Kosovar Stability Initiative, 
2011:3). Kastrati (2014) notes that since Milošević’s policies had terminated the employment of 
Kosovo Albanians in SOEs and civil service, Gjakova has experienced one of the highest out-
migration rates in Kosovo (Kastrati, 2014:19), with its harmful “brain drain.” Few of Gjakova’s 
SOEs have since been successfully privatized and reopened to employ any sizable number. The 
high-employment SOEs have been slowly replaced by private micro-enterprises, which typically 
have less than ten employees, and are overwhelmingly sole proprietorships (ibid).  
Given the thousands of Ferizaj residents employed on Camp Bondsteel, it is remarkable that the 
percentage of employed residents in Gjakova is similar to the municipalities with that military 
base and to Kosovo overall. The percentage of dependents, or “persons supported by others” 
are similarly comparable (KOSME, 2014), and like Kosovo as a whole, this figure is nearly double 
the combined number of employed and self-employed.  See Table 8.1, Sources of Individual 
Income. 
Municipality Work / Employed All Other Sources of 
Income 
Dependents -
Supported by Others  
Ferizaj  28.1% 26.3% 45.6% 
Gjakova  25.6% 25.8%  48.6% 
Prizren  29.1% 25.2%  45.7% 
Kosovo  28.9% 26.9%  44.2% 
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Table 8.1 Sources of individual income. All other sources of income include Yugoslavia-era and foreign 
pensions and remittances from abroad. Dependents/Persons supported by others also includes 
individuals below 15 years and over 65 years old, and the infirm. Source: KOSME (2013). 
 
Gjakova’s post-conflict economy presents the usual pattern of rapid growth immediately after 
conflict’s end with its flood of donor funding and humanitarian aid to meet crisis and immediate 
needs (Cerra & Saxena, 2007), and also restoration of culturally significant buildings. As 
example, Gjakova received funding to restore its 15th Century Ottoman district to preserve that 
cultural treasure in 1999 by USAID. Nevertheless, humanitarian aid generally tapers off as 
urgent needs are met, and tends to decline in the third or fourth year after conflict (Collier, et 
al., 2008; Demekas, et al., 2001; de Coning, 2008). Further investment in subtantitive 
infrastructure re/construction projects often wait until the environment appears to have well 
stabilized (UNCTAD, 2009:58).  
The loss of SOEs in this heavily industrialized municipality, and destruction of the traditional 
private businesses have been chiefly replaced with new small businesses. This subsection 
examines business starts in the sectors most often identified in post-conflict literature: 
construction services and trades, retail trade, transportation and hotel/restaurants for the 
study period231.  
Figure 8.1, below, provides an overview of the five primary sectors. 
                                                             
231 The spike in business starts in 2003/2004 is the result of a successful Kosovo-wide business registration campaign. 
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Figure 8.1 Gjakova Business Starts. Bars represent number of starts for years 2000-2012. Data source: 
Kosovo Ministry of Trade and Industry (2016). 
 
 
This figure clearly shows retail sales was the most active sector, at least in part a reflection that 
it had been Gjakova’s primary means of income generation for centuries, in addition to the 
post-conflict spike. Retail sales is followed by hotel/restaurants and transportation,232 
businesses that are more often associated with tourism. However, given that the Gjakova 
Municipality and surrounding area were badly damaged by the war, the increase in 
hotels/restaurants are likely the result of the demand for transition shelter for returnees, and 
temporary lodging for displaced residents and possibly builders from Albania or Montenegro, as 
local builders and merchants would have been similarly impacted by the war. Transition lodging 
may also be inferred by the fairly constant level of hotel/restaurants starts, which indicate more 
than the clientele of international organizations’ staff alone were using these services 
(Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Carnahan, et al., 2006). Transportation follows a similar 
pattern to retail; private individuals register as transportation services – taxis - for hire. It must 
                                                             
232 Transportation in this period includes privately owned vehicles used as taxis, as well as multi-passenger 
transporters.  
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be noted here that the Italian KFOR had also rebuilt portions of the Gjakova’s transportation 
infrastructure as it was within the Task Force area of responsibility, and while primarily 
intended for KFOR’s own use such as for patrolling, the improvements would have benefitted 
Gjakova’s businesses and commerce as well.  
8.5 Comparison of Municipalities 
In the absence of substantial outside investment, Gjakova is expected to have lower wages and 
a lower number of business starts 233 234 including a lower number of businesses in the post-
conflict sectors, when compared to the Municipalities with bases. This inference is based on 
two factors directly attributed to the military base: the first is a high number of residents 
employed, and secondly higher spending for those who are employed on base, noting monthly 
salaries235 averaged over 1,200€ in Ferizaj with Camp Bondsteel, and 600€ in Prizren with Camp 
Prizren.  
The figures in Table 8.2 below finds percent employed in the three municipalities are 
surprisingly similar, despite the high number of workers in Ferizaj. Gjakova’s percentage of 
employed residents is only slightly lower than either Ferizaj and Prizren, or the Kosovo average. 
Gjakova’s average wages, however, are slightly higher than both Ferizaj and Prizren. This wage 
differential may be attributed to Gjakova’s higher number of business and personal services 
businesses which tend to pay slightly better than does retail (Harris, 2016), hence the military 
bases appear to have had negligible overall effect on local wages or employment. 
Table 8.2 Comparison of economically active population, 2000-2012 
                                                             
233 Business registration serves as a proxy for business starts.  
234 This lower number of business starts would be most pronounced in secondary and tertiary business enterprises.  
235 Particularly at Camp Bondsteel, the very-high salaries of up to $5,000 USD (4,000€) had decreased to under 
$2,000 (1,600€) by 2007/2008.  
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Municipality Percent Employed Percent 
Unemployed 
Average Wages 236       
all sectors 
Ferizaj  26.1 43.7 208€ 
Gjakova  22.6 48.8 213€ 
Prizren  25.4 43.4 199€ 
Kosovo  24.7 44.8 209€ 
 
Table 8.2 Percent of population employed, unemployed (looking for work). Data source: KOSME (2013), and Kosovo 
Agency of Statistics (2005). 
 
According to Héthy (2000), Kosovo’s monthly wages in 1999 after the war for government and 
civil servants “ranged from 150 DM for technical support staff to 600 DM for senior directors, 
with an average of 270 DM paid to state/civil employees. Teachers received 150 DM; doctors 
and professors received 360 DM, which was later increased to 1,000 DM, [noting] the UN paid 
its’ local staff between 940-2,200 DM, and UNDP paid its staff 400 DM.”  Monthly wages paid by 
private businesses ranged from a high of 200 DM for construction-related services, while 
industries and trade with heavy competition, thus market saturation, paid employees between 
50 and 60 DM (Héthy, 2000:14). Salaries for government and civil servants did not increase to 
accommodate inflation or other raises in costs of living (ibid). Specific details concerning 
Kosovo’s civil and private wages following the adoption of the euro from the Deutchemark, 
(DM), in 2002 are not readily available. However, like the interviewees in Ferizaj and Prizren, 
many in Gjakova believed that the conversion from DM to euro doubled the cost of goods and 
services for the purchaser, although it is not supported by literature. It is probable that some 
accommodation in wages for the euro conversion were made in 2002 or 2003, particularly as 
Kosovo’s annual budget, and subsequent donations and commerce with Western Europe were 
henceforth based on the euro.  
                                                             
236 Reliable municipality-level wage rates begin in fiscal year 2003-2004. 
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While post-conflict economic assessments rightly concentrate on the immediate recovery 
business sectors; construction services, retail trade, transportation and hotels/restaurants, 
Gjakova appears to have independently established a higher number of secondary business 
services and tertiary personal services business enterprises.237 These secondary and tertiary 
services require additional knowledge, training and often licensing prior to establishing the 
business and are thus more representative of a mature economy. Their presence may indicate a 
strategic decision to develop them in the absence of other options, particularly to increase 
Gjakova’s appeal for donor and foreign investment – a frequent best practice found in base 
closure literature (Carnahan, et al., 2005; Carnahan, et al., 2006). See Table 8.3.   
Municipality Business Starts 
1000 residents238 
Business Services  Personal Services  
Ferizaj  101 7.0% 8.4% 
Gjakova  91 7.6% 13.9% 
Prizren  75 7.0% 9.7% 
Kosovo  76 10.4%239 9.7% 
Table 8.3 Secondary and tertiary business starts, 2000-2012. KOSME (2013); UNDP & USAID, (2012). 
 
While not conclusive, secondary and tertiary businesses may also contribute to stability through 
clustering and business diversification, and therefore improve the ability for a wider range of 
businesses to operate successfully, shown by Gjakova’s low business exit rate. See Table 8.4. 
 
                                                             
237 Secondary services include banking and insurance, communication, real estate and scientific/technical activities, 
some administrative services and wholesaling. Tertiary services include accountancy, consulting, law, information 
technology, recreation, and some government services. 
238 Based upon the 2011 Census 
239 This figure includes Kosovo’s capital city, Pristina, containing a disproportionate number of international 
organizations and government offices that have an exceptionally high demand for these services. 
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Municipality Business Starts/ 
1000 residents 
Business Entry Rate Business Exit Rate 
Ferizaj  101 14.2% 6.0% 
Gjakova  91 11.0% 3.9% 
Prizren  75 11.0% 7.8% 
Kosovo  76 13.6% 6.5% 
Table 8.4 Business performance, 2000-2012. Data source: KOSME (2013). 
 
8.6 Gjakova Analysis and Summary 
A study of Kosovo’s official federal and Municipality publications, its website, and a field visit 
finds more similarities than differences between the Municipality of Gjakova and the 
Municipalities with bases. The small number of differences tend to point to mostly neutral and 
localized effects on the political, social and economic areas of interest. This assessment 
contrasts with much of the academic post-conflict literature which asserts dramatic increases in 
predominantly malign political activities; unsustainable new businesses that service the 
international community, and substantial criminal activity, particularly prostitution and 
trafficking, that can be directly attributed to the military bases. 
Reasons appear threefold. First, the absence of a KFOR base in the Gjakova Municipality 
provides fewer occasions for relations to develop between military and political leaders, 
particularly given KFOR’s risk aversion and preference for limited and formal contact, and thus 
to be perceived as well outside of Kosovo politics. Community elites did not actively attempt to 
influence military leaders to benefit themselves as had occurred in Afghanistan, Somalia and 
other post-conflict interventions because there was little opportunity or benefit to do so. 
Secondly, Gjakova’s centuries-old trade routes were a convenient transit for weapons 
trafficking and smuggling supplies by the KLA (OSCE, 1999). Although KFOR had included 
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Gjakova in its regular patrolling schedule since its arrival in June 1999 (Salerno, 2003), poor local 
roads made travel difficult and the municipalities’ long border with Albania and Macedonia 
made trafficking of arms, drugs and humans very easy to hide. Thus, the social ills usually 
associated with military and peacekeeper bases; prostitution/human trafficking, drug use and 
organized crime, were able to emerge in Gjakova without the presence of a military base.  
Thirdly, unlike the Ferizaj Municipality, social and economic opportunities for women have 
either had not increased or regressed. Despite a fairly open past, after the mass employment 
termination policies of Milošević, Gjakova’s residents turned inward for self-support and 
protection. Men typically became the sole wage earners, while women would be relegated to 
low pay/no pay caretaker roles that often held a lower social value. In addition, well-founded 
fears resulting from the increasing harassment of Kosovo Albanians during that time had led to 
the re-cloistering of women and often a greater acceptance of traditional gender-based 
restrictions. These habits have only been gradually relinquished since the end of the war. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of new social and economic opportunities and their influences for 
both men and women, including those that may be produced by a military base, Gjakova’s 
social and economic development may be disadvantaged in the long term.  
At the same time, Gjakova’s economy appears to have taken an unexpected direction. At first 
review Gjakova presents the expected lower number of business starts and a lower 
employment rate throughout the study period than Ferizaj or Prizren. Gjakova and its industry 
had been badly damaged in the war. Not only had it lost much of its substantial Yugoslav-era 
industrialization that had been higher than both Ferizaj or Prizren, it also lost the pre-war 
capacity created by its historical trade network. Yet Gjakova presents a comparable percentage 
increase in business starts per capita in the primary post-conflict business sectors, construction 
services; retail trade, transportation and hotel/restaurant, to those that are seen in Ferizaj and 
Prizren, and with lower exit rates, Table 8.4.  
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However, Table 8.3 demonstrates Gjakova has uniquely developed a small, but substantial 
secondary and tertiary services sector. Businesses in these sectors typically require additional 
professional training and education, and hence are unlikely to have been simply established by 
former SOE employees, but may be due to returning expatriates, replacing the ‘brain drain’ of 
the prior decades. Similarly, Gjakova may have specifically encouraged such business 
development to take the place of manufacturing as well as increase Gjakova’s appeal to foreign 
investors and international donors, particularly in the absence of proximate economic 
opportunities such as a military base. This turn to business and personal services is frequently 
emphasized as a best practice to recover from base closure, hence Gjakova may ultimately 
develop into a more sustainable political, social and economic environment.  
Therefore, based on these observations of the Municipality of Gjakova and a comparison with 
the Municipalities of Ferizaj and Prizren, the KFOR military bases appear to have had negligible 
effect overall on the political, social and economic factors of their local communities.  
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Chapter 9: Analysis of Case Study Municipalities  
 
9.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the influences that military bases have on their local 
communities in the contemporary post-conflict environment. While a substantial range of 
academics and practitioners have detailed the ways peacekeeping forces and their bases place 
a heavy political, social and economic strain on the residents and community in post-conflict 
environments (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Autesserre, 2014; Carnahan, et al., 2005; 
Duffield 2011; Enloe 2000; Sciarra 2008; Toft 2010), a similar examination of the influences of 
military bases established in this environment is nearly absent. Drawing from a livelihoods 
approach to political economy analysis, this chapter examines the effects of military bases from 
the local communities’ own perspective, the meso and micro levels, which Collinson (2003) 
notes “reveals the totality of the economic, political, social and cultural factors that affect 
people’s lives” (Collinson 2003:4).  
The chapter is comprised of two sections and built upon the characteristics and interrelated 
effects of military bases. The first describes the Political and Social effects of the base, focusing 
on the relationships between the community, community leaders and military leaders. It is 
followed by an examination of the perceptions of base employees, vendors, business owners 
and community members, and their individual experiences with the military bases. A closer 
view of the bases’ influence upon women and their usual gender roles, and a discussion of 
base related crime is provided. An introduction to Kosovo-unique Liaison Monitoring Teams 
completes this section.  
 
The second section concentrates on the bases’ economic effects. It further analyzes the 
economy at the meso and micro (local) level, finding many of the anticipated effects are far 
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less robust than predicted, concluding the military bases have a limited effect on the 
communities.  
 
9.1 Section 1:  Intra-Community Dynamics in Case Study Municipalities 
Among the many criticisms of both military bases are their extensive intra-community effects, 
generally negative outcomes of external influences that have modified locally acceptable 
attitudes, behavior and activity. These effects range from crime and the entrenchment of local 
opportunist actors; introduction of Western values concerning women, including women in the 
military; its contrast with the traditional roles of women in a patriarchal society; and, inflation 
and emergence of a peacekeeper-based economy. A close review of the academic and grey 
literature finds three broad areas where peacekeeper practices directly affect the local 
community: through local employment, local purchasing, and community relations. Military 
base closure studies similarly assess these areas and their effects on the community.  
Base closure studies also examine the factors common to successful and unsuccessful 
transitions to a fully civilian economy, identifying four consistent factors:  the proportion of 
community residents that work or provide services for the base; the bases’ proximity to an 
urban area; the technical expertise of those employed on base, and the quality of relations 
between community leaders and the military base. These were examined with the field 
research, and evaluated within the three broad characteristics of a community, its political, 
social and economic roles.  
In this chapter, Political, refers to relations between the community and the military leaders; 
Social refers to the attitudes and actions of the military personnel toward the community, and 
those of the community toward the military and between community members. Economic 
includes both local employment and purchasing and the secondary/tertiary effects of that 
employment and purchasing. These three factors are used as a framework to examine the 
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effects of the practices on the community by the base established by the German KFOR in the 
Municipality of Prizren, and the United States’ KFOR in the Municipality of Ferizaj. The results 
are subsequently compared to the Municipality of Gjakova which does not contain a base, to 
determine whether, and in what ways, the base affects the local political economy. This Section 
therefore examines the social, political and economic intra-dynamics of the base communities. 
9.2 Political Effects 
The immediate post-conflict environment often finds vacated civil government offices have 
been filled by victorious military forces, organized crime, and warlords (Cheng, 2013; Münch, 
2013). As Berdal (2009) and Cheng (2013) note, in the absence of the rule of law and a credible, 
capable government, criminalized war and conflict economies are quick to emerge to exploit 
the power vacuum, and in the absence of capable institutions, these conflict economies are 
likely to continue when conflict ends, becoming entrenched and permanent (Berdal, 2009; 
Cheng, 2013; also, Pugh, 2004). Such an appropriation of authority had occurred throughout 
Kosovo; members of the KLA  and their supporters quickly occupied municipal government 
offices, including those municipalities containing KFOR bases. In part due the KLA’s wide 
popularity240, these former KLA members and political supporters remained in those positions 
until the outcome of the 2000 elections, when many were voted out and replaced by members 
of newly established political parties.  
As a military organization, KFOR strives to remain as apolitical as possible. Especially in a post-
conflict environment, military leaders will tend to remain firmly outside local politics, intending 
to give little incentive for local leaders to establish [malign] relations with them. Hence, the 
commander and military leaders representing both Camp Bondsteel and Camp Prizren typically 
had only infrequent and formal interaction with the community leaders. Typically, this absence 
                                                             
240 Also, the slow deployment of UNMIK and it’s law enforcement organization, CIVPOL.  
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of interaction is offset through the relations between municipal-level civil servants and the non-
US CIMIC or US Civil Affairs personnel. In Kosovo, these are joined by the NATO Liaison 
Monitoring Team (LMTs)241, directed to gather, share and distribute news and information 
(Interviews 23, 25, 58, 60, 73; Svensson, 2008), yet may also establish a proxy political 
relationship for the military. Hence, whether it is intentional or not, by doing so military leaders 
and their forces ultimately give tacit approval to the status quo through their activities, or 
failure to act, hardly a neutral position. 
Field interviews with members of International and non-governmental organizations; Kosovo 
Albanian and Kosovo Serb residents and government officials, regularly stated that KFOR has 
had generally positive relations and cooperation with the local civil society and international 
civilian organizations since 1999. Interviews especially describe the early collaboration between 
KFOR Military Police patrols and United Nations Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to oversee 
and protect returning internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees (Interviews 8, 3, 29, 72; 
Morris, 1999:16; UNMIK, 1999:6), as well as supporting their efforts to shelter and meet the 
physical needs of the local population by providing information regarding the hard-to-access 
very small and very remote villages on the patrol routes (Etchemendy, 2010:9). Similar 
descriptions of cooperation were expressed by UNMIK and Kosovo Police, who attended many 
of the same coordination meetings (Interviews 8, 27, 28, UNMIK, 1999:6).  
9.3 Social Effects  
A common claim against peacekeeping forces are their “influences which cause widespread 
societal changes when large numbers of the community are employed to their operations on 
their base” (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007:277; Carnahan, 2005; Sciarra, 2008). These 
range from a ‘brain drain’ from the community by competition between the international 
                                                             
241 The activities of CIMIC, Civil Affairs and LMTs are examined more fully in Chapter 10. 
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community and local government for skilled workers (Gauster & Maruszczak, 2006; Sciarra, 
2008); gender-based trafficking and insult to traditional gender roles (Ammitzbøell & Dons 
Tychen, 2007:277); and unsustainable entrepreneurship that “specifically caters to the tastes of 
foreigners” (ibid). At the individual level however, the most common changes are shifts in 
acceptable and unacceptable social behavior concerning personal status, effects on the role of 
women and peacekeeper-related crime. 
9.3.1 Personal Status 
For years working at a KFOR base was a not only a source of income, it was also a source of 
special status242 and pride243, a sentiment consistent with all interviewees that had worked on a 
KFOR base, including businesses, (Interviews 9, 10, 20, 48, 50, 53, 55, 57), although businesses 
generally did not publicize their relationship. Prior employment on the base tended to be an 
advantage when seeking new employment in their community (ibid). Few, however, were 
known to have sought employment with other international organizations as is often stated in 
post-conflict literature (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Carnahan, et al., 2006; Jennings & 
Bøås, 2015). This is likely due to the low demand for the skills developed on the base, typically a 
construction trade, food service or cleaning. Translators, with their more marketable expertise 
to the international community, were the exception (Interviews 13, 19, 38, 73). However, those 
who had been fired were often unable to find employment despite their experience on a KFOR 
base, and would seek employment with family, become self-employed, relocate to another 
location, or migrate out of Kosovo (Interviews 11, 73, 78, 84).  
 
                                                             
242 Interviews and informal conversations with local employees of international and non-governmental organization 
did not express this sense of status and pride.  
243 By the second research visit in 2016, working on a military base was no longer a significant source of social 
prestige. 
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9.3.2 Influence on Women 
The experiences of women were more complex. While women who had worked on base also 
described increased pride and self-respect (Interviews 11, 64, 84), they, and other women they 
knew, had often heard disapproving comments from their family, typically from male family 
members living outside Kosovo, (Interviews 11, 64, 77, 78, 84, 85). Although economic need for 
the woman’s income generally overruled such disapproval, that noncompliance was an affront 
to the patriarchal tradition and occasionally a source of family friction (ibid). Some women, 
however, were expressly exploited by their families for their high salaries, pressured to give 
their income to the male family members, and did not benefit from it (Interviews 77, 78, 85). 
Community disapproval of a woman working on base could also extend to the spouse and 
children, with accusations of “shameful wives and disgraceful mothers working on the base 
with strange men” (Interviews 30, 31, 32, 64, 77, 85.) The disparagement for unmarried women 
was punitive; she became undesirable as a wife or simply unmarriageable, although 
interviewees stated these views have subsided with the increase of the number of women 
employed and continued presence of the bases (Interviews 11, 64, 77, 84).  
In some cases, a job transfer on base or promotion challenged local gender roles. Women 
seldom worked ‘in front of the counter244’ and very rarely worked where alcohol was served. As 
coffee shops typically serve alcohol in Kosovo, a woman that had been transferred from a retail 
jewelry counter to work in a coffee shop hid her new job from her family for months, although 
no alcohol was sold there, in fear of their disapproval. More consistent with feminist literature 
were anecdotes and insinuations of prostitution, ‘friendly laundry ladies,’ the details of which 
                                                             
244 Women who worked outside the home was not an issue, it was where. Women already worked in point of sale 
services such as retail, bakeries and fast foods, ‘behind the counter.’ Serving coffee with its closer contact to male 
customers, is considered ‘in front of the counter,’ comparatively risqué.  
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were unverifiable245, and a small number of romances, mostly between male Soldiers and their 
female translators.  
Woman’s rights and health organizations, including Kosovar civil society, Kosovar-led 
international organization leaders, and women business owners, stated the military base has 
been good for women overall. First because women working on base eventually gain 
community respect for their contributions to the family, and secondly, because military women 
[especially as leaders] have been good role models to demonstrate professional relationship 
with men. Several male political leaders had made similar statements concerning their positive 
opinions, in addition to their greater willingness to hire women, and support for increased 
opportunities for women to work and “be a part of society.”  
9.3.3 Military Peacekeeper Crime 
A frequent theme in academic and grey literature concerning military bases is the increased 
level of crime; black marketing, labor exploitation and prostitution that are directly attributable 
to the presence of those international and military forces (Carnahan, et al., 2005; Carnahan, et 
al., 2006:21; Enloe, 2014:126; Martin, 2005; Mendelson, 2005; Sadikaj, 2010:2; Stern, 2015). 
Moreover, these organizations have acknowledged they have often failed to hold offenders 
accountable when the crimes were discovered (Carnahan, et al., 2005; Martin, 2005; 
Mendelson, 2005), undermining their organizations’ credibility and further damaging the 
community it was sent to help (ibid).   
                                                             
245 On the US base, mostly women received and returned bagged laundry, and were professionally friendly as they 
often saw the same individuals on a regular basis. This led to speculation by some military personnel they were 
available for prostitution. Claims of such attempts were not verified; however, military personnel that spent an 
inordinate of time at the laundry or other base venues could be reprimanded for harassment. Relationships and 
romances between the military and local workers were very strongly discouraged to avoid negative impressions of 
KFOR through violation of traditional customs. Moreover, the time needed for marriage visas was often much longer 
than a Soldier would have in Kosovo, resulting in broken engagements and irreparable damage to the fiancée’s 
reputation (Author’s experience, 2009). 
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Although such activity is well documented in the Balkans, such as the Arizona Market in Bosnia-
Herzegovina246, and elsewhere in post-conflict literature, these malign activities did not appear 
to have emerged in Kosovo expressly due to the military bases247 per the field interviews. Nearly 
100 percent248 of the interviews249 conducted in Kosovo contained questions concerning the 
informal economy, to include black marketing and smuggling; human trafficking, prostitution 
and sex-crimes; inappropriate conduct, such as theft, drunkenness and rude/culturally offensive 
behavior250 after the arrival of military forces. Several interviewees acknowledged that there 
had been offenses and crimes committed by military personnel in the early years, but none of 
those interviewed stated they had more recent knowledge of KFOR’s involvement in illegal 
activity including prostitution (Interviews 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 44, 73, 84). Human Rights Watch 
had closely chronicled human rights violations in Kosovo since 1998, and cites Kosovo had 
become a thruway and destination for prostitution in the late 1990s, (Human Rights Watch, 
2001; Amnesty International, 2004; also Interviews 29, 30, 84), but it did not ‘take hold’ as it 
had in Bosnia (Mendelson, 2005; Interviews 29, 30, 84).  
Prostitution had secretly existed in Kosovo within clandestine “Public Houses,” however, very 
few KFOR personnel would have had knowledge of them (Interview 84), and fewer would have 
had the means to visit due to the base restrictions on travel. Far more common was rudeness 
                                                             
246 Named after the roadway in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina on which it is located, NATO “Route Arizona” near the 
city of Brčko. Arizona Market was encouraged and protected by US Stabilization Forces (SFOR) to promote positive 
inter-ethnic relations by creating a protected area for private commerce, generally farm products and household 
items. Its good intentions were quashed by its usurpation by organized crime, especially human trafficking for 
prostitution. Arizona Market was eventually ‘cleaned up’ and regulated, but the crime network has remained 
(Haynes, 2010).   
247 This is not to state that it was not present, as Mendelson, Martin and Human Rights Watch provide substantial 
evidence of its occurrence. Rather, the field research did not find the same clear and direct connections often stated 
in literature.  
248 Several individuals were interviewed for their background knowledge of NATO operations outside of Kosovo.  
249 The interview sample included local police, Kosovo government officials at the municipality level; senior 
international organization officials, German and US military - including military intelligence, and civilian personnel 
that had been posted on a base in Kosovo during in the research period; youth and women’s rights and domestic 
protections groups and international civil society, a Municipal ombudsman for minority communities, and the senior 
KFOR cultural advisor. 
250 Inappropriate behavior includes, but not limited to overly-loud talking, disrespectful attitudes and mannerisms; 
sexually suggestive gestures to local girls and women; harassing animals; unnecessarily blocking roads and aggressive 
driving through villages.  
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and gratuitous roughness with men, and inappropriate touching of women by military 
personnel during security searches, particularly in the months immediately after the war’s end. 
The rape and murder of a 12-year old Kosovo Albanian girl by a member of the US KFOR in 2000 
led to that Soldier receiving a jail sentence for life, in addition to multiple career ending 
reprimands for several others, and an aggressive pre-deployment rules of behavior training 
program for all NATO forces to be rotated into Kosovo, all of which were made public.  
Therefore, while some negative responses may have been the effect of nervousness, strong 
social taboo or discomfort concerning prostitution, the absence is more likely to have been the 
result of the highly restrictive procedures for leaving the military base251. Such restrictions are 
listed among the UN best practices (Carnahan, et al., 2006). Hence, KFOR appeared to have 
mitigated much of the usual destructive activity and behavior historically found in military base 
communities, as the majority of reported incidents in literature are 2005 and earlier. Table 9.1 
provides a snapshot of expected findings. 
 
 Hiring Purchasing Community Relations 
Hypothesis  Direct hires in large 
numbers at high 
salaries  
Inflated prices emerge 
due to high demand for 
scarce housing, food, 
fuel; all become too 
high for local incomes  
Local leaders/elites 
attempt to influence 
military forces for own 
benefit; may infer 
return to violence  
    
Camp 
Bondsteel: 
US KFOR 
Contractor hires in 
very high numbers; 
very high salaries ~ 
$1,000-
5,000/month. 
Low demand for local 
resources. High volume 
purchase of material 
through US government 
civilians. 
Infrequent, mostly 
formal relations with 
local leaders. Frequent 
informal relations with 
patrols, LMTs  
    
Camp Prizren: 
German KFOR 
Direct hires in small 
numbers; high 
salaries ~ 600-
800€/month. 
Low demand for local 
resources. Purchased 
single items or small 
amounts. Contracted 
for military services. 
Infrequent, mostly 
formal relations with 
local leaders. Frequent 
informal relations with 
patrols, LMTs 
Table 9.1. Comparison of hypothesis expectations and field observations.  
                                                             
251 Military forces and civilians were typically confined to the base unless leaving was a necessary part of the job, e.g. 
patrolling, and then in multi-vehicle convoys and in military uniform. Military forces posted on the two bases of this 
research were either restricted to consuming alcohol on base during prescribed hours (Germany) or restricted from 
alcohol consumption completely (United States). 
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9.4   Section 2: Economic Effects  
A period of rapid economic growth after the end of conflict is well documented, (Cerra & 
Saxena, 2007; David, et al., 2011; Dobbins, et al., 2007; Ohiorhenuan & Stewart, 2008). While 
the early practices of establishing the military bases did not result in the anticipated balloon 
economy and extreme inflation, the majority of the effects on the community were undeniably 
economic. 252 Indeed, Lynch (1970), in reference to measuring the employment effect of small 
regional economies in base closure communities, states:   
“… the increase in [base activity] leads to an increase in local employment; that such an 
increase in employment directly leads to an increase in community income, which as 
spent, induces a derived and calculable increase in localized income.” 253  (Lynch, 
1970:263) 
 
More simply, the overall positive or negative economic effect on a community is an outcome of 
the number of local employees employed and their spending, in proportion to the size of the 
community (Cowan, 2012; Dardia, et al., 1996;  Lynch, 1970; Sharp, 1990).  
This section, economics, examines interrelated economic activity-relationships: the primary, 
direct economic relationships, such as individual salaries and purchases; the most typical 
secondary and supporting economic relationships formed by within-community purchasing; 
and, the projected tertiary economic effects on the communities as a whole. These activity-
relationships describe a simple economic model where a business activities’ distance from the 
primary base-individual relationship is increasingly more complex and incurs more risk to those 
that precede it, thus revealing a communities’ tendency toward economic maturity and 
stability. 
                                                             
252 Per both empirical and published data from the Kosovo Small and Medium Enterprise Promotion Program, 
KOSME, the Kosovo Ministry of Trade and Industry; individual Municipalities and the United States Agency for 
International Development, USAID 
253 Lynch, (1970:263), referring to the multiplier effect of changes in local/base economy and subsequent changes in 
the community.  
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9.4.1 Direct Economic Relationships  
The post-conflict literature rightly highlights the antagonism felt by community members who 
had not benefitted from high-salaried work with international organizations (Ammitzbøell & 
Dons Tychen, 2007; Gauster & Maruszczak, 2006; Sciarra, 2006), or profited by their 
considerable purchasing power.254 This resentment, however, appeared to be mostly absent in 
the communities surrounding KFOR bases. The US bases Camp Monteith and Camp Bondsteel 
together hired unprecedented thousands of individuals to work on the bases at very high 
salaries for several years255, drawing mostly from the Gjilan and Ferizaj Municipalities. Yet, with 
the exception of concrete blocks purchased for building SEA-hut foundations in the first year, 
and the very substantial gravel and crushed stone purchases for nearly 10 years,256 these bases 
actually bought very little from the community overall.  
The German base, Camp Prizren had hired a only a small number of individuals from the much 
larger Prizren Municipality to work on the base, and at a comparatively modest salary257. Camp 
Prizren personnel made numerous small and regular purchases for a variety of consumable 
items, and had locally contracted for base printing, vehicle maintenance and laundry services in 
their entirety. Economic opportunity therefore, was not specifically confined to a small number 
of industries or elites, (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007) but was distributed within multiple 
sectors of the community. Hence, the anticipated concentration of economic resources by a 
small number of persons or businesses do not appear to have emerged in these two 
muncipalities. 
                                                             
254 Carnahan observed where local businesses catered to UN fieldworker preferences, approximately 20 percent of a 
fieldworkers’ money spent would remain in the community (Carnahan, et al., 2006:3). 
255 As high as 5,000 USD per month in 1999 for nearly 12 months. Salaries stabilized at 1,200-1,500 USD per month, 
for several years, at a time when most salaries in the community were 50-300 USD per month. Base salaries in 2014 
were 600-800 USD per month.  
256 While thousands of tonnes of quarry material representing millions of dollars is not insignificant, it is a single 
economic sector with a fairly low linkage to other economic sectors, thus contributes little the local economy overall. 
257 Salaries at Camp Prizren ranged from an initial high of approximately 1,200 USD to the present (2014) 400-600 
USD per month.  
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9.4.2   Individual Soldier Spending  
While almost 20,000 US KFOR and partner nation Soldiers, and hundreds more US contractors 
were deployed to Gjilan and Ferizaj, and some 17,000 German and partner nation KFOR 
soldiers258 were deployed to Prizren, individual soldiers and contractors spent little money in 
the local community, the result of KFOR-wide and Camp Bondsteel and Camp Prizren travel 
restrictions.259 Particularly as arson and armed fighting continued well into 2000, with the 
exception of patrols and select military activities, very few KFOR soldiers were permitted to 
travel outside of the base, which significantly reduced soldier purchasing opportunities. These 
spending opportunities were further limited to the daylight operating hours as directed by the 
Kosovo-wide curfew imposed by KFOR to reduce crime and vandalism.  
Soldiers on patrol or travelling between duty locations were generally permitted to buy 
personal consumables, such as cigarettes, bagged snacks and bottled non-alcoholic beverages; 
clothing,260 jewelry or souvenir items such as ashtrays and small electronics (Interviews 8, 35, 
62, 73). However, KFOR soldiers were restricted to eating pre-packaged meals or at the base 
dining facilities and canteens (Interview 62, 73) for nearly a decade, and remained limited 
thereafter. Such everyday practices such as meeting at local cafés, eating meals at local 
restaurants or drinking at bars, were not allowed to prevent soldiers from acquiring food borne 
illnesses. Thus, the price spikes typically associated with a rapid influx of wealthy outsiders 
consuming local housing, food, fuel or other goods and services, and thereby inflating prices or 
causing shortages (Ammitzboll & Tychsen, 2007) did not appear to materialize in Gjilan, Ferizaj 
and Prizren because of the KFOR personnel. Rather, community members in these 
                                                             
258 Soldiers from Austria, Netherlands and Turkey and were also posted in Prizren, and operated under the same 
restriction.  
259 Restrictions to leave the base was relaxed following the establishment of the Liaison Monitoring Teams in late 
2004. 
260 This was minimal mostly gift items, such as for children; civilian clothing was not permitted to be worn by military 
personnel on KFOR bases.  
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municipalities consistently believed that the rise in local prices was caused by the transition 
from the Deutschmark to the Euro in 2002, not as the result of KFOR or “internationals” 
(Interviews 35, 62, 73, 78; also, Tyrbedari, 2006:9261).  
9.4.3 Secondary Economic Relationships     
The salary of a single base employee typically supported seven to nine adult family members 
and several children, all of whom would have lived in a family home of four to six rooms 
(Interviews 73, 85). Given many homes had been damaged by war or vandalized, the majority of 
base employees invested a large part of their salaries on home repair, home expansion or on 
new construction (ibid), often purchasing from the numerous new retail businesses selling 
imported building supplies, paints, lighting and sanitary fixtures that had opened to meet 
demand. This construction also appeared to have energized, or coincided with, the restart of 
several of the pre-war textile, wood furniture and cabinetry businesses [in Ferizaj] (Cardno, 
2015; Daniel, 2003), and manufacturing of new construction products’ such as roof tiles and 
preformed concrete supplies; metal specialties used in tile and brick work, and glass products 
such as windows and doors [in Prizren] (ibid). Likewise, the increase in discretionary income 
would likely have also increased the establishment and use of convenience services, such as 
restaurants and taxis, automobiles and non-essential retail consumables.   
Thus, the effect of purchasing by local base employees would be expected to have facilitated 
starts for complementary business servicing enterprises, such as importers and suppliers, that 
have specifically formed to support business or industry. These carry a somewhat higher degree 
of risk; business to business enterprises are dependant upon a comparatively small range of 
potential clients for larger, but more infrequent purchases (Harvard Business Review, 1978). As 
the military bases made few purchases from local businesses, the business to business growth 
                                                             
261 The bank conversion rate for Deutschemark (DM) to Euro (€) conversion in 2002 was 1.9551 DM to 1€, which 
appeared to double the cost of goods and services for the purchaser. Although not supported, this “doubled cost” 
was widely believed throughout Kosovo. 
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in the base community would chiefly reflect local demand. Thus, an increase in number and 
variety of business services and business to business enterprises would indicate a more 
sustainable local economy.  
9.4.4 Tertiary benefits to the community   
In addition to increased non-base related employment, the wider community also benefits 
through revived industry, and payment of personal income, property and point of sale taxes, 
which fund improvements to municipal infrastructure and services. Business registration and 
tax enforcement also reduce the informal economy and limit opportunities for criminal activity 
and corruption (Ferizaj Municipal Tax Authority, 2016). Figure 9.1 provides a graphic the 
expected direct and indirect economic impact of a military base.  
Figure 9.1 Anticipated Model of Base Economy  
 
9.5 Evaluation Considerations and Significant findings 
Given the observations made by Lynch (1970) concerning base employment and purchasing, the 
following assumptions were made:  
Primary Beneficiaries: 
Base employees and 
vendors: increased 
local, individual 
spending
Secondary Benefits: New businesses 
open to meet demand for retail 
goods and services; distributers; 
new business services and revived 
light industry
Tertiary Benefits: New 
employees hired to meet 
demand for retail good and 
services
New manufacturing; B2B and 
personal services; improved 
municipal services; reduced 
informal economy 
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• The Municipality of Ferizaj, a 2000 estimated population of 140,000, containing US base 
Camp Bondsteel, which had employed thousands of local residents at high salaries, and had 
made a high volume, but low absolute number of purchases, will show a high number of 
business starts across sectors 
 
• The Municipality of Prizren, a 2001 estimated population of 221,000, containing the 
German base Camp Prizren, which had hired few local workers and contracted for many 
small quantities of goods and services, will show a low level of business starts across sectors 
 
• The Municipality of Gjakova, a 1999 estimated population of 132,000, without a military 
base was expected to have a very low level of business starts across sectors  
 
The availability of historic municipality-level data for pre-Kosovo War is limited, primarily due to 
Kosovo’s incorporation into Serbia’s overall data as a province262. Nevertheless, the Kosovo 
Business Registration Agency, and the Kosovo Small and Medium Business Enterprises (KOSME) 
Programme provides comprehensive longitudinal data263 of private businesses operating in 
Kosovo between 2000 and 2013. 264  
Figure 9.2 displays the total number of business starts for the three municipalities.  
                                                             
262 Kosovo specific economic data was complied, but often destroyed or relocated to Serbia (Interviews 24, 25, 58, 
60, 67) 
263 KOSME’s compilation of OSCE reports collected from 2000 forward, and KOSME’s own surveys from 2010-2013. 
264 The 2003-2004 spike in business starts reflects a successful Kosovo-wide business registration program.  
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Figure 9.2 Business starts 2000 - 2012   
The graph of business starts by municipality finds the high number of starts in 2000, which fall 
to a much lower point only a few years later in 2002, is congruent with Cerra & Saxana’s (2007) 
research regarding post-conflict economic recovery and rapid local growth (Cerra & Saxena, 
2007; also, David, et al., 2011:6). It also supports Serneels & Verpoorten (2012) conclusions that 
after the rapid expansion, the number of businesses contract, and that ultimately, economies 
will approach, but rarely to return to, their pre or post conflict highs. In addition, the number of 
businesses tend to stabilize, and barring further conflict or other external factors265, the 
economy tends to henceforth function below its pre-war levels (ibid). Acknowledging the spike 
seen in 2003 which reflects a successful Kosovo-wide business registration campaign, the profile 
of business starts for the three municipalities appear to follow the same trendline. Noting that 
Prizren shows the highest number of business starts, both proportionally and in real numbers, 
                                                             
265 Such as the global economic slowdown of 2007 - 2008.  
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rather than Ferizaj as expected, it suggests that Prizren’s already robust business environment 
is likely to have played a greater part in new business establishment, which appears more 
consistent with base closure literature concerning base proximity to an urban center (Cowan, 
2012; Dardia, et al., 1996) than the proportion of base employees and their expenditure in the 
community (Lynch, 1970).  
9.6 Municipal Profiles  
When the primary post-conflict business sectors are disaggregated into the five primary post-
conflict economic recovery sectors, and graphed as a percentage of the municipal economy, the 
profiles are again similar across the three municipalities. Surprisingly, overall construction 
business starts are low, mostly under 25 starts per year. As individual post-conflict repairs are 
generally cash-based, the low level of construction business starts in Prizren and Gjakova may 
indicate limited income, or a general tradition of self/family-repair. However, the low level of 
construction business starts in Ferizaj, despite a very high number of base workers with high 
incomes, may stem from an economic preference to work on base for a high salary for as long 
as possible, rather than take on risk and open a business, hence construction businesses may 
have been suppressed by the base. Thus, the overall number of construction business starts is 
unexpectedly low especially considering the widespread destruction in Gjakova; vandalism in 
Prizren, and new affluence in Ferizaj. 
The disproportionally high level of retail starts in Prizren is likely to reflect its long tradition in 
regional trade; Gjakova presents a similar trend at a far lower level. Given Ferizaj does not have 
this tradition of trade, its elevated level of retail business starts, which is coupled with high 
transportation and hotel/restaurants starts, appears to support that these activities are mostly 
related to income generated by the base. This specific combination is common and well 
described in peacekeeping literature (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Carnahan, et al., 
2006). However, the predominance of trade overall may also reveal systemic economic 
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weakness, as trade can also become “subsistence employment” in the absence of other 
opportunities (Denfeld, 2013:28). See Figures 9.3 – 9.5 below. 
 
Figure 9.3 Municipality of Ferizaj business starts, 2000 - 2012 (Camp Bondsteel) 
 
Figure 9.4 Municipality of Prizren business starts,266 2000 - 2012 (Camp Prizren) 
                                                             
266 Note the Y-axis for the Municipality of Prizren is 800 units, rather than 400 units for Municipalities of Ferizaj and 
300 for Gjakova.  
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Figure 9.5 Municipality of Gjakova business starts, 2000 - 2012 (no base) 
To further examine the municipalities overall economic sectors’ growth, and whether the base 
and its activities had a meaningful effect on the local economy as a whole, the Municipalities of 
Ferizaj, Prizren and Gjakova, and for Kosovo overall are disaggregated and compared by ten key 
NACE economic sector areas267: construction, wholesale/retail trade; hotels/restaurants; 
transportation; manufacturing268; personal services; human health; business services; 
energy/water supply and education. These profiles below again indicate trade alone is nearly 
half of all new enterprise. 
 See Figure 9.6.   
                                                             
267 Based on 2008 NACE Code, “Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community”   
268 Although manufacturing appears strong, this mostly represents construction materials for domestic sale/use, as 
described earlier.  
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Figure 9.6                                                    Ten Primary Economic Sectors 
9.7 Analysis and Summary 
These disaggregated graphs demonstrate trade, which is likely to be primarily consumption due 
to the absence of any significant balancing sectors such as manufacturing (especially for 
export), or business and personal services, ultimately reveals economic weakness across Kosovo 
including the municipalities of Ferizaj and Prizren. This conclusion is twofold. Trade, especially 
retail trade, requires few skills and has a low barrier to entry. Trade operates on a simple 
principle of selling merchandise at a price higher than that it was purchased in order to result in 
profit and therefore income. However, in the absence of adding further value through 
processing, that margin is small, hence profit often remains low (Denfeld, 2013). Particularly in 
the post-conflict environment, this merchandise is likely to be seasonal food, packaged 
consumables and small household goods, which not only tend to have low profit margins269, but 
the ease of business duplication can saturate the market with the same products and result in 
                                                             
269 Smuggling, particularly of tobacco and alcohol is an exception; profit margins greatly improve by avoiding tariffs. 
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losses. Even when the merchandise ‘advances’ to more durable goods, the simple retail 
structure remains. Transportation and most restaurants offer similar low startup costs. In 
contrast, construction requires additional specialized skills and tools, while manufacturing 
requires not only skills, but also suitable equipment, resources and infrastructure.  
Although business registration aids tax accountability, most small businesses continue to 
operate informally and without sufficient management experience or investment to expand 
(Gilbert & Singh, 2005). Hence, such small enterprises generally fail to grow or add new jobs 
beyond one’s family (Denfeld, 2013), and have little protection from external market 
fluctuation (Ndlovu, 2014). Secondly, as trade represents approximately 50 percent of all 
businesses, and over 80 percent of businesses operate as sole proprietorships (KOSME, 2014), 
the ability to earn sufficient profit to invest, grow and hire employees, such as those noted in 
the expected secondary effects in Figure 9.1, becomes much more difficult.  
It must be restated here that military organizations have little proficiency, and even less dictate 
to intentionally participate in developing the economy of their local communities. Nevertheless, 
the establishment and day-to-day practices of operating the base have an effect on them. The 
Municipality profiles of Ferizaj, Prizren and Gjakova present small, but telling variations.  
• The Ferizaj Municipality which contains Camp Bondsteel was expected to show a 
markedly high number of business starts for all of the five primary post-conflict 
reconstruction sectors: construction services, construction trades, retail trade, 
transportation and hotels/ restaurants. It does not. Rather, Camp Bondsteel which 
provided substantial training and experience for local residents in construction trades 
for several years, and the payment of very high salaries paid to thousands of employees 
for over a decade, appears to have had mainly increased Ferizaj’s prosperity and 
consumption. The high levels of trade, and fairly consistent level of transportation and 
hotels/restaurants suggest Camp Bondsteel had not significantly catalyzed growth in 
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more ‘mature’ service business sectors as would have been anticipated after 12 years in 
the community. The same general pattern is seen in the 10-economic sector graph 
where manufacturing, and services are also minimal. Thus, Camp Bondsteel’s economic 
benefits to the Ferizaj Municipality is low and relatively superficial, and does not 
support the expected strong economy, regardless of the high local income.  
• Prizren also displays a disproportionate level of trade business starts in the five post-
conflict reconstruction sectors and in the 10-economic sector graph, though it is more 
likely to be related to Prizren’s its long history of trade than an extraordinary post-
conflict surge. This is concluded because trade is paired with hotels/restaurants, the 
proportion of which is nearly 50 percent higher than Ferizaj, and close to 100 percent 
higher than Gjakova per year since 2000. Moreover, there is a virtually identical number 
of new construction services and construction trade business starts as in Ferizaj and 
Gjakova. Hence, Prizren is most likely returning to its primary pre-war economy, trade 
and tourism, which the local military base would have had little influence, and 
therefore supports Camp Prizren’s overall low economic effect on the Prizren 
Municipality.  
• Gjakova, without a military base, shows the expected lower number of business starts 
in all five post-conflict sectors, giving an initial impression that the absence of the base 
has had a negative effect on its economy. However, further examination of the 10-
economic sector graph shows Gjakova has developed larger secondary and tertiary 
services sectors than are seen in either Ferizaj or Prizren. As businesses in these sectors 
tend to require additional professional training and education, they may be due to 
returning expatriates, replacing the ‘brain drain’ of the prior decades. However, 
Gjakova may have specifically encouraged such business development to replace lost 
manufacturing as well as to increase Gjakova’s appeal to investors, specifically because 
of the absence of proximate economic opportunities such as a military base. This turn 
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to business and personal services is a frequently emphasized as the best practice to 
recover from local base closure. Thus, while the low number of post-conflict business 
starts predicted in the Gjakova Municipality is supported by the data, Gjakova in fact 
demonstrates a more mature and stable economy, hence the KFOR military bases 
appear to have had at best a very minor effect overall on the political, social and 
economic factors of this community.  
The chapter therefore concludes that the crime, including black marketing, labor 
exploitation and prostitution which are directly attributable to humanitarian and military 
forces, can be greatly mitigated by careful procedures and increased personnel 
accountability. Likewise, localized inflation and a balloon economy can be reduced by 
adhering to appropriate lessons-learned and best practices, such as those published by the 
United Nations. Significantly, the high salaries paid by military organizations tend to 
increase local prosperity rather than catalyze and sustain local business development, and 
therefore base communities require the same developmental investment as those 
communities without bases. This research strongly suggests that well-coordinated relations 
between military and civilian peacekeepers and the community may indirectly support 
peace building initiatives. Nevertheless, noting the main influence of military bases on the 
community is the relationship between military and community leaders, and observing the 
limited, formal relations noted in the base communities, Chapter 10 analyzes the role of 
military LMTs, particularly whether they have served as a proxy for military leaders to 
influence community relations, and if so, in what ways and with what effects. 
  
248 
 
Chapter 10: The Liaison Monitoring Teams  
 
10.0 Introduction 
 
This Chapter introduces the military Liaison Monitoring Teams, (LMTs), small groups of military 
personnel that have worked throughout Kosovo at the community level since early 2005. The 
LMT structure, and ways of community engagement are unique to Kosovo. The Chapter argues 
that while UNMIK and other international organizations have formal political and economic 
influence over local politics, KFOR, through the LMTs have had a substantial but chiefly 
unintended, informal influence.  
The LMTs were established in response to an eruption of riots that had started near the 
majority Kosovo-Serb municipality of Mitrovića and rapidly spread across Kosovo in March 
2004. The riots were a surprise to the international community, including KFOR. KFOR realized 
that, five years into its mission, it lacked both an understanding of local community dynamics 
and an appropriate means to quickly and flexibly respond. Since early 2005 LMTs have served as 
KFOR’s “eyes and ears” and a means to detect and address potential areas of conflict as they 
emerge, especially ethnically-based tensions, rather than when they have escalated into a 
potentially violent crisis. Moreover, LMTs have facilitated information sharing between the 
military base, the local government and the populace, as well as various international and non-
governmental organizations located within its Brigade area of responsibility.  
For KFOR, the activities of the LMTs have been a significant contributor to everyday security in 
Kosovo for both KFOR and the populace. Yet paradoxically, LMTS may also have facilitated a 
dependency upon KFOR which could ultimately degrade Kosovo’s longer-term stability as they 
have become a mechanism through which relationships between communities and local 
authorities are mediated. The chapter concludes with a reflection of the relationships and 
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activities performed by the military through the LMTs and their consequent influence on the 
local community.  
10.1 LMT’s Relation to the Wider Argument   
While LMTs have been a ubiquitous part of KFOR’s “Safe and Secure Environment” (SASE) 
strategy since early 2005 and continue to be a core part of KFOR’s everyday activities, 
comprehensive study of the role and activities of NATO Liaison Monitoring Teams (LMTs) is 
nearly absent in academia (Janssens, 2015; Svensson, 2008). This void is surprising, considering 
their widespread use in Kosovo for over a decade, and the similar Liaison and Observation 
Teams, LOTs270, active in Bosnia-Herzegovina several years prior to the establishment of the 
LMTs in Kosovo (Gstrein, 2007; Janssens, 2015). Instead, first-person anecdotes, typically 
written by military personnel in personal web logs (blogs); in military public affairs stories in 
soldier journals, and in press releases for hometown newspapers271 are the most commonly 
found materials relative to them. Their content is largely positive and self-congratulatory, often 
relating their contributions to the improvement in the living conditions of Kosovars in their 
assigned area (Reyes, 2005; Wade, 2009272). Limited non-anecdotal discussion of LMTs were 
also found in NATO, and gray literature, often as good news stories or “lessons learned,” that 
were embedded among other improvements in local situational awareness, and for smoothing 
community relations in support of the KFOR mission (Cook, 2008; Janssens, 2015). The most 
substantial academic examination was limited to a handful of Master’s Degree theses 
concerning civil-military liaison officers generally (Chalmers, 2001), and KFOR LMTs specifically 
                                                             
270 Although outwardly similar to LMTs, Liaison and Observation Teams (LOTs) in Bosnia-Herzegovina closely 
supported intelligence collection and were focused on threats to the military mission. Likewise, the engagement 
operations of the community-based Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Houses found in Banja Luka (UK Sector) and 
Mostar (French Sector). LMTs expressly do not collect intelligence.  
271 A 2005 article in the New York Amsterdam News highlights the New York National Guard LMTs meeting with 
Kosovo Serb shepherds in support of a USAID program to increase Kosovo’s wool production and market in the 
Balkans. 
272 See “One Team … Once Goal” by 69th Public Affairs Detachment for a description of KFOR LMTs in the MNB-E area 
of responsibility: https://www.dvidshub.net/news/printable/37629.   
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(Svensson, 2008); a critical review of post-conflict policing (Janssens, 2015) and an assessment 
of German armed forces’ civil-military operations (Voget, 2008). Hence, an examination of 
LMTs, which have operated throughout Kosovo since 2005 may be a key factor to explain and 
understand the absence of relations between KFOR’s military leaders and community elites as 
described in post-conflict literature, and address whether LMTs act as proxies for military 
leaders.  
10.2 Environmental Factors   
The field interviews and informal conversations conducted during the in-Kosovo research 
periods, 2014 and 2016, consistently found leaders at the municipal level, including the mayor 
of Ferizaj; the mayors’ offices in Ferizaj, Gjilan, Gjakova and Prizren as well a representative of 
the informal (parallel) government of the majority Kosovo-Serb village of Strpče273 to have had 
very little contact with KFOR commanders or senior staff (Interviews 19, 25, 58, 60, 73, 86, 89). 
Instead, most of these leaders noted occasional visits by KFOR patrols; frequent office visits by 
civil affairs or CIMIC soldiers, and especially the daily presence of LMTs in their communities. 
The Mayor of Ferizaj also described attendance at the monthly mayor’s luncheon on Camp 
Bondsteel and invitations to various special KFOR events (Interview 19). However, these 
focused and formal visits were chiefly the extent of their relations with KFORs senior leaders.  
An investigation into probable circumstantial factors to explain the absence of the military 
leader’s relations in the community that are otherwise described in academic literature 
produced two interrelated primary reasons: first, the nature of the Kosovo War, and second, 
the terms of KFOR’s responsibilities. These are reinforced by the Kosovo Albanian popular 
support for the KLA, and KFOR’s overall risk aversion, which left little political reason or space 
                                                             
273 While KFOR did not formally recognize the unelected Kosovo Serb parallel governments, it had actively attempted 
to maintain a positive relationship informally through interaction and visits by civil affairs or CIMIC personnel, (and 
later by LMTs) and enhanced security by specially posted KFOR forces near minority enclaves and religious/cultural 
sites. 
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for the residents of Kosovo and KFOR to interact. These interrelated factors are addressed 
below: 
A significant factor why Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb leaders did not actively attempt to 
influence KFOR may be understood by a brief re-examination of Kosovo’s history.  
10.2.1 Nature of the Kosovo War   
The first factor is the nature of the Kosovo War. Since the inception of Yugoslavia, Kosovo 
Albanians have generally had a low level of autonomy. However, between 1974 and 1988, 
Kosovo had enjoyed an unprecedented level of federal economic investment, and Kosovo 
Albanians gained substantial social and political freedoms. These freedoms were revoked in the 
decade prior to the outbreak of war in 1999, and Kosovo Albanians began to live under growing 
social, political and economic oppression in an apartheid-like system.  
The loss of rights and freedoms, coupled with Milošević’s provocative nationalist and violent 
anti-Kosovo Albanian agenda, built a deep distrust between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo 
Serbs. Prior to these conditions, many Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs had not only lived 
near each other but had often played together as children and worked with each other as 
adults. In this light, the ensuing violence which Parent names “neighbor on neighbor killing” 
(Parent, 2012:26), was an especially personal betrayal and therefore formed more deeply 
entrenched animosities (Eckstein, 1965). With increasingly eroding political and social 
conditions, and their blanket ousting from public employment in 1990, Kosovo Albanians 
established a parallel government to provide themselves with basic government services, 
including health care, education and economic support for the most vulnerable, building upon 
the traditional clan/family networks and the parallel government structure that had been 
developed under Tito during Kosovo’s industrialization in the late 1960s and 70s274. It is these 
                                                             
274 See Chapter 5, Section 5.4. 
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clan and family networks, and later, the parallel government, that the KLA relied upon for 
support to fight against the JA. Hence, at the conclusion of the war, KLA military leaders 
established themselves as rightful political leaders and representatives275 of a Kosovo Albanian-
led republic to UNMIK, OSCE and the wider political community.  
This contrasts with the conditions of the Kosovo Serbs, who had long enjoyed superior social 
and economic status, and had had significant political and economic support from Serbia 
despite their minority numbers. The conditions of UNSCR 1244 ending the Kosovo War in 1999 
not only deprived Kosovo Serbs of much of their political support from Serbia, which became a 
pariah for its decades of “ethnic cleansing” under Milošević, (Hosmer, 2001) it had also caused a 
humiliating status reversal that stripped away their higher social and economic standing, of 
which KFOR was clearly a significant part. Consequently, Kosovo Serbs formed their own parallel 
government that was increasingly insular and often refused to reconcile with Kosovo’s new 
Kosovo Albanian-led government. Thus, it is very unlikely either Kosovo Albanian or Kosovo 
Serb leaders would have attempted to ingratiate themselves with the military base or seek 
alliance with KFOR. This is only reinforced by KFOR’s own risk-aversion and its military security-
oriented tasking and mandate.  
10.2.2 KFOR Responsibilities under UNSCR and The Military Technical Agreement   
The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 in June 1999 and The Military 
Technical Agreement (MTA) directed KFOR to “Establish a secure environment and ensure 
public safety and order,” colloquially to create a “Safe and Secure Environment” (Force, 1999; 
                                                             
275 Torjesen (2013) describes ‘wartime cooperation for safety against an enemy threat may lead to new social 
organizations where some segments or individuals benefit at the expense of others.  
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United Nations, 1999)276. More simply, KFOR’s task was to provide physical security for other 
organizations277 to operate and remain outside of political activity. 
Under UNSCR 1244 UNMIK was responsible to “enable a provisional civil government, under 
the direction of the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG), to coordinate and 
oversee the political and economic restoration of Kosovo”278 (UNMIK, 2017). Foremost among 
UNMIK’s responsibilities was to perform basic civilian administrative functions and promote the 
establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government. Thus, while KFOR was likely to 
have been more visible in many communities than UNMIK or other organizations, KFOR’s lack of 
mandate279 to take the lead in these areas would have them redirect residents to other, more 
appropriate, organizations.  
10.2.3 Popularity of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
As described in earlier chapters, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) enjoyed enormous popular 
support – more aptly described as hero status. Yet the KLA was often at odds with KFOR and the 
international community concerning ethnically motivated destruction and revenge killing that 
continued for nearly a year after the end of the war (Coelho, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 1999; 
Janssens, 2015:100); for their occupation of important government offices  (Cheng, 2013:72; 
International Crisis Group, 2000:i; Morina, 2011; Narten, 2009:271), and the establishment of 
its own strident and self-serving “provisional government” (Human Rights Watch, 1999:50; 
Kifner, 1999; Taylor, 2002:72). Nevertheless, the KLA’s continued high popularity with Kosovo 
Albanians deemed wholesale removal of the KLA from the government offices to be too 
destabilizing (Narten, 2009:260), thus they were “co-opted and monitored” until the local and 
                                                             
276 See Chapter 5, Section 5 for complete discussion of KFORs tasking per the MTA.  
277 Chapter VII, Article 39 states, “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken 
in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security” 
278 Coelho notes that while the SRSG recommended that international organizations coordinate with each other, 
there was no requirement to do so. Hence, they often acted independently, and their activities were both 
contradictory and less effective (Coelho, 2008:177). 
279 Also, likely to be absent with KFOR were sufficient technical capability and supporting resources to assist.  
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Kosovo-wide elections were held in 2000, and many were voted out (International Crisis Group, 
2000:i; KIPRED, 2006). Under these circumstances, and particularly as seen in Prizren with 
KFOR’s failure to protect Kosovo Serbs, moderate Kosovo Albanians and Roma (Chapter 8), 
KFOR would not have appeared to be the resource and powerbroker worth courting often 
described in post-conflict literature.  
10.2.4 Demands for Stability and the Climate of Risk Aversion 
Zaum & Knaus (2013) assert when international organizations concentrate their efforts on 
stability and the prevention of renewed violence after conflict ends at the expense of 
substantial institutional and social change, these practices undermine the credibility and 
legitimacy of their organizations at home and in the field (Zaum & Knaus, 2013:234, also 
Narten, 2009). Moreover, the international communities’ refusal to confront antagonstic 
individuals and organizations not only cements their behavior into a new and 
counterproductive normal, it also tends to redirect future reconstruction funds into security 
and security-related activities to contain them instead (Zaum & Knaus, 2013:236). 
Duffield has often pointed to the “risk avoiding temperament” of military organizations, which 
he states are “by nature stability and security oriented” (Duffield, 2011; also, Call & Cousens, 
2007:12). Mockaitis (2004) is especially critical of KFOR’s climate of risk aversion and its over-
emphasis on force protection under which it attempts to establish its mandated “safe and 
secure environment” (Mockaitis, 2004:33). Although Etchemendy (2010) is more positive, he 
too, notes that KFOR’s interaction with the community was shallow, and has concentrated on 
its own popularity to the exclusion of proactive initiatives to address local issues and concerns 
(Etchemendy, 2010:28). Yet this risk avoiding mindset promotes “bunkerization”, a tendancy to 
become insular and avoid the civilian population. As a result, military forces were increasingly 
likely to continue to miss opportunities to have any meaningful positive influence on their local 
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community (Duffield, 2011), a condition that specifically led to the Kosovo-wide riots in 2004 
and establishment of the LMTs. 
Thus, while KFOR would have been welcome and seen by many to halt the fighting and reverse 
the apartheid conditions and ethnic cleansing, these interrelated factors strongly suggest that 
KFOR was unlikely to be viewed as a significant resource for material and financial benefit, or 
for political gain.  
10.3 The 2004 Kosovo Riots 
Ironically, the international community, including KFOR, had falsely believed ethnic tensions 
had substantially eased and relations had normalized, (Lemay-Hebert, 2009). By late 2003 KFOR 
had already reduced its forces from nearly 50,000 to 17,500; ended its community patrols and 
civil-military projects, and had initiated plans to withdraw additional military forces later in 
2004 (Cook, 2008; Marley, 2016; Parliamentary, 2004). The unexpected riots in March 2004 
were the result of a cascade of unnoticed events that led to increasingly violent actions, 
reactions and responses that were ultimately based on the still unsettled tensions between 
Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, and especially by continued postponement of Kosovo’s bid 
for independence (Weller, 2009).  
Precipitating these riots was an incident in early March 2004, when an 18-year old Kosovo Serb 
man was killed in a drive-by shooting280 in the Kosovo Serb majority town of Çaglavicë near 
Pristina. The following week, three Kosovo Albanian boys drowned in the Ibar River in the 
majority Kosovo Serb village of Zubin Potok, near the city of Mitrovica (OSCE & UMNIK, 2005) as 
snow melt made the river run dangerously high and fast. A surviving fourth boy could only give 
enough detail of the incident to create more conjecture. In the end, the story told was the boys 
were cruelly forced into the swollen river by Kosovo Serb men with dogs in revenge for the 
                                                             
280 The assailants against the 18-year-old Kosovo Serb were not found, nor their ethnicity confirmed. 
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drive-by shooting. This story rapidly spread throughout Kosovo; in less than 24-hours, the first 
anti-Serb riot by ethnic Albanians occurred near the city of Mitrovica.  
Riots and increasing violence soon spread to other Kosovo Serb areas and enclaves and lasted 
almost three days. When the violence subsided, there had been 34 separate riots with over 
50,000 participants, leaving 19 dead, 954 injured, and 4,100 displaced. The violence destroyed 
hundreds of homes, and numerous monasteries and other culturally significant sites (Kovacevic, 
2008; OSCE & UNMIK, 2005; Svensson, 2008).  
10.4 Establishment of Liaison Monitoring Teams 
This ‘surprise’ was deemed to be the result of three interconnected issue that substantially 
overlooked  growing civil frustrations: first, a climate of risk aversion on the part of the military 
leaders (Mockaitis, 2004); second, an over-focus on military security to prevent a return to 
armed fighting (Brocades Zahlberg, 2006); and, third, a general failure to recognize the growing 
hostilities and unresolved social tensions between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs since the 
official end of the war in June 1999 (Daltweit, 200; Etchemendy, 2010). Most disturbing for the 
international community was that UNMIK’s civil police force, CIVPOL, had initiated and had had 
significant success with comprehensive community policing by the Kosovo Police Services since 
2003 as a means to build community confidence, but the program was dissolved within the year 
due to lack of funding (Janssens, 2015).  
Thus, to “fill the information gap” (Marley, 2016:226) and prevent such a surprise from 
reoccurring in the future, small teams of four to seven trained military personnel were formed 
to regularly circulate throughout each of the Multinational sectors “to take the pulse of the 
people of Kosovo” (Etchemendy, 2010:6; Janssens, 2015:232; Marley, 2016:226). These teams 
differed from the  military patroling already underway which was performed by well armed 
combat soldiers and military police personnel in full protective gear whose interactions with the 
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community were focused on security: weapons trafficking interdiction, removal/deterrence of 
illegal roadblocks, and border violation prevention. As a result, the less obvious social nuances 
and inter-community issues were mostly unseen. Therefore, to reduce this aggressive military 
motif, the LMTs would not carry weapons, nor wear helmets or protective vests as did the 
patrols; they were instead to become the less intimidating ‘the eyes and ears’ of the 
Multinational Brigade commander, serving as a bridge between the military forces and the local 
community to identify and solve potentially volatile issues early, and thereby prevent a repeat 
of the March 2004 violence (Svensson, 2008; Wade, 2009).  
As NATO stated:  
... At the local level, KFOR Liaison Monitoring Team’s goal is to liaise closely with local 
administrations, community leaders and relevant individuals and organizations through 
regular meetings and also increase the local confidence. … LMTs are a tool dedicated to 
operate in addition to Intel assets as a force multiplier281. (Voget, 2008: 165) 
Thus, the LMT’s purpose and activities signifcantly differed, yet complemented, those of both 
CIVPOL’s civilian law enforcement and KFOR’s military patrols security activities deployed 
throughout Kosovo. 
10.4.1 Historical Precedent for LMTs 
While the LOT’s that operated in Bosnia-Herzegovina had provided a useful template (Gstrein, 
2007), the community-based concept underlying LMTs was derived from community law 
enforcement practices, particularly The Koper Concept, (Koper, 1995; Lum & Koper, 2011) 
where the presence of  non-threatening authority was regularly found to re/build trust and 
cooperation between local government and the community (Koper, 1995). Police officers would 
                                                             
281The Liaison and Observation Teams, LOTs, already in use in Bosnia-Herzegovina, had a pronounced intelligence 
role, unlike the LMTs.  
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regularly ‘walk their beat’ to know and be known by the local populace, as well as to become 
attuned to their conditions and circumstances (Janssens, 2015; Koper, 1995). Koper had found 
random, informal meetings of up to 15 minutes between the police and residents at key ‘hot 
spots’ consistently reduced criminal activity and calls for police assistance in that area (ibid). 
Importantly, this technique not only deterred crime in those ‘hot spots,’ it did not cause an 
increase in crime elsewhere282, which substantially improved the community’s confidence in 
police and local government (Koper, 1995).  
Counterinsurgency doctrine increasingly adopted the same technique for its operations; use of 
this technique helped identify and address grievances283 upon which terrorist, criminal or civil 
unrest fed (Dixon, 2016; Lum & Koper, 2011; Petraeus, 2006). Known colloquially as ‘winning 
hearts and minds,’ this approach could turn a hostile, or at best suspicious, population into a 
more cooperative one. Cooperation in turn produced information concerning the actions and 
whereabouts of criminals and insurgents, which led to more focused and effective use of force 
or other action against them. Moreover, improved intelligence reduced unintended civilian 
causalities (Petraeus, 2006) which had reinforced anti-military stereotypes and tended to 
inflame public opinion against the military. The use of the Koper Concept in counterinsurgency 
is clearly “limited in direct application, as local improvements in the quality of life are easier to 
grant than political solutions” (ibid:3-12). Nevertheless, the employment of LMTs in this 
community focused role provided KFOR with improved insight and forewarning of potentially 
destabilizing grievances as well as provided the community with an outlet for their concerns.  
10.4.2 Composition of the LMTS 
Since early 2005, each of the Multinational Brigades contained a LMT Section comprised of 
multiple LMT-teams and a small administrative unit; a total of 40 LMT teams were established 
                                                             
282 The military colloquially refer to this phenomenon as “whack-a-mole.” 
283 Such as access to water, land use, health care, education, and opportunities for employment. 
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and worked throughout Kosovo within months of the program’s inception (Cook, 2008; NATO, 
2004). The size of the Task Forces’ LMT Section and teams varied slightly, from four to seven 
soldiers, based in part on the size and ethnic makeup of the community, but also upon the 
number of personnel available, and overall capabilities of the nation contributing to the 
staffing. National composition of LMTs also varied. The team members assigned from one of the 
lead nations such as the US and Germany, or a strong NATO nation such as Turkey, were 
typically four to seven members of the same nationality284, both male and female, and joined by 
one or more interpreters. When limited numbers of personnel were assigned by the smaller 
contributing nations, such as Poland and Ukraine, they were generally combined with other 
nations to produce a team large enough to cover their areas of responsibility. Task Force 
commanders selected the location of the LMT offices to best address the unique conditions of 
their Brigade area of responsibility. Hence, while most teams lived inside the military base and 
commuted to an office from which they made their daily rounds, typically provided by the 
Municipality, other teams lived and worked from a “LMT house” established within the 
community285. The role, location and activities of LMTs were widely advertised in local media by 
KFOR messaging286 in multiple languages, and their presence, function and office hours were 
well known throughout Kosovo.  
10.5 Selection and Training of LMTs 
Specific details of the selection and training of the Liaison Monitoring Team are nearly absent, 
and all LMT personnel were either unable and unwilling to be interviewed.287 This sub-section is 
                                                             
284 LMTS from Austria and Switzerland, both non-NATO nations, operated under the administration of Camp Prizren as single 
nationalities.  
285 Camp Prizren operated several LMT houses due to national caveat preferences, e.g. non-NATO members Austria 
and Switzerland, operated CIMIC/LMT houses. Camp Bondsteel operated a LMT house in an area of interest, the 
Kosovo Serb enclave Strpče. The LMT interpreters lived elsewhere and typically commuted daily from their homes. 
286 Messaging includes billboards, radio and television public information spots, as well as signs in municipal buildings 
and hand distributed flyers by the LMTs themselves. 
287 See Chapter 2 for discussion of declined interviews by KFOR. 
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therefore primarily based on archived press releases found on the NATO website; human 
interest stories in the KFOR magazine KFOR Chronicles, informal conversations with former 
LMTs, interpreters, and the author’s own experiences.  
LMTs have been operating in the Balkans for over a decade, yet the selection process and the 
training are not specifically described in NATO doctrine288. Instead, this activity is an extracted 
component of Civil Military Cooperation, CIMIC, which is defined as: “The coordination and 
cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, 
including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-
governmental organizations and agencies” (Paul, 2009:31). The primary means of establishing 
coordination and cooperation is through civil military liaison. Kosovo’s Liaison Monitoring 
Teams are … [to] “establish and maintain liaison with civil actors at appropriate levels, 
facilitating cooperation, harmonisation, information sharing, concerted or integrated planning 
and conduct of operations” (ibid). More simply, Kosovo’s LMTs have ‘interaction with civil 
actors’ as their sole function.  
10.5.1 Non-United States LMTs 
Since their establishment in late 2004 the majority of LMTs from Germany, France, Italy, the UK, 
and their partnering countries, have been trained per NATO CIMIC-based doctrine. NATO 
officers and enlisted personnel are both full time military and military reservists. They are 
mostly seasoned junior and mid-level officers and senior enlisted staff who demonstrate 
personal maturity, ‘good people skills’ and an ability to work in stressful situations289. Team 
members typically attend NATO accredited or based CIMIC courses, often the Liaison Officer 
                                                             
288 United States’ Civil Affairs doctrine, which more narrowly focused on tactical to operational level activity in 
support of US military operations, is used by all branches of US services, particularly the US Army and US Marine 
Corps.  
289 CIMIC personnel tend to be older than their peers; LMTs in their 30’s and late 40’s is not unusual. Personal and 
professional maturity is part of CIMIC training and evaluated in the exercises.  
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course conducted through the CIMIC Center of Excellence in The Hague, Netherlands290. This 
course incorporates CIMIC doctrine, lectures by visiting experts in the field, and small group 
work, leading to a comprehensive scenario-based exercise incorporating the lesson material.  
According to Janssens (2015), the initial LMT training course was just a week in length; it has 
since been expanded to two, with additional instruction on interviewing and personal relations 
skills. LMTs also receive a short orientation to their area of responsibility upon arrival to their 
assignment in Kosovo, followed by up to two weeks of accompanying and supervised 
replacement291 of the departing LMTs. A small number of NATO partners may also participate in 
alternate training with the US LMTs in Hohenfels, Germany. In general, these LMTs they believe 
their liaison work is important and adds to Kosovo’s stability. 
10.5.2 United States’ LMTs 
From the time the LMTs were established in late 2004 through late 2014, US doctrine did not 
include a dedicated liaison element comparable to the CIMIC Liaison Officer. LMT training 
materials were developed by military trainers and civilian contractors. Training reflected 
components of CIMIC, US civil affairs as well as military police skills but were not specifically 
based upon any of these doctrines. Pre-deployment training included a series of short lectures 
followed by ‘situational training exercises’ or STXs, to practice their skills in simulated benign 
and contentious environments. They were similarly evaluated for personal maturity, people 
skills and the ability to work in demanding situations. The initial classroom training took place 
first in the US, with skill reinforcing STX training events conducted in Germany where the LMTs 
participated in a final comprehensive scenario-based exercise that have occasionally included a 
small number of non-US LMTs292. Upon arrival to their assigned units, US LMTs would receive 
                                                             
290 This course is most frequently offered in Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia. 
291 Referred to left seat/right seat training, the incumbent trains his/her replacement on a one-to-one basis for two 
weeks, switching the lead role for the second week.  
292 Military forces’ rotations vary in duration, thus not all US rotations would include training with non-US LMTs, 
typically Partnership for Peace or NATO candidates, such as Romania and Ukraine.  
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the same short orientation to their area of responsibility followed by up to two weeks of 
combined on the ground familiarization, then the replacement, of the departing LMTs.  
By 2004, the US had redirected much of its active duty forces to Afghanistan and Iraq, thus only 
a very small number of the initial LMTs would have been regulars; by mid-2005 the US LMTs 
have consistently been military reservists293, with full-time non-military professions294. Unlike 
the CIMIC liaison officers, LMT personnel from the US are unlikely to have had prior exposure to 
civil liaison. Moreover, despite their recognized stabilizing presence and proven value as a 
source of timely information, US LMTs are not highly regarded by US commands. The majority 
of US LMTs tend to be junior officers and enlisted Soldiers whose skill sets are not specifically 
relevant to the Kosovo mission, such as cooks, drivers and mechanics; those who are otherwise 
“excess personnel” or who are brought in from other units to fill the mandated number of 
personnel prescribed for the Task Force LMT section. US LMTs tended to be unexceptional 
during the early weeks or even months of their Kosovo tour, though they improve quickly 
through continued experience and positive relations with the community. Ultimately, as US 
deployments tend to be up to a year, much longer than other nations, the eventual quality and 
capability of the LMTs are similar.  
Military organizations tend to be risk averse in general, however, the differences in the 
selection processes and training reveal divergent national outlooks concerning opportunity for 
conflict. The US places far greater emphasis on response to violence, hence there is a greater 
emphasis on preparing to respond to potential civil unrest, than the soft skills to prevent that 
unrest. In contrast, the CIMIC influenced conflict mitigation orientation of the non-US Task 
Forces tends to place a greater emphasis on negotiations and preventing civil unrest in the first 
                                                             
293 Specifically, The National Guard, representing one of the 50 US states and Puerto Rico. 
294 The civilian professions of these military reservists vary widely. However, the military reservists often have more 
in common with the local community and therefore tend to have better understanding of civilian issues and 
concerns.  
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place (Mockaitis, 2004). As a result, the US KFOR is likely to limit its understanding of the 
actions and conditions that contribute to violence and may unintentionally weaken the stability 
it seeks to maintain.  
10.6 LMT Responsibilities and Activities  
The LMTs have three core responsibilities: to monitor the local economic, social and religious 
conditions; to facilitate military and civilian communication in their communities; and to 
cooperate with the international, governmental and non-governmental organizations in their 
assigned area. LMTs visit their communities on a daily basis. They meet openly and informally in 
public places including markets and cafes; with shepherds and farmers in their fields; in local 
government offices and at schools and sporting events. LMTs ask standardized open-ended 
questions and a small number of additional questions relevant to that community, particularly 
regarding ethnic and religious concerns (Wade, 2009). LMTs listen to the resident’s daily 
problems, interests and fears, and share what they had observed and learned - without analysis 
- as written reports to the LMT leader, and with local community officials and non-
governmental organizations that have the appropriate responsibility, authority or ability to 
act295. The KFOR military chain of command may also identify additional topics of interest for 
inquiry, but these are strictly kept to a minimum to prevent an impression of intelligence 
collecting by the community, or an create an attitude of intelligence gathering by the LMTs 
themselves.  
10.7 The LMT reporting process  
The LMT information flow and coordination is detached from that of the usual military chain of 
command. This separation from command and intelligence channels was intentionally 
established to reinforce the community focus of the LMT and to help soften relationships with 
                                                             
295 Primarily, but not exclusively, OSCE, UNMIK and UNHCR in addition to community ombudsmen.  
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non-governmental and civilian organizations that prefer not to work with military forces296. The 
process described below is the official report flow from the individual LMTs to the Commander 
of KFOR (COMKFOR) 297.  
1) LMTs hold informal conversations with community residents. LMTs may also attend local 
events in addition to the regular community visits, based on local news, significant future 
or past events (e.g. elections); in response to patrol reports, or follow up to an earlier 
LMT report. LMTs also meet informally with local officials and members of non-
governmental organizations, such as Office of Security and Cooperation in Europe, (OSCE) 
and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to share their observations 
and community issues; to follow up on local projects, or to share military activities.  
LMTs record their conversations anonymously using a simple factual format of 
“who/what/where/when/why/how;” the resulting reports are submitted to the Regional 
LMT without further analysis.  
2) The Regional LMT (RLMT) is the section of the Task Force responsible for a specific 
MNB/MNTF region. The RLMT consolidates the individual LMT reports into a single report 
and submits it to the MNB/MNTF operations section, and the LMT Coordination Center 
(LMTCC).  
 
3) a. The MNB/MNTF operations staff adds the RLMT report to the daily consolidated 
regional update to KFOR operations and distributes the report internally to other staff 
sections for their use and situational awareness.  
b. The LMTCC receives the MNB/MNTF LMT reports, and scans them for any obvious 
errors or trends, and shares their insights with KFOR Operations. However, the primary 
function of the LMTCC is to receive and collate reports and to train and support the 
RLMTs; the LMTCC does not task subordinate RLMTs, nor it is tasked by KFOR.  
4) KFOR Operations’ staff analyze the collated LMT reports in context of intelligence, Civil-
Military and other MNB/MNTF reports and the wider political environment, to produce 
a briefing and information book for KFOR Headquarters and the KFOR Commander 
(COMKFOR).  
                                                             
296 While it is clear LMTs are military personnel, the absence of weapons and protective wear softens the heavy-
handed perception. 
297 Informal conversation with LMT Section leaders, noting variations were permitted on a case by case basis. Neither 
Camp Bondsteel nor Camp Prizren were known to vary from this structure. 
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5) KFOR Headquarters and COMKFOR use the information book to comprehend the present 
social, political and economic situation and as a guide to develop KFOR plans and 
operations.  
 
6) Requests for clarification and additional information follow a similar, reverse track.  
 
The diagram below details this general flow of LMT information to KFOR Headquarters:  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International 
Organizations 
Local Aid Organizations 
Community Leaders  
Local Government 
 
Figure 10.1   Adapted from Svensson, 2008 
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10.7.1 LMT Reporting in Practice 
 
In parallel to the formal KFOR information reporting process, LMT share their observations with 
military personnel and civilian organizations that are appropriate to address the concerns of the 
community. Examples from Camp Bondsteel298 LMTs illustrate this relationship:  
Strpče Primary School Repair 
In late 2008, Ukrainian LMTs submitted their daily reports containing the conversations 
they had had with Kosovo Serb parents concerning a remote primary school that would 
have to close during the winter as a result of an insufficient annual allotment of wood 
for heating. Due to its location in a closely monitored area of interest, the LMTs also 
informed the Ukrainian CIMIC officer, who presented the winter closing of the primary 
school at a regularly scheduled Civil Military Operations (CMO) coordination meeting 
for consideration as a potential ‘project’299.  
Although KFOR, and especially the US military, does not provide heating fuels or have 
reconstruction funding resources, the school met the conditions for a NATO Quick 
Impact Project (QIP), which provides up to 5,000 euros for local assistance projects that 
support civil-military NATO goals and objectives. The school was approved for further 
study; the Ukrainian LMT and CIMIC officers, and US civil military operations officer 
arranged for a meeting at the primary school with local officials from the Kosovo Serb 
Ministry of Education representing the local Serb shadow government, while US civil 
affairs personnel informed the official elected Kosovo Albanian mayor of the future 
meeting for the proposed school project. The Albanian mayor agreed to the project and 
there was no further coordination with this office300.  
The assessment meeting determined that like most buildings in the area, the condition 
of the school was due to deferred maintenance, rather than war damage. School 
officials identified and prioritized the numerous deficiencies with the school building to 
                                                             
298 The Camp Bondsteel example in the author’s own in October/November 2008.  
299 A catch-all descriptor of any activity with a tangible outcome; intangible activities were similarly called ‘missions.’ 
300 In the predominantly Kosovo Serb village of Strpće, the Kosovo Albanian was mayor in name only, voted in by 
Kosovo Albanians when the Kosovo Serbs boycotted an election. The mayor was mostly ignored by the Kosovo Serb 
constituency who ‘retained’ their former ethnic Serb mayor. That local government also received direct financial 
support from Serbia. 
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be repaired, and eventually agreed to new chimney/roof flashing, and the replacement 
and insulation of the woodstove exhaust pipes in the classrooms, all of which could be 
funded by QIP. Additional funds to repair smaller deficiencies, such as replacing broken 
window glass and sealing the woodstoves, would be provided by the local Ministry of 
Education. Classroom painting and minor repairs would be donated by the parents. 
When some parents objected that the selected roofer was Kosovo Albanian, the local 
official for the Ministry of Education personally advocated for the contractor301, and as 
a result, the school remained open through the 2008/2009 winter.  
The Kosovo Serb enclave of Strpče was considered a bellwether community for promoting 
renewed violence. Thus, the positive outcome of the school repairs was viewed as a major step 
to warm the aloof relationship KFOR had had with the community which had long believed 
KFOR favored Kosovo Albanians over Kosovo Serbs. Subsequently, as the KFOR and LMTs had 
“proven” themselves to this important Kosovo Serb enclave, it prompted better relations with 
other Serb communities, and eventually led to information sharing concerning criminal activity 
near the Kosovo-Macedonia border302 and it reinforced KFOR’s overarching tenet of providing a 
“safe and secure environment” for all of Kosovo. 
10.8 LMTs and Dependency   
The grey and academic literature have appropriately raised a range of concerns regarding the 
use and activities of military personnel in humanitarian and development roles, (Anderson, 
2000; Dixon, 2016; Etchemendy, 2010; Pugh, 2001), especially concerning the blurring of lines 
between military and civilian aid organizations (Collinson, 2012; Jackson & Haysom, 2013) for 
over two decades. Among the chief concerns were military short-termism; insufficient training 
of (military) personnel, particularly in their ability to recognize and appropriately resolve 
conflict (Dixon, 2016), anticipate secondary consequences (Anderson, 2000:25), and their over-
                                                             
301 Although ethnic balance was not a specified goal of QIP projects, the “wrong ethnicity” was not sufficient reason 
to refuse a contractor, and insistence to do so was known to cancel NATO/QIP projects and redirect that funding 
elsewhere.  
302 Such as cigarette and alcohol smuggling, which are civil law enforcement responsibilities, and cross border tree 
cutting, which is both a civil and military infraction.  
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orientation on potential threats (Duffield, 2011) thereby missing positive outcomes and 
opportunities for collaboration. 
These allegations have merit from the non-military and development organization perspective, 
at the same time, they should be further examined within this unique post-conflict context. 
LMTs were widely and openly known by the community as part of a larger military organization 
and as being specifically directed to improve relations and understanding in their communities 
on behalf of the military. LMTs also regularly shared their observations with international and 
local humanitarian organizations303, and had provided them with current information on local 
concerns and feedback on their own programs304. Most importantly, LMTs do not compete with 
humanitarian organizations, nor do their activities prevent these organizations from conducting 
their own research or activities.  
More substantial criticism includes the military being seen as provider of humanitarian aid, such 
as the early heavy involvement in winterization activities and the aforementioned school 
repairs. Such projects can foster an aid dependency (Campbell, et al., 2011), therefore 
weakening confidence in local governance over the long term (ibid). Nevertheless, while KFOR 
may continue to occasionally fund road and bridge repairs, usually between 5,000-10,000 USD, 
in order to continue its military patrolling and ability to receive materials and supplies, the 
distinctly provider-like activities that KFOR had perfomed with UNHCR and other organizations 
had effectively ceased by 2005.  
At the same time, local projects that stem from the good intentions of KFOR soldiers of nearly 
all of the contributing nations, coupled with the professional skills of many military reservists 
can both raise expectations (Etchemendy, 2010), and exacerbate impressions of favoritism 
                                                             
303 Organizations include Caritas; FINCA, Liria, Mother Theresa Society, UNCHR, USAID   
304 While LMTs and other military personnel regularly liaise with the local government, humanitarian organizations 
and the local population in support of the military mission, these are intended to be limited in scope and duration; 
military personnel are neither intended nor trained to take on such political responsibilities.  
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when ‘projects’ appear to beneft one group over another305, or damage community relations 
when community projects are left incomplete because the initiating military forces rotated out, 
and the new units failed to continue them306. In addition, as Narten (2009) claims, there is a 
tendency to overlook the importance of ‘training the trainers/training the managers’ from the 
earliest days, and therefore fail to build genuine local capability (Narten, 2009:259). Thus, the 
assertions of fostering dependancy and impeding local capacity seem to have merit, as several 
signs of such dependancy appear to have emerged and may have become the norm. These 
assertions are examined below.  
10.8.1  Community Dependancy on LMTs  
The residents and government officials interviewed in Ferizaj, Prizren and Gjakova regularly 
expressed their positive opinion of the KFOR LMTs. The interviews generally revealed two lines 
of belief, the first is KFOR’s reputation as an “honest broker,” likely formed and reinforced by 
LMTs’ openly engaging in conversations with all members of the community, and by doing so, 
are believed by the population to be an important check to prevent a return to violence.  As 
many interviewees offered, “we trust KFOR to protect us from ourselves” and “we need KFOR 
(to stay) to protect (Kosovo) Albanians and (Kosovo) Serbs from each other” (Interviews 25, 39, 
31, 31, 33, 34, 64, 73).  
The second is related to the first: since the LMTs regularly visit remote villages and ethnically 
homogeneous enclaves, they are well known and have knowledge, ease of access and entrée 
into these communities that the local government may not. Consequently, local governments 
have come to rely on LMTs for community information, “we couldn’t do our job without them” 
(Interviews 25, 34).  
                                                             
305 The technical and economic support by the German KFOR to the new owner of a privatizing vineyard is an 
example.  
306 Author’s experience to complete a primary school left unfinished for several years in the same Kosovo Serb area.  
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This presents an untenable condition for four reasons. First, the LMTs themselves are an 
artificial construct. Highly resource intensive, few communities have means to establish such a 
robust non-military equivalent of LMTs to regularly seek and provide information to the 
government on behalf of small communities307. Second, intentionally or not, the resources that 
could be dedicated toward positive community outreach can be directed elsewhere without 
penalty. This allows community leaders and civil servants to continue to under-support remote 
and minority communities, which may subsequently reinforce an inequitable status quo; it can 
also fail to note emerging local issues and concerns that are invisible to outsiders, and therefore 
contribute to future conflict. Third, the presence of the LMTs allow community members to 
relinquish taking part in community affairs or holding their local leaders accountable, even to 
the limited degree they had through informal neighborhood councils. Instead, residents are 
able to take their individual concerns and grievances directly to the LMTs who bring them to the 
attention of KFOR, the local government and non-governmental organizations anonymously. 
Local governments may likewise depend upon LMTs to deliver official information to the 
populace in remote or contentious areas. In both cases, LMTs unavoidably represent the 
authority of KFOR, and therefore contribute its weight to whatever the information they 
deliver.  
Fourth, and most critically, this shuttle diplomacy solidifies the status quo rather than invites 
change, even as it infers – or even confirms - that Kosovo is not yet safe and capable of solving 
its own problems. In this regard, as Donais (2012) contends, such top-driven activities that are 
often  introduced by strong outsiders directly inhibit governance strategies that are based on 
local culture and social context, and instead, local leaders acquiesce to the outsiders’ demands 
for cooperation (Donais, 2012:7). As a result, sustainable solutions to everyday disagreements 
are not created and ‘owned’, but only last until the outsiders have departed (ibid:5). Thus, the 
                                                             
307 This is not to minimize the work of civil servants and the community ombudsmen located in the Municipalities. 
However, these offices are not designed or staffed for extensive outreach and travel.  
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LMTs can easily and unintentionally impair the development of the necessary trust that the 
local government can and will serve, sustain and protect all members of the community 
equitably308.   
 
10.9 Critique and Paradox of LMTs  
Kartas openly challenges such ‘positive’ community interaction by the LMTs as depolitcizing the 
local government (Kartas, 2007:2). His argument returns to the power and interests [of the 
West] inherent in military forces, where Pugh likewise states, where “the local government and 
community are forced to comply with an outside ideal of good governance, they are therefore 
deprived of space to deliberate about their own political organization” (Kartas, 2007:2; Pugh, 
2001; also, Donais, 2012; Narten, 2009:257), and they must conform, particularly if future 
assistance is conditioned (Koeberle, et al., 2005; Marley, 2016). Similarly, Jabri contends such 
‘intervention’ by outsiders not only denies communities their struggle to develop their own 
solutions, but may also re/impose policies that led to the conflict in the first place (Jabri, 2016). 
Consequently, the array of coordination activities performed by the LMTs, outsiders and 
representitives of the military, though outwardly positive, may unintentionally delay emergence 
of appropriate civilian actors (Donais, 2012:7; Pugh, 2001), and ultimately serve to undermine 
local problem solving capability and long term stability, (ibid) by preventing locally owned 
solutions.    
 
10.9.1 Wither the LMTs?  
The LMTs have three core responsibilities: to monitor the local economic, social and religious 
conditions; to facilitate military and civilian communication in their communities; and to 
cooperate with the international, governmental and non-governmental organizations in their 
                                                             
308 Etchemendy (2010) provides supporting case studies.  
272 
 
assigned area. To this end, the LMTs have been a success. Since their inception in response to 
the riots in 2004, and despite a continued reduction of military forces operating in Kosovo, 
KFOR and the LMTs continue to be perceived as fair minded and trustworthy by Kosovo 
Albanians, Kosovo Serbs and the minority communities (see Section 10.10). Where Eckstein and 
Parent note internal wars “tend to scar deeply and prevent the formation of consensus 
indefinitely” (Eckstein, 1965:134; Parent, 2012:28), LMTs appear to support Darby & MacGinty 
who state rebuilding trust after civil wars often benefit from the effort of third parties (Darby & 
MacGinty, 2008). Noting that even at the time of this research in 2014 and 2016, the informal 
community forums have not substantially reemerged, LMTs therefore, may provide the first 
step to start that conversation.  
Nevertheless, as Narten, (2009) warns “when, as the result of any ill-delivered external 
assistance, the level of dependency increases, this dependency can develop into a ‘structural 
quality’, becoming self-perpetuating and resistant to easy solution” (Narten, 2009: 258). In this 
regard, both the military and civilian peace operations community have recognized that the 
long-term interlocutor activity of the LMTs serving as this bridge does not belong to the 
military. The query therefore, is not simply wither the LMTs, but who or what will take their 
place, and when. Yet the overarching question to be answered here is ‘are the LMTs a proxy for 
KFOR’s military leaders,’ particularly as a prevalence of post-conflict literature found military 
leaders are often solicited by local elites for personal benefit in that difficult environment. 
Particularly in Kosovo, that answer in no, and for three principal reasons. 
First, the stated role of the LMTs which were only fully operational in early 2005, was to serve 
as the “eyes and ears of the commander” at the local level within the Task Force commander’s 
area of responsibility. This listening role was made well known throughout Kosovo. As the LMTs 
were established more than five years after the arrival of KFOR, the local military and 
community leaders would have already formed their relationships and the LMTs would have 
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been unlikely to replace them.  Secondly, a substantial military chain of command was already 
in existence for the military leaders to meet with local leaders on behalf of the commander at 
the community level: The Multi-National Brigade commanders’ subordinate battalion and 
company commanders. These subordinate commanders inherently possessed coercive power 
and an authority to act on under the auspices of their KFOR commander, which the LMTs do 
not. Third, in accordance with the Military Technical Agreement, KFOR’s mandate is security: ‘to 
establish a safe and secure environment.’ Thus, military leaders would likely have quickly 
redirected politically motivated overtures to civilian organizations, particularly given KFOR’s 
considerable risk averse orientation.  
 
10.10 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described the purpose, role and activities of the Kosovo Forces Liaison 
Monitoring Teams, KFOR LMTs, and provided an analysis of those roles and activities in the 
community. Post-conflict literature provides a substantial number of examples where local 
leaders and community elites ingratiated themselves with the military in pursuit of their own 
benefit. In contrast, field research found the military base in the study areas to have had little 
official contact with their local leaders, and instead, there has been significant and continual 
informal contact through patrols, CIMIC and Civil Affairs personnel, and especially LMTs. This 
chapter sought to answer whether the LMTs have had a political, social and economic influence 
on their local communities, and more importantly, whether the LMTs serve as political proxies 
for their military leaders.  
Analysis finds that the Kosovo Forces’ LMTs, established in late 2004 and operating throughout 
Kosovo since early 2005, with a clear mission to ‘keep a finger on the pulse of the community, 
are specifically intended to observe and mitigate emerging animosity between groups to 
prevent KFOR from being surprised by violence as it had been in March 2004. The LMTs ‘walk 
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their beat’ and provided a reassuring presence in their assigned communities. LMTs actively and 
openly meet with local leaders, government officials, members of the community including 
minority populations, and representatives of local and international organizations to share 
observations and concerns. Thus, as LMTs performed their duties to support KFOR’s mandate to 
maintain a safe and secure environment, they often acted as a go-between to the community 
and its government, lending KFOR’s weight to both recipients, thereby also unintentionally 
reinforcing Kosovo’s political status quo. Nevertheless, while LMTS are military personnel, and 
clearly represent the military base and KFOR more generally, the LMTS do not appear to have 
had a substantial political, social and economic influence on their communities. Moreover, as 
LMTS possess neither an express nor implied authority in their observer role, they do not serve 
as a proxy for their military base leaders.  
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Chapter 11: Thesis Conclusion and Recommendations for Further Research 
 
11.0 Introduction 
The objective of this thesis was to examine the effects military bases established after conflict 
have on their surrounding communities. There is a rich body of literature concerning peace 
operations, especially since the end of the Cold War, and a growing examination of the effects 
of international organizations on the communities within post-conflict environments is 
underway. Yet, a systematic examination concerning the effects of military bases established in 
post-conflict and peacekeeping environments is nearly absent.  
The research first considered three major premises that are directly related to the 
establishment of a military base drawn from the peace operations literature: that the base is an 
employer and consumer; that the base is a catalyst for economic growth; and, the base is a 
political actor. The findings of initial field research with regard to the impact of military bases in 
Kosovo varied significantly from the assertions of much of the existing peace operations 
literature. Moreover, these findings also varied between the individual communities where the 
bases were established, and therefore required further investigation concerning the unique 
political, social and economic activities and procedures of the military bases. These additional 
characteristics proved useful for identifying how the daily activities of bases influence the 
communities’ political economy. Therefore, this research begins to fill a significant gap in 
knowledge of the impact post-conflict state- and peacebuilding practices, contributing 
especially to the understanding of everyday practices, the importance of which has been 
increasingly highlighted in critical peace and state building literature.  
11.1 Objectives  
This research sought to answer, “How do the everyday practices of military bases established in 
post-conflict environments affect the local political economy, and what are the implications for 
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peacebuilding?” Hence, this thesis set out to substantiate three hypotheses: (1)There will be a 
positive shock of employment and business opportunities, but also a crowding by expatriates 
which limit benefit to the local community; (2) Shortages and inflation will be temporary; high 
wages will stimulate local secondary and tertiary enterprise and industry; (3) Local elites will 
solicit and leverage relationships with military to reinforce power/leadership positions in the 
community. To accomplish this, a concentrated schedule of desk research was conducted, 
followed by two field visits to Kosovo. The desk research revealed an underlying perception by 
humanitarian organizations that military base operations were essentially homogeneous, and 
their influences were primarily negative on the local community; that the degree of their 
damaging effects varied only by the size of the military forces on the ground (De Torrenté, 
2006; Duffield, 2011; Enloe, 2000, Fishstein & Wilder, 2012; Jackson & Haysom, 2013; 
Mendelson, 2005). This perception sensitized this researcher to become especially vigilant 
concerning potential practioner blindness. This researcher was not only a current member of 
the military, but had also served in Kosovo at one of the camps in the study for over a year, and 
was therefore more likely to unintentionally project a favorable personal bias.  
Following the literature review, the research focus was narrowed to three suitable communities 
for fieldwork. The selection of those communities was based on comparable size of deployed 
military forces; the size and pre-war development level of the base community, and the relative 
physical isolation from other newly established bases and each other. As noted above, the 
fieldwork responses varied substantially from the literature, and the bases demonstrated 
significant differences in their operating procedures.  
 
See Table 11.1, Hypothesis/Field Results Crosswalk, below, for initial fieldwork responses. 
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Hypothesis/Field Results Crosswalk 
Hypothesis Expected response Received response 
Hypothesis 1:  
The military base is an 
employer and primary 
consumer of local goods and 
services.  
There will be a positive 
shock of employment and 
business opportunities, but 
also a crowding by 
expatriates which limit 
benefit to the local 
community.  
High but select number of 
local residents hired; high 
number of expatriate and 
extra-local persons and 
businesses crowd out local 
residents for jobs and 
contracts.  
High demand and 
consumption of 
re/construction resources by 
military.  
US Base: Contractors hire 
high numbers of local 
residents at high pay to work 
on base; most building 
materials, supplies and 
equipment imported from 
outside Kosovo. Very few 
local expatriates. 
German Base: Self-sufficient. 
Few local residents hired, but 
high pay. Limited services are 
contracted. Most businesses 
hired by the German KFOR by 
“walking door to door.”  
Hypothesis 2:  
The military base is a 
catalyst for price and wage 
inflation; secondary 
economic activities and 
effects.  
Shortages and inflation will 
be temporary; high wages 
will stimulate local 
secondary and tertiary 
enterprise and industry to 
support military base and 
personnel.  
Military damaged 
infrastructure limits 
reconstruction progress. 
High inflation and ‘balloon 
economy;’ shortage of basic 
goods and real estate; 
Increased local crime, 
especially drugs and 
prostitution.  
Military damage to local 
infrastructure impedes local 
reconstruction and 
commerce. 
Military not dependent upon 
local goods, services or real 
estate; no shortages.  
Little military-related crime 
due to curfew, no-alcohol 
policy, and limited movement 
off base.  
Much infrastructure was 
poorly built, ill maintained; 
most damage due to war and 
Serb withdrawal.  
New businesses support the 
community; not military.  
Military rebuilt significant 
local infrastructure for own 
use and to develop goodwill.  
Hypothesis 3:  
The military base is a 
political agent. 
Local elites will solicit and 
leverage relationships with 
Local elites and leaders solicit 
relationships with military 
base to benefit self or 
political interests.  
Corruption, “gatekeepers” 
and elite involvement in local 
Relations between local 
elites/ leaders and military 
base is formal and 
infrequent; local elites have 
no input to base hiring or 
purchasing.  
278 
 
military to reinforce power/ 
leadership positions in the 
community.  
hiring and business 
operations; local examples 
and complaints of unfair 
practices and/or 
discrimination.  
Military personnel assigned 
in Liaison Monitoring Teams 
(LMTs) provide “eyes and 
ears” for both the military 
base and local 
government/civil servants.  
Table 11.1 Hypothesis/Field Results Crosswalk 
11.2.1 Findings   
There were several unexpected findings and significant variance with the post-conflict 
literature:  
• Hypothesis 1, that the base is a major local employer is only partially supported. With 
exception of the initial military forces arriving in June 1999, the ‘military’ did not hire a high 
number of civilians from the local community. Instead, both the German and US military 
forces hired very few local residents, mostly as interpreters. The German KFOR ultimately 
hired fewer than 500 community residents to work at the main base or one of the multiple 
locations where German Soldiers were temporarily lodged throughout Prizren. This 
contrasts with the US KFOR, where several thousand residents from Gjilan and Ferizaj were 
hired exclusively through the US-based logistics contractor Brown and Root (B&R) to work 
on the US bases, where nearly every able-bodied adult that applied for work on the base 
between July and November 1999 was hired and trained on a range of construction trades, 
foodservice and maintenance skills, or for a variety of housekeeping and service positions. 
Hence, the anticipated local ‘gatekeeper’ did not emerge in this initial period as expected. 
Potential employees at Camp Bondsteel would later apply for positions through a 
centralized internet-based system, adding a new insulating layer between the hiring 
manager and eventual workplace, and thereby reducing opportunity for influence by 
current base employees. Camp Bondsteel remains the largest employer in the Ferizaj 
Municipality to the present day, and its presence has become commonplace. The gradual 
but significant reductions of base staff and salaries have also made employment at Camp 
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Bondsteel a less secure and less economically advantageous source of employment, 
although still a favored and desirable opportunity. 
 
• Hypothesis 2, the base as a catalyst for wage and price inflation and stimulus for business 
enterprise is only partially supported. The disproportionally high military wages and  
subsequent increase in personal spending by local employees was congruent with the 
literature309, especially in the early years. However, the number of personnel employed 
have steadily decreased since 2005 and dropped again to 2008 to less than half of their 
original number and at approximately a third of the initial salaries.310 At the same time, 
neither the substantial inflation nor a distinct balloon economy that was expected to 
accompany the high wages appear to have developed as result of the military base. These 
are likely to have been mitigated by the advance positioning of supplies and construction 
materials outside of Kosovo by both the US and German KFOR, so local purchasing of 
reconstruction materials did not occur; the very limited off-base travel which soldiers could 
engage in, and enduring restrictions which prohibited military personnel from eating or 
drinking in local restaurants, thus few opportunities for soldier spending, resulting in few 
resource demands on the local economy.  
 
Local industry appears to have made only minor advances. Ferizaj, and Prizren to a lesser 
extent, realized the reopening of several small private and former socially-owned 
manufacturers of building products, particularly for windows, doors and textiles. However, 
they reopened at a far lower capacity and with far fewer employees. Although many have 
remained open until the present day, it is primarily at the consumer level, rather than for 
                                                             
309 Individuals employed at the local bases typically supported families of up to nine adults and children (Warrander 
& Knaus, 2010). 
310By July 2014, German KFOR base wages were just 10-25% higher than the local wages, approximately 400 Euro per 
month for retail clerks, to 800 Euro for skilled professionals. Likewise, Camp Bondsteel’s 2014 employees numbered 
approximately 2,000 (Interview 73) with monthly salaries of 600-800 USD, although still almost twice the local wages 
(Kosovo Agency of Trading Economics, 2017). 
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export. Thus, while the base did provide stimulus for local industry though salary income, 
eventual satisfaction of consumer demand is likely to limit further growth. Finally, repairs to 
civil infrastructure is common for US and German military forces who will build or restore 
the local civil infrastructure necessary for military operations, such as roads and bridges 
used for patrolling through the MNB area of responsibility, or to ensure their freedom of 
movement such as construction of a ring road in the Gjilan Municipality, that was built to 
bypass the city congestion. These smoothed local commerce, but did not substantially 
catalyze regional economic development. 
The fieldwork likewise found little to support the assertions of enduring crime and other 
malign effects which could be considered the direct result of peacekeeping forces that is 
well described in post-conflict literature. This is potentially the result of the KFOR ‘zero 
tolerance policy’ established in late 2004 for drugs, prostitution and trafficking among 
soldiers. However, these topics, especially prostitution, are also relatively taboo in a 
conservative and patriarchal society such as Kosovo’s, thus negative responses may in fact 
be based on preexisting social mores.  
 
• Hypothesis 3 concerning the relations between local elites and the military base is not 
supported. Fieldwork found relations between community and military leaders to be formal 
and infrequent, primarily limited to attendance at the MNB monthly Mayor’s Luncheon, or 
change of command ceremonies for incoming and departing KFOR commanding officers. 
This is substantially contrary to the post-conflict literature. Instead, local elites appear to 
have greater interaction with political organizations such as UNMIK, which hold 
considerably more influence over political and municipal activities than the military base.  
 
The most significant unexpected finding was the relationship of the Liaison Monitoring Teams 
(LMTs) with the local community. The LMTs are unique to the Balkans; these small teams of 
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four to seven military personnel are tasked to serve as ‘the eyes and ears of the commander.’ 
They were initiated after the Kosovo-wide riots in March 2004 to gain an understanding of local 
political conditions and particularly to serve as an advance warning for potential violence from 
ethnically based divisions. The LMTs informally interact with all members of the local 
community on a daily basis to promote and maintain positive relations between the military 
and community, to liaise between the military and local government and to share information 
and anticipate sources of friction that could lead to a return to violence. Thus, LMTs are the 
visible constant presence of KFOR, rather than the military leaders, and they develop an 
enduring though informal working relationship with community leaders and civil servants, in 
addition to the casual relationships with local residents and non-governmental organizations. 
While LMTS do not serve as proxies for their military leaders, LMTs nevertheless project their 
influence as representatives of the military to both local residents and the local government 
through their community relations. As a result, the LMTs are more apt to reinforce the military-
centric status quo, than project a stable future without KFOR support, and therefore are 
ultimately likely to weaken wider peacebuilding efforts.  
 
11.3 Analysis of Military Base Operations 
The substantial variance from the post-conflict literature required a closer investigation of the 
base communities, and a comparison with a community without a base. These were examined 
using a livelihoods view of political economy analysis, through the three broad characteristics of 
a community, its political, social and economic features311 to assess the effects of the practices 
on the community by the base established by the German KFOR in the Municipality of Prizren, 
and the United States’ KFOR in the Municipality of Ferizaj. The results are subsequently 
                                                             
311 As defined in Chapter 9, Political, refers to relations between the community and the military leaders; Social 
refers to the attitudes and actions of the military personnel toward the community; those of the community toward 
the military and between community members, and Economic, which includes both local employment and 
purchasing and the secondary/tertiary effects of that employment and purchasing. 
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compared to the Municipality of Gjakova which does not support a base, to determine whether, 
and in what way, the base affects the local political economy.  
11.3.1 Political Characteristics 
The military bases in Ferizaj and Prizren appeared to have had minimal political effect. Table 
11.2 demonstrates the political relations for all three municipalities are low and nearly 
identical: base leaders do not have a significant or influential relationship with their 
communities, and therefore local elites/ leaders are unlikely to have a significant reciprocal 
influence or leverage with the military base. The Liaison Monitoring Teams have not performed 
as a proxy for the military leaders. 
11.3.2 Social Characteristics 
The bases have a mixed effect on community social characteristics. Camp Bondsteel continues 
to employ several thousand local residents from Ferizaj, including a considerable number of 
women, many of whom had had experienced some societal disapproval, but all had also 
enjoyed higher self-respect. As described in Chapter 6, this has substantially improved the social 
and economic status of women in Ferizaj. Anecdotally, Camp Prizren, analyzed in Chapter 7, is a 
good place to work, but it does not appear to evoke the same source of personal pride or status 
in the community. This is likely due to its much small number of employees employed on the 
camp. Subsequently, Prizren also employs fewer women and therefore has had little influence 
on women. Both Camps provide substantial skills training for their employees in select positions 
that are also useful to establish a business in the community. However, Camp Prizren permitted 
soldier use of prostitution in Prizren until the implementation of the KFOR-wide zero tolerance 
policy in late 2004, which allowed trafficking and crime to operate more easily in Prizren. 
Gjakova, without a military base, analyzed in Chapter 8, gains no associated benefit. As Gjakova 
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was badly damaged during the war and contains a high percentage of widows, the absence of 
employment opportunities for women is especially pronounced.  
11.3.3 Economic Characteristics 
Overall, the bases have had a mixed economic effect upon their local communities. The high 
base salaries in Ferizaj appear to have largely increased local prosperity and consumption. 
Hence, retail has increased, and several former construction/construction-related businesses 
and industries have reopened to serve the local area. The bases had minimal effect in Prizren 
and effectively none in Gjakova. However, both Prizren and Gjakova municipalities already had 
a long history of trade, which was able to benefit from pent-up demand, and therefore able to 
return to prior economic capability more easily. They also demonstrated more qualities of 
mature or stable local economies such as business and professional services which are less 
dependent or influenced by a military base.  See Table 11.2 for Community Characteristics 
Overview.  
Community Characteristics Overview 
Municipality Ferizaj (Chapter 6) Prizren (Chapter 7) Gjakova (Chapter 8) 
Political 
Effects 
Little military leader 
interaction with local 
leaders/elites.  
Little military leader 
interaction with local 
leaders/elites. 
Very little military leader 
interaction with local 
leaders/elites. 
Social Effects  Local strong positive 
identity with base 
employment. Many 
opportunities for 
women. Some skills 
training. Little base-
related crime. Positive 
opinion of LMTs 
Local positive opinion of 
Camp Prizren. Few base 
employment openings. 
Some skills training. 
Supported prostitution 
until zero tolerance 
policy. Positive opinion 
of LMTs.  
Minimal; positive opinion 
of KFOR LMTs.  
Economic 
Effects  
High number of local 
employees with high 
salaries. Several 
construction-related 
industries restarted. 
Increase in retail 
transportation and 
restaurants is typical 
post-conflict.  
Small number of local 
employees with high 
salaries. Very strong 
history of trade. Several 
industries restarted, 
mostly construction 
related. Strongest post-
conflict recovery.  
No base; very long history 
of trade. Manufacturing is 
comparable to Ferizaj and 
Prizren. Highest number 
of business/professional 
services businesses, 
demonstrates a more 
stable economy.  
Table 11.2    Community Characteristics Overview 
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11.4 Limitations of the Study 
There is one important limitation to this study: the extent to which it is possible to generalize 
from a solitary case in a particular post-conflict environment that was conducted by NATO 
military forces that are both comparatively wealthy, and politically and socially ‘Western.’ This 
study of Kosovo acknowledges that similar peacekeeping forces, such as those directed by the 
United Nations, African Union and European Union do not necessarily share these attributes 
and perspectives, nor would have completed identical training. Nevertheless, this case study 
analyzed with a livelihood-focused political economy analysis, and framework of the three 
hypotheses reflecting political, social and economic influences is transferable to other post-
conflict environments and produces locally-oriented results. 
 
11.5 Implications of the Study 
This study of the Municipalities of Ferizaj, Gjakova and Prizren demonstrates the day-to-day 
activities to establish military bases have had varying levels of political, social and economic 
effects, but relatively little influence on their local communities. The fieldwork reveals the US 
and German bases function under very different base operating procedures and guidelines 
concerning local purchasing and employment, despite operating under a single unified NATO 
leadership and United Nations tasking. This finding directly challenges the perception of military 
base homogeneity found in the literature and requires better knowledge of the procedures and 
‘habits’ of deploying military forces: rules matter more than size.  
Military bases contribute primarily to local prosperity and appear to do very little to catalyze 
substantial economic development. The often-described retail, restaurant and transportation 
businesses that start immediately after conflict end tend to be subsistence employment, and 
many fail to prosper. Hence, these results indicate that while military bases can have a positive 
influence on their community, the communities will require the same international support in 
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economic development, governance, rule of law and social well-being as communities without 
bases.  
Finally, this research demonstrates the effectiveness of international peacekeeping lessons-
learned and operational best practices when they are effectively implemented. Intentionally or 
not, many of the recommended practices that were published by the United Nations were 
followed by KFOR and produced generally positive results. Thus, this research strongly suggests 
that military bases established in post-conflict environments under a deliberate peace 
operations strategy may substantially reinforce international peacebuilding programs and 
initiatives.  
 
11.6 Recommendations for further study 
This research may facilitate further study in three related areas. The first is further analysis of 
the short and long-term effects of the Liaison Monitoring Teams, and a comparison of their 
influence with earlier unarmed community-level teams such as the UN Observers. Such an 
examination and comparison of the political and social influences of unarmed teams operating 
in a range of post-conflict mission environments would inform their suitability and appropriate 
role in peacebuilding. Noting particularly those internal war conditions described by Eckstein 
and Parent where “internal wars tend to scar deeply and prevent the formation of consensus 
indefinitely” (Eckstein, 1965:134; Parent, 2012:28), and by Darby & MacGinty who state that 
rebuilding trust after civil wars often benefits from the presence of third parties, such teams 
may reinforce positive dialogue.  
Second, a focused investigation of the culture of humanitarian and military organizations while 
on mission, the particularly in what ways the internal cultures of lead and contributing nations 
influence their operations and relations with their community. Humanitarian and military bases 
are not homogeneous; their effects and influence on the local political economy are primarily 
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the result of their internal procedures and practices and their national/corporate culture, thus a 
focused investigation furthers understanding and best practices in peacebuilding operations. 
Third is a study of the gender effects of the social and political empowerment of women as a 
result of the base, particularly where women had been employed on base as primary wage 
earners. This study would include a close examination of the enduring influence upon their 
roles in the family, on traditional mores and their own influence in the local community, 
including those leading to greater opportunities for culturally-appropriate leadership and 
conflict resolution.  
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Appendix 1: Interview Participants  
 
Interview 
Number 
Interview 
Location 
Date 
2014 Type Participant  Business/ Occupation 
 
 
3 Pristina      7-May Government Official  
Netherlands Ambassador to 
Kosovo 
4 
Pristina      7-May 
Director, 
International 
Organization United Nations Political Unit 
5 
Ferizaj      9-May 
Ferizaj Business 
Owner  Restaurant  
6 
Ferizaj 10-May 
Ferizaj Business 
Owner 
Mfg. and set up playground 
equipment  
7 
Ferizaj 10-May 
Ferizaj Business 
Owner Café and Bar  
8 
Ferizaj 11-May CBS contractor US MP Soldier 1999/2000 
 
 
 
9 Ferizaj 12-May 
Ferizaj Business 
Owner 
Road construction and 
const. materials 
 
 
 
10 Ferizaj 12-May 
Ferizaj Business 
Owner 
Construction salvage 
materials; iron & steel  
 
 
11 Ferizaj 12-May 
Former base 
employee Coffee Shop employee 
 
12 
Ferizaj 12-May 
Ferizaj Business 
Owner Small retail business 
 
 
13 Ferizaj 13-May CBS Media specialist Public Affairs Specialist 
 
14 Ferizaj 13-May 
Former KBR 
employee Food Service employee 
 
15 
Ferizaj 13-May Business Owner Ferizaj Retail Business 
 
 
16 Ferizaj 14-May Ferizaj Municipality Ferizaj Economic Director 
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Interview 
Number 
Interview 
Location 
Date 
2014 Type Participant  Business/ Occupation 
 
17 Ferizaj 14-May PX employee 
Camp Bondsteel  
PX department manager 
 
 
 
18 Ferizaj 14-May 
Ferizaj Business 
Owner 
Owner of land used by US 
KFOR; runs café and shop, 
parking lot at Main Gate 
 
 
19 Ferizaj 15-May Ferizaj Municipality Mayor of Ferizaj  
 
 
20 
Ferizaj 19-May Bakery Owner Exclusive baker to CBS  
 
 
21 
Ferizaj 19-May 
Ferizaj Business 
Owner 
CADI Cleaning Wholesale 
cleaning products 
 
 
 
22 Ferizaj 19-May Local store employee  
Super Viva Grocery store 
w/restaurant 
 
 
23 Gjilan 21-May Gjilan Municipality Chairman for Communities 
 
 
24 
Gjilan 21-May Gjilan Civil Society 
Pres. Gjilan Chamber of 
Commerce 
 
 
25 Gjilan 
22-May 
27-May Gjilan Municipality 
Office of Economic 
Development  
 
 
26 
Gjilan 22-May Business Owner 
Co-Owner Beta Commerce 
Quarry/Gravel  
 
 
27 Gjilan  26-May Gjilan Municipality  
Gjilan Police Officer for 
minority Communities  
 
 
28 Gjilan 26-May Gjilan Municipality  
Gjilan Police Forces/Serb 
Officer  
 
 
29 Gjilan  27-May 
International 
Organization Coordinator, UN Women 
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2014 
Type Participant  Business/ Occupation 
 
 
         30 Gjilan  27-May Gjilan Municipality Director, Gjilan Youth 
 
 
31 
Gjilan  27-May Community member Member, Gjilan Youth  
 
 
32 
Gjilan  27-May Community member  Member, Gjilan Youth  
 
 
 
33 Gjilan 27-May Community member 
Farmer; sells produce at 
Serb farm market 
 
 
 
34 Gjilan 28-May Gjilan Municipality 
Director, Youth, Culture and 
Sports 
 
 
 
35 Prizren  29-May Community member 
Professor, University of 
Prizren 
 
 
36 Prizren  29-May Prizren Municipality 
Director for Economy and 
Finance  
 
 
37 Prizren  7-Jun German KFOR  German KFOR CIMIC Team  
 
 
 
38 Lipjan 9-Jun 
Former interpreter/ 
base employee. Son 
of business owner  
Puntori Construction 
materials  
 
 
39 
Gjilan 9-Jun Gjilan Municipality 
Exec Director, Center for 
Protection of Women & 
Children  
 
 
 
40 Ferizaj 11-Jun 
Former KBR 
employee 
Construction estimator, 
Loan Officer, Raffisen Bank 
 
41 
Ferizaj 11-Jun 
Former KBR 
employee 
Not presently employed/ 
returned from Afghanistan 
 
42 
Ferizaj 11-Jun 
Former KBR 
employee 
Not presently employed/ 
returned from Afghanistan 
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43 Ferizaj 11-Jun 
Former KBR 
employee 
Not presently employed/ 
returned from Afghanistan 
 
 
44 Ferizaj 12-Jun US KFOR  Camp Bondsteel, Intel NCO 
 
45 Ferizaj 12-Jun 
US KFOR  
Camp Bondsteel, CMO 
 
46 Ferizaj 12-Jun 
US KFOR  
Camp Bondsteel, CMO 
 
47 Ferizaj 12-Jun US KFOR 
Camp Bondsteel, Public 
Affairs 
 
 
48 Prizren  13-Jun Business Owner Co-owner, Retail hardware  
 
 
49 Prizren  16-Jun Prizren Municipality Prizren Information Center 
 
 
50 Prizren  16-Jun Business Owner Construction materials 
 
 
51 Prizren  16-Jun 
Business Owner 
Camp Prizren laundry  Laundry 
 
 
52 Prizren  17-Jun 
International 
Organization 
Caritas Kosovo, Head of 
Mission 
 
 
53 Prizren   17 Jun 
Prizren Business 
Owner 
Printshop for all CPZ paper 
products 
 
 
54 Prizren 17 Jun 
Camp Prizren 
Interpreter  
*Chance meeting, provided 
contact information for #62 
 
 
55 Prizren   17 Jun 
Prizren Business 
Owner Small electronics shop  
 
 
56 Prizren  18-Jun 
International 
Organization 
Caritas Kosovo, Minority 
Integration 
 
 
57 Prizren  18-Jun 
Prizren Business 
owner; Produce 
vendor to CPZ Co-owner, Produce Market   
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Interview 
Number 
Interview 
Location 
Date 
2014 Type Participant  Business/ Occupation 
 
 
58 Prizren 18-Jun Prizren Municipality Prizren Econ. Development   
 
 
59 Gjilan 2-Jul Director  
War Veteran Association 
Gjilan Civil Society 
 
 
60 Ferizaj 4-Jul Mayor Mayor of Ferizaj  
 
61 Ferizaj 4-Jul Engineer  Ferizaj Municipal Engineer 
 
 
62 Prizren 5-Jul 
Albanian - German – 
English Translator  Camp Prizren Employee 
 
63  
Gjilan 7-Jul Director Local Catholic NGO  
 
 
64 Ferizaj 7-Jul Fulltime mother 
Former University of 
Maryland employee  
 
 
65 Ferizaj 7-Jul Community member  
Local land owner; lessor to 
CBS  
 
 
66 Gjilan  8-Jul 
Son of business 
owner 
DEA Water and Krystal 
Hotel employee 
 
67 
Ferizaj 8-Jul 
Director, Ferizaj 
Public Library Ferizaj Municipality  
 
68 Ferizaj 8-Jul Director US NGO 
 
 
69 Pristina 15-Jul 
Director, Regional 
Units and 
Associations 
Kosovo Chamber of 
Commerce 
 
 
70 Pristina 15-Jul 
Director, Dept. of 
Administration 
Kosovo Chamber of 
Commerce  
 
71 Pristina 20-Jul Director IKS  
Local Civil Society 
Organization 
 
72 Pristina 21-Jul 
Chief of Mission 
UNHCR International Organization 
 
73 Pristina 21-Jul Translator Camp Bondsteel employee 
 
74 Ferizaj   
Civil Engineer, US 
Corps of Engineers 
Lead Engineer, Camp 
Bondsteel 1999 
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Interview 
Number  
Interview 
Location 
Date 
2016 Type Participant  Business/ Occupation 
 
75 Oberammergau 
27-Mar 
(2015) German KFOR Communications Officer  
76 
Ferizaj 17-Oct 
Employee, Business 
Association 
Alliance of Kosovo 
Businesses 
77 
Ferizaj 17-Oct 
Employee, Business 
Association 
Alliance of Kosovo 
Businesses 
78 
Pristina 17-Oct 
Former Camp 
Bondsteel Cultural 
Advisor 
Senior Advisor to Ministry 
of Internal Affairs  
79 
Fushe Kosovë 18-Oct 
Ministry of 
Communities & 
Returns  Republic of Kosovo 
80 
Fushe Kosovë 18-Oct 
Ministry of 
Communities & 
Returns Republic of Kosovo 
81 
Prizren 18-Oct Bank Manager Regional Bank 
82 
Prizren 18-Oct 
Director of Economy 
and Finance Prizren Municipality 
83 
Ferizaj 19-Oct 
Manager, Tax 
Compliance Dept.  
Ferizaj Municipality 
84 
Ferizaj 19-Oct 
Director, Economy & 
Tourism 
Ferizaj Municipality 
85 
Gjakova 21-Oct 
Volunteer, Local Civil 
Society 
Gjakova Veterans 
Association 
86 
Gjakova 21-Oct Mayor of Gjakova  Gjakova Municipality 
87 
Pristina 21-Oct Executive Director 
Kosovar Civil Society 
Foundation 
88 
Pristina 24-Oct 
International 
Organization 
UNMIK Senior Program 
Officer for Minorites  
89 
Pristina 24-Oct Economics Professor University of Pristina 
90 
Pristina 25-Oct Economics Professor 
University of Pristina 
(cancelled/email only) 
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Appendix 2: Camp Bondsteel/Camp Prizren Questions 
• How was the site for this Camp selected? Why were JA base/other facilities selected?  
 
• Was the labor for construction/repairs made up of military personnel or people from 
the local area? A combination? Skilled or unskilled?  
 
• Were there construction companies after the war, if so, what was the any system of 
selection?  
 
• Where did construction companies usually come from (local, Pristina, out of Kosovo)?  
 
• Following the groundworks and rough construction, if the laborers were civilians, where 
did they go when they were finished?  
 
• Were building materials (quarried gravel, concrete mix, lumber) for the base or local 
use purchased locally or brought in? What was the vendor selection process?  
 
• Were construction equipment/generators/furnishings purchased locally/in Kosovo, or 
imported? 
 
• Small businesses often open near a military base to service military and civilians 
working there - did this also occur near this base? If so, what sort of businesses? Did 
civilians not working on the base use them?  
 
• It is very common for a rapid increase of outsiders (returnees, neighboring countries, 
etc.) to arrive at a base construction site to take advantage of economic opportunities. 
Was this noticed here? If so, did the outsiders compete or displace the local people. 
What happened? 
 
• It is very common for illicit businesses to spring up in response to the increase in local 
income, especially after conflict, and the arrival of peacekeepers such as KFOR, NATO 
and UN. Was an increase in crime, including prostitution and drugs, noticed near the 
base? How did people find out; who was likely to participate?  
